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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision In re Gault I trans-
formed the juvenile court into a very different institution than that
envisioned by its Progressive creators. 2 Judicial and legislative ef-
forts to harmonize the juvenile court with Gault's constitutional
mandate have modified the purposes, processes, and operations of
the juvenile justice system. The Progressives envisioned a proce-
durally informal court with individualized, offender-oriented dispo-
sitional practices. The Supreme Court's various due process
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S
JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 155 (1978); Feld, Criminalizing JuvenileJustice: Rules of Proce-
durefor the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-42 (1984). See infra notes 13-17.
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decisions engrafted procedural formality onto the juvenile court's
traditional, individualized-treatment sentencing schema. 3 Increas-
ingly, as the contemporary juvenile court departs from its original
model, it procedurally and substantively resembles adult criminal
courts.
4
Central to the "criminalized" juvenile court is the presence and
role of defense counsel. Gault held thatjuvenile offenders were con-
stitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings because "a proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be delinquent' and subjected to
the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution." 5 The Court in Gault also decided thatjuveniles
were entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to confront and cross-examine their accusers at a hearing.6 Without
the assistance of counsel, these other rights could be lost as well.7
"The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, [and] to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings .... The child 'requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.' "8 In
subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has reiterated the crucial
role of counsel in the juvenile justice process. 9
In the two decades since Gault, the promise of counsel remains
unrealized. Although there is a scarcity of data in many states, in-
cluding Minnesota, less than fifty percent of juveniles adjudicated
3 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (procedural due process). See infra note 32.
4 Feld, supra note 2, at 272-75; Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal", 65 MINN. L. REv. 167, 222-24
(1981) [hereinafter Dismantling Rehabilitative Ideal]; Feld,Juvenile Court Meets Principle of Of-
fense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. (1988) (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter Punishment, Treatment].
5 Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
6 Id. at 55, 57.
7 See Guggenheim, The Right to be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Repre-
sentation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 86-87 (1984). Professor Guggenheim con-
tends that Gault reflects the Court's commitment to personal legal rights and individual
autonomy and that the rights afforded in Gault can only be implemented if the youth has
the power to direct his or her own counsel. Id. at 86-87. To allow the child's attorney to
substitute his or her version of the child's "best interests" would simply "replace the
paternalism of the state with the paternalism of the lawyer" which would be contrary to
the basic rationale of Gault. Id. at 87.
8 Gault, 387 U.S. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
9 In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the Court noted that "the lawyer occu-
pies a critical position in our legal system .... Whether it is a minor or an adult who
stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the
protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the
courts." Id. at 719.
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delinquent receive the assistance of counsel to which they are con-
stitutionally entitled.' 0 Although national statistics are not avail-
able, surveys of representation by counsel in several jurisdictions
suggest that "there is reason to think that lawyers still appear much
less often than might have been expected."" The most comprehen-
sive study to date reports that in half of the six states surveyed, only
37.5%, 47.7%, and 52.7% of the juveniles were represented.' 2
This Article analyzes variations in rates of representation and
the impact of counsel in juvenile delinquency and status proceed-
ings in Minnesota in 1986. These statistical analyses provide the
first statewide examination of the circumstances under which law-
yers are appointed to represent juveniles, the case characteristics as-
sociated with rates of representation, and the effects of
representation on case processing and dispositions. Part of these
analyses treat the availability and role of counsel as a dependent va-
riable using case characteristics and court processing factors as in-
dependent variables effecting rates of representation. Other parts
treat the presence of counsel as an independent variable, assessing
lawyers' impact on juvenile court case processing and dispositions.
Taken together, they provide the most comprehensive analyses
available on the role of counsel in contemporary juvenile justice ad-
ministration. These analyses attempt to answer the interrelated
questions regarding when lawyers are appointed to represent
juveniles, why they are appointed, and what differences does it make
whether or not a youth is represented?
II. THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
A. THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE COURT-PROCEDURAL INFORMALITY
AND INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS
The social history of the juvenile court is an oft-told tale.'3
10 Feld, supra note 2, at 187-90; Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of
the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINO. 393, 400-02 (1988)[hereinafter
In re Gault Revisited]. Although juveniles have a constitutional right to representation,
the low rates of representation reflect the fact that the right to counsel may be waived.
See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
11 D. HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 185 (1977).
12 Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 401, Table 2 and, accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2; E. RYERSON, supra note 2; Feld, supra note 2. See
also, L. EMPEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS
(1979);J. INVERARITY, P. LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PER-
SPECIiVES ON CRIMINAL LAW 173 (1983); A. PLATr, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920 (1977); J. SUT-
TON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELIQUENCY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981
(1988); Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile
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Changes in the structure and functions of families and a newer cul-
tural conception of childhood accompanied economic moderniza-
tion. 14  Rapid industrialization, immigration, and urbanization
fostered the Progressive movement, many of whose programs
shared a unifying child-centered theme.' 5
The Progressives introduced a variety of criminal justice re-
forms at the turn of the century-probation, parole, indeterminate
sentences, and the juvenile court-all of which emphasized open-
ended, informal, and highly flexible policies to rehabilitate the devi-
ant.16 Discretionary decision-making pervaded Progressive criminal
Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) [hereinafter Principle of Offense];
Fox,Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
14 Economic modernization and industrialization are examined in: S. HAYS, THE RE-
SPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914 (1957); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:
FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATIVISM: A REIN-
TERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963); D. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN:
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM (1977); J. WEINSTEIN,
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
Changes in family structure and function are analyzed in: C. DEGLER, AT ODDS:
WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178-209
(1980); J. DEMOS & S. BOOCOCK, TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL Es-
SAYS ON THE FAMILY (1978);J. KErr, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790
TO THE PRESENT (1977); C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BE-
SIEGED 6-10 (1977); S. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING
IDEALS AND PRACTICES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN FAMILY (1975). Demographic changes in the numbers and spacing of children
and a shift of economic functions from the family to other work environments altered
the roles of women and children. Especially within the upper and middle classes, a more
modem conception of childhood emerged in which children were perceived as corrupti-
ble innocents whose upbringing required greater physical, social, and moral structure
than had previously been regarded as prerequisite to adulthood. The family, particu-
larly women, assumed a greater role in supervising a child's moral and social develop-
ment. The modernization of the family and the changing conception of childhood are
analyzed in: P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962);J. GILLIS, YOUTH AND HISTORY:
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN AGE RELATIONS 1770-PRESENT (1974); J. HAWES
AND N. HINER, AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK
(1985); D. HUNT, PARENTS AND CHILDREN IN HISTORY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAMILY LIFE
IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE (1970); B. WISHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC (1968);
DeMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 4 (L. DeMause ed.
1974).
15 The changing cultural conception of childhood informed the Progressives' poli-
cies embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor laws, child welfare laws, and com-
pulsory school attendance laws. See, e.g., L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876-1957 (1961); L. EMPEY, JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (1979); J. KErr, supra
note 14; S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRES-
SIVE ERA (1982); W. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM (1970); R. WIEBE, supra note 14.
16 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 206-7; Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 25-27 (1964); Rothman, The State as Parent: Social
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justice reforms, because diagnosing the causes of and prescribing
the cures for delinquency required an individualized approach
which precluded uniform treatment or standardized criteria. 17
The juvenile court movement attempted to remove children
from the adult criminal justice and corrections systems and to pro-
vide them with individualized treatment in a separate system of their
own. The Progressives envisioned juvenile court professionals us-
ing indeterminate procedures to achieve benevolent goals and so-
cial uplift by substituting a scientific and preventative approach for
the traditional punitive purposes of the criminal law.18 Under the
guise of parens patriae, an emphasis on treatment, supervision, and
control, rather than punishment, the state could intervene affirma-
tively in the lives of more young offenders.19 Thus, the juvenile
court's status jurisdiction encompassed behaviors that previously
might have been ignored. 20
In separating children from adult offenders, the juvenile court
also rejected the jurisprudence and procedures of criminal prosecu-
tions. Progressive reformers modified courtroom procedures to
eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding and sometimes
Policy in the Progressive Era, in DOING GOOD: THE LIMrrs OF BENEVOLENCE 67 (D. Roth-
man ed. 1978).
17 The Progressives' reformulation of criminal justice strategies reflected basic
changes in the ideological assumptions about the sources of crime and deviance. Posi-
tivism-the effort to identify the antecedent variables that cause crime and deviance-
challenged the classic formulations of crime as the product of free will choices. D.
MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr 5 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 50-51; Allen,
Legal Values, supra note 16, at 28.
The new criminology, as distinguished from the old "free will," regarded deviance
as determined and sought to identify the causes of crime and delinquency. Attributing
criminal behavior to external forces rather than to deliberately chosen misconduct re-
duced an actor's moral responsibility for crime and focused efforts on the reform of the
offender rather than the punishment of the offense. The conjunction of positivistic
criminology, analogies to the medical profession in the treatment of criminals, and the
growth of new social science professionals gave rise to the "Rehabilitative Ideal." F.
ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE
11-15 (1981)[hereinafter DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL]; Allen, supra note 16, at
25-27 (1964); Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 150-51 (1978).
18 A. PL.xrT, supra note 13, at 67-74; E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 36-37; Fox, supra
note 13, at 1207-30; Mack, supra note 13, at 106-07.
19 See, e.g., Exparte Grouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838); CoganJuvenile Law, Before and After
the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. REV. 147, 181 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Pa-
triae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 207-10 (1971).
20 Youthful activities such as smoking, sexuality, truancy, immorality, stubbornness,
vagrancy, or living a wayward, idle, and dissolute life authorized pre-delinquent inter-
vention to enforce the dependent conditions of youth and supervise their moral up-
bringing. See, e.g., A. PIA-rr, THE CHILDSAVERS, supra note 13, at 135; Schlossman &
Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48
HARV. EDUC. REV. 65, 70, 81 (1978).
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conducted proceedings in a physically separate court building.2 ' To
avoid stigmatizing a youth, hearings were confidential, access to
court records limited, a euphemistic vocabulary was introduced, and
courts found children to be delinquent rather than guilty of com-
mitting a crime. Since the important issues in juvenile court pro-
ceedings were the child's background and welfare rather than the
details surrounding the commission of a specific crime, juries and
lawyers were excluded almost universally and with them rules of evi-
dence and formal procedures. 22
From its inception, juvenile court judges were actively hostile to
the presence of lawyers in delinquency proceedings:
Although judges could not banish a lawyer from the courtroom alto-
gether, they did not consider his presence either appropriate or neces-
sary. Minnesota juvenile court judge Grier Orr boasted that in his
courtroom "the lawyers do not do very much.., and I do not believe I
can recall any instance where the same attorney came back a second
time; he found that it was useless for him to appear.., for an attorney
has not very much standing when it comes to the disposition of chil-
dren in the juvenile court." 23
Juvenile court judges regarded lawyers as both irrelevant and an im-
pediment to their "childsaving" mission. At the time of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gault, juvenile court judges still rou-
tinely discouraged the retention or appointment of counsel. 24
21 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 218; E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 48-50; PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 92 (1967)[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
22 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 216.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Note,Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79
HARv. L. REV. 775 (1966), in which the authors report that:
[i]n the court itself, the parent's inquiry as to whether a lawyer is needed is often
answered with the statement "that is a decision you must make for yourself," cou-
pled with a reminder that if an attorney is to be retained the proceedings will have
to be continued to another date (with the resulting inconvenience). Moreover, par-
ents who are told by the judge that he is willing to proceed immediately and will
make every effort himself to ensure that the rights of the child are protected may
well fear that to bring in an attorney would be an implicit insult to the judge, an
especially unattractive prospect when the judge has such wide discretion in making
decisions.
Id. at 796-97. See also Ferster, Courtless, and Snethen, TheJuvenile Justice System: In Search
of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 379 (1971) (examples of incomplete and
prejudicial notice of right to counsel); Handler, Juvenile Court and The Adversary System,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 32 n.86 (quoting CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMM'N
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT, Pt. II, at 13 (1960)) ("Many judges discourage the pres-
ence of counsel in their courts in an effort to reduce the time devoted to the juvenile
court assignment .... Some courts believe that attorneys have no place in the juvenile
court and use coercive means to discourage their presence."); Lefstein, Stapleton & Tei-
telbaum, In Search ofJuvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAw & Soc'y REV. 491,
511-12 (1969) (colloquies between judges and juveniles that purported to advise the
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The Progressives expected expert judges, assisted by social
services personnel, to investigate the child's background, identify
the sources of the misconduct, and develop a treatment plan to
meet the child's needs. Juvenile court personnel enjoyed enormous
discretion to make dispositions in the "best interests of the child."
Principles of psychology and social work, rather than formal rules,
guided decision makers. They collected as much information as
possible about the child-his or her life history, character, social en-
vironment, and individual circumstances-on the assumption that a
scientific analysis of those facts would reveal the proper diagnosis
and prescribe the cure. The specific offense that a child committed
was accorded minor significance in the overall inquiry, because it
indicated little about a child's "real" needs. At hearings and dispo-
sitions, the court considered first and foremost the child's character
and lifestyle. Dispositions were indeterminate, nonproportional,
and continued for the duration of minority.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT-
PROCEDURAL FORMALITY AND INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDER-
ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS
The Supreme Court's Gault decision, which mandated proce-
dural safeguards in the adjudication of delinquency, focused judicial
attention initially on the determination of legal guilt or innocence.
Following its "constitutional domestication," no longer was "sav-
ing" an offender's "soul" at issue, but rather proof of his commis-
sion of a criminal offense as a prelude to sentencing or, in the
euphemisms ofjuvenile justice, disposition. In so doing, Gault fun-
damentally altered the operation of the juvenile court.
In Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile court
and the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to
juveniles: that the proceedings were not adversarial; that delin-
quency proceedings were civil, not criminal; and that when the state
acted as parens patriae, a child was entitled not to liberty, but to cus-
tody.25 In rejecting these assertions, the Court observed that "un-
bridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
youths of their right to counsel but that were delivered in a manner designed to discour-
age the assertion of that right); Rubin,Juvenile Court's Search for Identity and Responsibility,
23 CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 5 (1977) (juvenile courts still actively discourage youths from
exercising their right to counsel through a variety of approaches and with a variety of
motivations).
25 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17. The Court recently revived the idea that juveniles
are entitled "not to liberty but to custody." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)
(preventive detention ofjuveniles is constitutional in part because of their lesser liberty
interests). See Feld, supra note 2, at 191-209.
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poor substitute for principle and procedure" and concluded that the
denial of procedures frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than
"careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. ' 26 Although the
Court hoped to retain the potential benefits of the juvenile process,
it insisted that the claims of "the juvenile [court] process should be
candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause us
to shut our eyes" to the realities of recidivism, the failures of reha-
bilitation, the stigma of a "delinquency" label, the breaches of confi-
dentiality, the conditions of institutional confinement, and the
arbitrariness of the process. 27
Several features of the juvenile justice process were critical to
the imposition of procedural safeguards and the right to counsel in
Gault: the fact that juveniles were being adjudicated delinquent for
behavior that would be criminal if committed by adults; the attend-
ant stigma of delinquency/criminal convictions; and the realities of
juvenile institutional confinement. 28 These realities motivated the
Court in Gault to mandate elementary procedural safeguards: the
right to advance notice of charges; a fair and impartial hearing; the
right to the assistance of counsel, including opportunities to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses; and the protections of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 29
Despite its critical dicta, the Supreme Court did not consider
the entire juvenile justice process, its jurisdictional reach, or its dis-
positional practices, but confined its decision narrowly to the adjudi-
catory hearing at which a child is determined to be a delinquent.30
It noted that the unique procedures for processing and treating
juveniles separately from adults would not be impaired by its proce-
dural decisions.3 1 The Court asserted, however, that the procedural
safeguards associated with the adversarial process were essential
both to the determination of truth and the preservation of individ-
ual freedom through limitations on the power of the state.32
26 Gault, 387 U.S. at 18.
27 Id. at 21.
28 Id. at 27-28. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
29 See id. at 31-57.
30 Id. at 13. See McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Courts: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1981); Rosenberg, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a Return to the .Vot So Distant Past, 27
UCLA L. REv. 656, 662-63 (1980).
31 Gault, 387 U.S. at 21.
32 Id. at 49-50. The dual functions of procedural safeguards-factual accuracy and
preventing governmental oppression-are most clearly exemplified by the Court's hold-
ing that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to delinquency adjudications. Id.
See Feld, supra note 2, at 154-56 nn.46-47 (While the "voluntariness" test assures the
factual reliability of confessions, the fifth amendment preserves the balance between the
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The Gault Court based its decision to grant juveniles the right
individual and the state.); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-67 (1967) (procedural due process ensures the
reliability of the guilt-determining process and ensures respect for the dignity of the
individual). By recognizing the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination,
juvenile adjudications could no longer be characterized as either "non-criminal" or as
"non-adversarial," because the fifth amendment privilege is both the guarantor of an
adversarial process and the primary mechanism for maintaining a balance between the
state and the individual. Compare Gault, 387 U.S. at 50 (1967) (policies of fifthi amend-
ment entail more than reliability of confessions and focus on equality between the indi-
vidual and the state) with Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) ("The Court in Gault
was obviously persuaded that the State intended to punish its juvenile offenders ... 
(emphasis in original).
In subsequent juvenile court decisions, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the
procedural and functional equivalence between criminal and delinquency proceedings.
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court decided that proof of delinquency must
be established "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than by the lower civil standards of
proof. Id. at 368. in holding that this highest standard of proof was required, the Court
emphasized that not only was the reasonable doubt standard the primary instrument to
reduce the risk of conviction based on factual errors, but also an important constraint on
governmental overreaching. Id. at 363-64. The seriousness of the consequences in both
the adult and juvenile contexts required the highest standard of proof. Id. at 363-67.
Similarly, in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court held that the protec-
tions of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibited adult criminal re-
prosecution of a youth after a prior conviction in juvenile court. Id. at 541. The Court
posited a functional equivalence between an adult criminal trial and a delinquency pro-
ceeding, describing the virtually identical interests implicated in both-"anxiety and in-
security," a "heavy personal strain" and the increased burdens as the juvenile system
became more procedurally formalized. Id. at 528-29. In light of the potential conse-
quences of a delinquency proceeding, the Court concluded that there was little basis to
distinguish it from a traditional adult criminal prosecution. Id. at 530.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (197 1), the Court halted the extension of
full procedural parity with adult criminal prosecutions by denying a constitutional right
to jury trials in state delinquency proceedings. It held that the only requirement for
"fundamental fairness" in juvenile proceedings is "accurate fact-finding" and asserted
that this could be performed as well by a judge as by a jury. Id. at 543. In suggesting
that due process in the juvenile context required nothing more than accurate fact-find-
ing, however, the Court departed significantly from its own prior analyses of the dual
functions of juvenile court procedures, because those earlier decisions were premised
on two rationales-accurate fact-finding and protection against governmental oppres-
sion. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; Gault, 387 U.S. at 47; Feld, Reference ofJuvenile
Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62
MINN. L. REV. 515, 601-07 (1978)[hereinafter Reference ofJuvenile Offenders].
Justice Brennan's separate opinion in McKeiver notes that protection from govern-
mental oppression is a fundamental element of procedural justice, but one which might
be afforded by an alternative method, such as a public trial that would render the adjudi-
cative process visible and accountable to the community. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553-
55 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., Feld, supra note 2, at
158-60, 262-66. Its insistence that accurate fact-finding was the only concern of funda-
mental fairness required the McKeiver Court to ignore its own analysis in Gault which
held that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was necessary in or-
der to protect against governmental oppression even though accurate fact-finding might
be impeded. See, Feld, supra note 2, at 154-57 nn.46-47.
The McKeiver Court, however, denied that protection against government oppres-
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to counsel on the fourteenth amendment due process clause, rather
than the sixth amendment, asserting that as a matter of due process
"the assistance of counsel is . . .essential for the determination of
delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of incarceration
in a state institution .... ,,33 The Gault Court's holding was strongly
influenced by the recommendations of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration ofJustice 34 that in or-
der to assure procedural justice, the appointment of counsel is nec-
essary "wherever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring
any affirmative choice by child or parent. '3 5 While Gault recognized
that the presence of lawyers would make juvenile court proceedings
more formal and adversarial, it asserted that their presence would
impart "a healthy atmosphere of accountability." ' 36 Although the
President's Crime Commission recommended the automatic ap-
pointment of counsel whenever coercive action by the juvenile court
was possible, Gault's actual holding was narrower, requiring only
that "the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right
to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable
to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the
child." 37
sion was required at all. Id. at 547-48. Invoking the mythology of the sympathetic, pa-
ternalistic juvenile court judge, the Court rejected the argument that the inbred, closed
nature of the juvenile court could prejudice the accuracy of fact-finding. According to
the Court, concern about procedural safeguards, such as jury trials, to assure accurate
fact-finding and protection against governmental oppression, ignores the benevolence
and compassion which is the premise of the juvenile court. Id. at 550-51.
33 Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37.
34 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 21.
35 Gault, 387 U.S. at 38. The Court quoted extensively from the Commission's Re-
port, stating:
no single action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child
in the juvenile court than provision of counsel. The presence of an independent
legal representative of the child, or of his parent, is the keystone of the whole struc-
ture of guarantees that a minimum system of procedural justice requires. The
rights to confront one's accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence
and testimony of one's own, to be unaffected by prejudicial and unreliable evidence,
to participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision, to take an appeal have sub-
stantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of persons brought before the juve-
nile court only if they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those
rights effectively.
Id. at 38 n.65.
36 Id. While conceding that lawyers would make juvenile court proceedings more
formal and adversarial, the Court asserted that this was desirable, because "[i]nformality
is often abused." Id.
37 Id. at 41. The Gault opinion is unclear regarding whether the various rights af-
forded juveniles attach because of the possibility of institutional commitment, see id. at
13, or if they attach only when the youth is actually committed to a state correctional
facility. See id. at 36-37, 41, 44, 49, 56, 57. In its holding regarding the right to counsel,
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In granting the right to counsel, Gault manifested the Warren
Court's belief that the adversary process could protect constitu-
tional rights and limit the coercive powers of the state, which, in
turn, would assure the regularity of law enforcement and reduce the
need for continual judicial scrutiny.38 Thus, Gault was a specific in-
stance of the Warren Court's general broadening of the right to
counsel to preserve individual liberty and autonomy.3 9
The Gault Court quoted favorably from its 1932 decision in
Powell v. Alabama,40 the first decision to hold that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause required the appointment of coun-
sel in some state criminal proceedings. 41 In a number of sub-
sequent decisions, the Court elaborated on the "special
circumstances" of a particular case that required the appointment of
counsel. 42 In Gideon v. Wainwright,43 the Warren Court finally held
that the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel applied to state
felony criminal proceedings as well as to prosecutions in federal
courts. 44 "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."'45
for example, the Court stated that the notification was required in "proceedings to de-
termine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juve-
nile's freedom is curtailed." Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Every delinquency proceeding
carries with it the formal possibility of institutional confinement, because there are no
explicit limitations on the dispositional authority of a juvenile court judge. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (West 1986). Many commentators adopt the broader con-
struction that it is the possibility, not the actuality, of incarceration that triggers the
right. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 662-63 (1980) (constitutional protections
should attach in proceedings that may result in incarceration of a child).
38 See Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and The Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 518, 530-3 1; Goodpaster, On the Theory ofAmerican Adversary Crimi-
nal Trial, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 125 (1987); Handler, supra note 24, at 7.
39 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also, Guggenheim, supra
note 7, at 89 ("These [due process] rights are ultimately bottomed on the constitutional
interest in personal autonomy.").
40 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
41 Id. at 71.
42 Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (fundamental fairness may require
appointment of counsel under "special circumstances") with Chewning v. Cunningham,
368 U.S. 443 (1962) ("potential prejudice" of a complex statute is a "special circum-
stance" requiring appointment of counsel). See generally, Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The
"Art" Of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211; Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The
Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962).
43 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. InJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court had
earlier held that the sixth amendment required the appointment of counsel in all federal
cases in which a defendant was unable to afford counsel and the right to counsel had not
been intentionally and competently waived. Id. at 468.
45 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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In Argersinger v. Hamlin,46 the Court considered whether an indi-
gent defendant who was charged with and imprisoned for a minor
offense was entitled to the appointment of counsel. In Argersinger,
the Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor or felony unless he was represented by coun-
sel."'47 Because Argersinger was actually imprisoned, it was unclear
whether the line the Court drew for the right to appointed counsel
was based on the type of charge-felony or misdemeanor-and the
penalty authorized, or on the actual sentence imposed. In Scott v.
Illinois,48 the Court clarified any ambiguity when it held that in mis-
demeanor proceedings, the sentence the trial judge actually im-
posed, i.e., whether incarceration was ordered, rather than the one
authorized by the statute, determined whether counsel must be ap-
pointed for the indigent.49 Basing the initial decision to appoint
counsel on the eventual sentence, however, poses severe adminis-
trative problems. How could a judge decide what the eventual sen-
tence likely would be without prejudging the defendant or
prejudicing his right to a fair and impartial trial?
In State v. Borst,50 the Minnesota Supreme Court, using its in-
herent supervisory powers, anticipated the United States Supreme
Court's Argersinger and Scott decisions, and shortly after Gideon re-
quired the appointment of counsel even in misdemeanor cases
"which may lead to incarceration in a penal institution." 5 1 The Borst
Court relied, in part, upon Gault's ruling on the need for counsel in
delinquency cases to expand the scope of the right to counsel for
adult defendants in any misdemeanor or ordinance prosecutions
that could result in confinement. 52 Like the Court in Gault, Borst
recognized the adversarial reality of even "minor" prosecutions.
[T]he possible loss of liberty by an innocent person charged with a
misdemeanor, who does not know how to defend himself, is too sacred
a right to be sacrificed on the altar of expedience. Any society that can
afford a professional prosecutor to prosecute this type of crime must
assume the burden of providing adequate defense, to the end that in-
nocent people will not be convicted without having facilities available
46 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
47 Id. at 37.
48 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
49 Id. at 369.
50 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
51 Id. at 397, 154 N.W.2d at 894 (emphasis added). Accord City of St. Paul v. Whidby,
295 Minn. 129, 203 N.W.2d 823 (1972) (municipal ordinance); State v. Collins, 278
Minn. 437, 154 N.W.2d 688 (1967) (ordinance violation); State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn.
434, 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967) (ordinance violation).
52 Borsi, 278 Minn. at 392-93, 154 N.W.2d at 891.
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to properly present a defense.53
Scott addressed the scope of the sixth amendment's right to
counsel in minor cases in state criminal proceedings. Because Gault
decided the question of a juvenile's right to counsel under the four-
teenth amendment due process clause rather than the sixth amend-
ment, the constitutional argument remains that "special
circumstances" require the appointment of counsel even in minor
non-incarceration cases in which a juvenile may be unable to pre-
pare an adequate defense because of the inherent disabilities of
youth, substandard intelligence, or the complexities of the particu-
lar case.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GAULT RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
When Gault was decided, the presence of an attorney in delin-
quency proceedings-was a rare event.5 4 In the immediate aftermath
of Gault, states that had not previously provided for counsel in juve-
nile court amended their statutes to do so.5 5 Despite the formal
legal changes, however, the actual delivery of legal services to
juveniles lagged behind. Professors Lefstein, Stapleton, and Teitel-
baum examined institutional compliance with the Gault decision and
found that many juveniles were neither adequately advised of their
right to counsel nor had counsel appointed for them.5 6 In a more
recent evaluation of legal representation in North Carolina, Profes-
sors Clarke and Koch found that the Juvenile Defender Project rep-
resented only 22.3% ofjuveniles in Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
and only 45.8% in Charlotte, North Carolina.5 7 Aday found rates of
representation of 26.27 and 38.7% in the two counties of the juris-
diction he studied.58 Professor Bortner's evaluation of a large, mid-
western county's juvenile court showed that "[o]ver half (58.2
percent) [the juveniles] were not represented by an attorney." 5 9
53 Id. at 397, 154 N.W.2d at 894-95.
54 See Note, supra note 24, 796-99 (attorneys appear for the juveniles in no more than
five percent of the cases).
55 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317 (West 1984); COL. REV. STAT.
§ 19.1.106(1) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B.135(a) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31.6.7.2
(West 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43.21.201 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35.2
(Baldwin 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.140(2) (1988).
56 Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 517-24, 530-37.
57 Clarke & Koch,Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a Differ-
ence?, 14 LAW & Soc'y REV. 263, 297 (1980).
58 Aday, Court Structure, Defense Attorney Use, and Juvenile Court Decisions 27 Soc. Q. 107,
112, 114 (1986).




Evaluations of rates of representation in Minnesota also indicate
that a majority of youths are unrepresented. 60 Professor Feld re-
ported enormous county-by-county variations within Minnesota in
rates of representation, ranging from a high of over 90% to a low of
less than 10%.61 A substantial minority of youths removed from
their homes or confined in state juvenile correctional institutions
lacked representation at the time of their adjudication and disposi-
tion. 62 Significant numbers of unrepresented juveniles continue to
be incarcerated in other jurisdictions as well. 63
There are a variety of possible explanations for why so many
youths are still unrepresented: parental reluctance to retain an at-
torney; 64 inadequate or non-existent public-defender legal services
in nonurban areas; a judicial encouragement of and readiness to
find a waiver of the right to counsel in order to ease administrative
burdens on the courts;65 cursory and misleading judicial advisories
of rights that inadequately convey the importance of the right to
counsel and suggest that the waiver litany is simply a meaningless
technicality; a continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in
traditional treatment-oriented courts; 66 or a judicial predetermina-
60 K. FINE, OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN MINNESOTA: A RESEARCH RE-
PORT 48 (1983); Feld, supra note 2, at 189; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 400.
61 Feld, supra note 2, at 190 n.162.
62 Id. at 189.
63 See Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 403-05.
64 When parents can afford to retain counsel but do not do so and counsel is ap-
pointed for the child at public expense, the county may seek reimbursement for the
expenses and attorney's fees expended on behalf of the child. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.251(4) (West 1984) ("[T]he court may inquire into the ability of the parents to pay
for such counsel's services and, after giving the parents a reasonable opportunity to be
heard, may order the parents to pay attorney's fees."). In some cases, reimbursement
may be considerable. See, e.g., In re Welfare of M'I.S.MV., 387 N.W.2d 194, 200 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (reimbursement was $3,191).
65 See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text. See generally Feld, supra note 2, at 169-
190.
66 For example, in In re Welfare of M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987),
the trial court summarily dismissed a juvenile's court appointed attorney for appealing
its decision. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal noting that "[t]his kind of arbi-
trary action can have no other but a chilling effect on conscientious advocacy. To dis-
charge an attorney without just cause simply because he or she challenges the court by
seeking a writ of prohibition or appeal is manifestly improper." Id. at 152. L. STAPLE-
TON AND V. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS (1972), described the problem of integrating counsel into
traditional juvenile court settings:
[e]mpirical studies show what is to be expected-traditional courts and personnel
are reluctant to adapt themselves to the new procedures now required by the due
process clause, particularly as they imply injection of elements of an adversary sys-
tem into juvenile court proceedings. This, taken with the increasing appearance of
counsel in juvenile court proceedings, undoubtedly will have consequences for the
manner of legal representation. An attorney in traditional courts will find himself
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tion of dispositions with nonappointment of counsel where proba-
tion or nonincarceration is the anticipated outcome. 67 Whatever the
reasons and despite Gault's promise of counsel, many juveniles fac-
ing potentially coercive state action never see a lawyer, waive their
right to counsel without consulting with an attorney or appreciating
the legal consequences of relinquishing counsel, and face the
prosecutorial power of the state alone and unaided.
The most common explanation for nonrepresentation is waiver
of counsel. In most jurisdictions, including Minnesota, the validity
of relinquishing a constitutional right is determined by assessing
whether there was a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver"
under the "totality of the circumstances." 68 The judicial position
that a young minor can "knowingly and intelligently" waive consti-
tutional rights is consistent with the Minnesota legislature's judg-
ment that a youth can make an informed waiver decision without
parental concurrence or consultation with an attorney. 69
The right to waive counsel and appear as apro se defendant fol-
lows from the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v.
Zerbst 70 and Faretta v. California.71 In Faretta, the Court held that an
adult defendant in a state criminal trial had a constitutional right to
proceed without counsel when he or she voluntarily and intelli-
gently elects to do so. 72 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
within a legal system that still considers itself non-adversary and seeks to serve goals
not usually associated with other branches of law. It is only reasonable to anticipate
that he will face formal and informal pressures to conform his manner of participa-
tion in delinquency hearings to the values of these courts-for example, to be less
of an advocate for the child's best interests.
Id. at 38.
67 M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 136-147; V. STAPLETON & L. TErrELBAUM, supra note
66, at 63-69; Feld, supra note 2 at 190; Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24,
at 530.
68 See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (juvenile's waiver of Miranda right
to counsel);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of counsel); In re M.D.S., 345
N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1984); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1980) (juvenile's
waiver of Miranda rights); In re L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); MINN. R.
P.Juv. CT. 6.01, 15.02(1), 15.03. See generally, Feld, supra note 2, at 169-90.
69 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(8) (West 1982) ("Waiver of any right... must be
an express waiver intelligently made by the child after the child has been fully and effec-
tively informed of the right being waived.").
70 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
71 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
72 Id. at 820. The Faretta Court emphasized that the sixth amendment guarantees
defendants the "assistance of counsel." It stated that:
[i]t speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an
assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that coun-
sel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a
willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling de-
fendant and his right to defend himself personally.
Id. The Farella Court noted, however, that in order to represent himself, the waiver of
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validity of a minor's waiver of the right to counsel in delinquency
proceedings as such, although it upheld a minor's waiver of the Mi-
randa right to counsel at the pretrial investigative stage under the
"totality of the circumstances. ' 73
While recognizing an adult defendant's Faretta right to waive
counsel and proceed pro se, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
strongly encouraged trial courts to appoint stand-by counsel to as-
sist a defendant at trial and temporary counsel to consult with a de-
fendant prior to the entry of a guilty plea.7 4 In State v. Rubin,75 the
court described the type of "penetrating and comprehensive exami-
nation" that must precede a "knowing and intelligent" waiver and
strongly recommended the appointment of counsel "to advise and
consult with the defendant as to the waiver." 76 In several earlier
adult cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed defendants'
convictions where their mental competency or youthfulness and be-
low average intelligence raised an issue about their capacity to
knowingly and intelligently waive the assistance of counsel.77
The crucial issue for juveniles, as for adults, is whether such a
waiver can occur "voluntarily and intelligently," particularly without
prior consultation with counsel. The problem is particularly acute
when the judges giving the judicial advisories seek a predetermined
result-the waiver of counsel-which influences both the informa-
tion they convey and their interpretation of the juvenile's re-
sponse.78 The "totality" approach to waiver of rights by juveniles
counsel must be "knowing and intelligent." Id. at 835. Accord Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-
65. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) (plurality opinion) (judge
must provide defendant with extensive information to assure that waiver is informed).
73 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979). See generally, Feld, supra note 2, at
171.
74 See State v. Rubin, 409 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Minn. 1987) ("[A] trial court may not
accept a guilty plea to a felony or gross misdemeanor charge made by an unrepresented
defendant if the defendant has not consulted with counsel about waiving counsel and
pleading guilty."); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. 1977) ("One way for a
trial court to help ensure that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent
would be to provide a lawyer to consult with the defendant concerning his proposed
waiver .... "). See also State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1978) (standby counsel
available to and did consult with defendant throughout proceedings and participated
occasionally on defendant's behalf).
75 409 N.W.2d 504 (Minn. 1987).
76 Id. at 506. See also ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES, § 5-7.3 (1980); MINN. R. CRIM. P. § 5.02(1).
77 See Burt, 256 N.W.2d at 636 (petitioner was "18 years old, had only a tenth grade
education and [low scores on I.Q. tests,] suggesting strongly that petitioner was of con-
siderably lower than average intelligence."); State v. Bauer, 310 Minn. 103, 125-26, 245
N.W.2d 848, 860 (1976) (defendant's mental condition impaired competence to waive
counsel).
78 See In reJohn D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1178 (R.I. 1984) ("[E]xceptional efforts must be
1202 [Vol. 79
1989] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
has been criticized extensively. 79 Empirical research suggests that
juveniles simply are not as competent as adults to waive their rights
in a "knowing and intelligent" manner.80 Professor Grisso reports
that the problems of understanding and waiving rights were particu-
larly acute for younger juveniles:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehen-
sion .... The vast majority of these juveniles misunderstood at least
one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with
adults, demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension of the na-
ture and significance of the Miranda rights. 8 1
Grisso also reported that although "juveniles younger than fifteen
manifest significantly poorer comprehension than adults of compa-
rable intelligence," the level of comprehension exhibited by youths
sixteen and older, although comparable to that of adults, was inade-
quate.82 While several jurisdictions recognize this "developmental
fact" and prohibit uncounselled waivers of the right to counsel or
incarceration of unrepresented delinquents,8 3 the majority of states,
including Minnesota, allow juveniles to waive their Miranda rights as
well as their right to counsel in delinquency proceedings without an
attorney's assistance.8 4
The questionable validity of many juveniles' waivers of the right
to counsel raises collateral legal issues as well. In light of Scott, Borst,
Burt, and Rubin, the initial confinement of an unrepresented juvenile
made in order to be certain that an uncounselledjuvenile fully understands the nature
and consequences of his admission of delinquency.").
79 See Feld, supra note 2, at 170-185; Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1140 (1980); Comment, Juvenile
Confessions: Whether State Procedures Ensure Constitutionally Permissible Confessions, 67 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 201 (1976). See generally, Y. KAMISAR, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41-76
(1980).
80 See T. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPE-
TENCE 170-82 (1981)[hereinafterJUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS]; Ferguson & Douglas, A
Study ofJuvenile Waiver 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 54 (1970); Grisso,Juveniles' Capacities to
Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 79, 1152; Lawrence, The Role of Legal Counsel in Juveniles'
Understanding of their Rights, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49, 50, 52-53 (Winter 1983).
81 Grisso, supra note 79, at 1160.
82 Id. at 1157.
83 See IowA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.23 (West
1987). See also, A.B.A.-IJ.A.,JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-
TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Std. 5.1, at 81 (1980) (the juvenile should have the right to
effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings, a right which is mandatory
and nonwaivable)[hereinafter PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS].
84 Compare In re Welfare of L.R.B., 373 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (valid
Miranda waiver by 14 year old with low normal I.Q, significantly below grade in school
and difficulty understanding) with Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn. 1977) (in-
effective waiver by 18 year old with low I.Q. and only a tenth grade education).
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may be improper.8 5 Moreover, it may be improper to consider
those prior uncounselled convictions for purposes of subsequent
sentencing. In Baldasar v. Illinois,86 the defendant's enhanced pen-
alty was based upon a prior uncounselled misdemeanor conviction
that had not resulted in incarceration.8 7 When Baldasar was con-
victed a second time for a similar offense, under the enhanced pen-
alty statute, the prior conviction was used to convert the second
conviction into a felony for which the defendant was imprisoned.88
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Baldasar's fel-
ony conviction.8 9 Baldasar is consistent with an earlier line of cases
that held that an uncounselled felony conviction could not be used
in a later trial to enhance punishments under recidivist statutes.90
In United States v. Tucker,91 the Supreme Court remanded for resen-
tencing a defendant whose prior sentence was based upon uncoun-
selled convictions. "The Gideon case established an unequivocal rule
'making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state
court unless he had a lawyer or had validly waived one.' "92 Tucker
followed Burgett v. Texas,93 in which the Supreme Court noted that
because it was unconstitutional to convict a person for a felony with-
out benefit of a lawyer or the valid waiver of that right,
85 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979); State v. Rubin, 409 N.W.2d 504, 506
(Minn. 1987); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Minn. 1977); State v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967); State v. Collins, 278 Minn. 437, 437, 154
N.W.2d 688, 689 (1967); State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434,435, 154 N.W.2d 687, 688
(1967). If the punishment is likely to be incarceration, then counsel must be provided
for an indigent. In Minnesota, there are no limitations on the dispositional authority of
juvenile court judges. Any adjudication of delinquency for any underlying offense-
felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance-may lead to removal from the home or commit-
ment to the State Department of Corrections. Moreover, delinquency dispositions may
continue until the age of 19. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.181(4) (West Supp. 1982). Thus,
every juvenile proceeding is of considerable consequence since it carries the potential
for confinement.
86 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
87 Id. at 223. Because Baldasar's initial misdemeanor conviction only resulted in a
fine and probation, but not actual incarceration, the right to counsel, as announced in
Scott, did not apply.
88 Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223.
89 Id. at 224. Justice Stewart condemned the increased penalty, noting that the de-
fendant "was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been
convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense." Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Jus-
tice Marshall stated that a defendant's "prior uncounselled misdemeanor conviction
could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a
subsequent conviction." Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring).
90 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.
109, 114 (1967).
91 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
92 Id. at 449 (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967)).
93 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
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[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to
be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punish-
ment for another offense . . . is to erode the principle of that case.
Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the
right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the depriva-
tion of that Sixth Amendment right.9 4
The principle of Baldasar, Tucker, and Burgett, that prior convic-
tions obtained without representation by counsel or a valid waiver
should not be used to enhance subsequent sentences, has been ap-
plied in several sentencing contexts involving uncounselled juvenile
convictions. In Stockwell v. State,9 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ap-
plied Tucker to Gault and held that juvenile adjudications in which
the juvenile was denied the right to counsel could not be considered
in subsequent sentencing proceedings.9 6 Similarly, in Majchszak v.
Ralston,97 in which the defendant was denied parole release based
on a salient factor score which included prior uncounselled delin-
quency adjudications, the court remanded for resentencing.98 In
Commonwealth v. Bivens,99 the court reversed the defendant's sen-
tence after the sentencing judge used juvenile convictions obtained
without the assistance of counsel in computing his adult criminal
history score. 100 And, in Rizzo v. United States,' 0 t the court remanded
for resentencing an adult defendant whose sentence was based, at
least in part, on prior uncounselled juvenile adjudications. 102
Because Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guidelines include prior
juvenile felony convictions in the calculation of a defendant's cur-
rent sentence, t03 whether those prior convictions were obtained
94 Id. at 115. Unless there is a valid waiver of the right to counsel on the record when
a guilty plea is entered, the conviction cannot be used to enhance the term of incarcera-
tion for a subsequent offense. See Reeves v. Mabry, 615 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Lufman, 457 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1972).
95 59 Wis. 2d 21, 207 N.W.2d 883 (1973).
96 Stockwell, 59 Wis. 2d at 31-33, 207 N.W.2d at 889.
97 454 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Wis. 1978).
98 Id. at 1144. See also Wren v. United States Board of Parole, 389 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.
Ga. 1975) (uncounselled juvenile convictions); United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165
(7th Cir. 1972) (uncounselled juvenile convictions).
99 337 Pa. Super. 216, 486 A.2d 984 (1985).
100 Id. at 221, 486 A.2d at 986.
101 821 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1987).
102 Id. at 1274 ("[T]he judge may have impermissibly relied on the uncounselled [ju-
venile] adjudication in imposing sentence .... ").
103 See MINNESOTA SENrENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 29
(1980). See also State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1985) (to use prior convic-
tion in criminal history, state must prove it was obtained without violating defendant's
right to counsel); State v. Thomas, 374 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (juve-
nile's waiver of right to counsel); State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(use ofjuvenile adjudications to enhance the sentence of an adult criminal defendant is
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without the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel re-
mains an issue at the later sentencing. In State v. Nordstrom,10 4 the
court held that a prior misdemeanor conviction based on an un-
counselled guilty plea may not be used to convert a subsequent of-
fense into a gross misdemeanor absent a valid waiver of counsel on
the record at the prior proceeding. 10 5 Similarly, in State v.
Edmison,10 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision on
Baldasar and Tucker, and held that a sentencing court may not use a
defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions in determining the pre-
sumptive sentence under the Guidelines unless the state proves that
the prior conviction was obtained with the assistance of counsel or a
valid waiver of the right. 10 7
While juvenile courtjudges in most states neither follow formal
sentencing guidelines nor numerically weigh a youth's prior record,
their use of prior uncounselled adjudications in sentencing juveniles
upon a subsequent conviction implicates the same issues that
Baldasar and Edmison condemned for adults. "It makes little differ-
ence whether an enhanced penalty provision mandates an increased
term of imprisonment or whether a judge imposes it exercising his
sentencing discretion. As long as the prior uncounselled conviction
leads to the increased incarceration, the defendant is being deprived
of his liberty because of that conviction."'' 0 8 Indeed, because ofju-
venile court judges' virtually unrestricted sentencing discretion, the
Baldasar issues are especially acute when sentencing juveniles. If a
juvenile who is convicted without counsel and placed on probation
is subsequently adjudicated delinquent for a new offense and com-
mitted to an institution, is the latter sentence "enhanced" based on
not contrary to Minnesota Juvenile Court Act and does not violate due process or equal
protection).
104 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1983).
105 Id. at 904-05. See also State v. Mod, 337 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Minn. 1983) ("absolute
bare minimum" examination of defendant by trial court necessary to establish valid
waiver of counsel); State v. Hanson, 360 N.W.2d 460,463 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (waiver
of counsel); State v. Brown, 346 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (waiver of
counsel).
106 379 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1985).
107 Id. at 87. See also, State v. Goff, 402 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (uncoun-
selled prior felonies may not be included in computation of criminal history or sen-
tence), rev'd, 418 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1988) (presume, absent evidence to the contrary,
that any prior conviction relied upon to enhance a defendant's sentence was not ob-
tained in violation of the right to counsel, with defendant bearing the burden of produc-
tion with respect to prior convictions obtained in violation of right to counsel); State v.
Marquetti, 322 N.W.2d 316 (1982) (imposed upon the state the burden of proving a
defendant's criminal history under the sentencing guidelines).
108 Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounselled Misdemeanor Convictions after Scott and
Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 536 (1982).
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the prior, uncounselled conviction, or does it simply reflect the
judge's assessment of the juvenile's "treatment needs" including
the subsequent delinquency? 0 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court affords defendants a right to
counsel even for minor offenses that may lead to incarceration. 10
Every delinquency proceeding in Minnesota carries with it the possi-
bility of removal from the child's home or incarceration.I 1 ' More-
over, the Minnesota Supreme Court has urged extreme caution in
recognizing the validity of waivers of counsel by young, inexperi-
enced, or impressionable defendants with obvious implications for.
the capacity ofjuveniles to waive their rights." 2 Finally, the court
has held that prior uncounselled convictions may not be used to en-
hance subsequent sentences unless there was a valid waiver of coun-
sel at the earlier proceeding.11 3 By analyzing empirically the
availability of counsel and sentencing practices in delinquency pro-
ceedings, this Article will explore the extent to which these well-
established legal principles for adults are implemented in juvenile
courts.
Even when juveniles are represented, attorneys may not be ca-
pable of or committed to representing their juvenile clients in an
effective adversarial manner. Organizational pressures to cooper-
ate, judicial hostility toward adversarial litigants, role ambiguity cre-
ated by the dual goals of rehabilitation and punishment, reluctance
to help juveniles "beat a case," or an internalization of a court's
treatment philosophy may compromise the role of counsel in juve-
nile court."X4 Institutional pressures to maintain stable, cooperative
109 Professor Martin Guggenheim succinctly noted the extraordinary complexity of
applying Baldasar to the sentencing of juveniles. Letter from Martin Guggenheim to
Barry C. Feld (July 25, 1988) (available from author). In emphasizing juvenile court
judges' sentencing discretion, Professor Guggenheim observed that:
judges rarely, if ever, enhance a sentence solely because of the number of prior
adjudications. Indeed, in my experience the court freely refers to prior contacts
without distinguishing between charges and adjudications .... A prior contact
which resulted in dismissal-whether counselled or uncounselled-if counted by
the sentencing judge, presents a due process problem that is beyond and unreach-
able by Baldasar. When adjudications, rather than mere contacts, do count, the
judge almost always focuses on the juvenile's post-sentencing conduct as evidence
of the need for more restrictive placement, not to demonstrate that a two-time loser
deserves more punishment than a virgin. Unless a prophylactic rule, barring all
consideration, direct and collateral, of the fact and effect of a prior, uncounselled
case is created, the Baldasar rule has little application in the operation of juvenile
justice.
Id.
110 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
111 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185(1) (c)-(d) (West 1982).
112 See supra notes 75-80 and infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
114 See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, 137-39;J. KNrrZER & M. SOBIE, LAW GUARDIANS IN
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working relations with other personnel in the system may be incon-
sistent with effective adversarial advocacy."15
Several studies have questioned whether lawyers can actually
perform as advocates in a system rooted inparenspatriae and benevo-
lent rehabilitation.' 1 6 Indeed, there are some indications that law-
yers representing juveniles in more traditional "therapeutic"
juvenile courts may actually disadvantage their clients in adjudica-
tions or dispositions. 117 Duffee and Siegel,118 Clarke and Koch,"19
Stapleton and Teitelbaum, 120 Hayeslip, 12' and Bortner, 22 all re-
NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 3 (1984); V.
STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra note 66, at 37-39; Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a
Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 15, 18-19
(1967); Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 297-300; Duffee & Siegel, The Organization Man:
Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 544, 548 (1971); Ferster, Courtless &
Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 378; 398-99 (1971); Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings:
A Non-Polar Approach, 61 CEO. LJ. 1401, 1410 (1973); Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum,
supra note 24, at 561; McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile
Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. Louis U.LJ. 561, 572 (1970); Platt & Friedman,
The Limits ofAdvocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1163
(1968); Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case Study of the Public Defender in
Juvenile Court, 43 IND. LJ. 619, 621 (1968).
115 See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 136-39; V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra
note 66, at 137-38; Blumberg, supra note 114, at 19-20; Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitel-
baum, supra note 24, 550-51.
116 See V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra note 66, at 137-38; Fox, supra note 13, at
1404; Kay & Segal, supra note 114, at 1402-03. One student commentator observed and
interviewed juvenile justice personnel in several jurisdictions and reported that:
an overzealous defense attorney may produce an adverse reaction in the court.
Even judges who are not actually hostile to the presence of an attorney may expect
him to assume a different role in the juvenile court from the one he would have in
criminal court. He is not to utilize "technical objections" to obtain a finding of no
delinquency. Rather he is to act as the servant of the court in the process of ascer-
taining the truth-a function that seems to entail actively encouraging his client to
confess.
Note, supra note 24, at 797.
117 See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 139-40(after controlling for offenses, repre-
sented juveniles received more severe dispositions); V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM,
supra note 66, at 79 (increased probability of commitment); Clarke & Koch, supra note
57, at 304-6 (negative effect of representation on dispositions); Note, supra note 24, at
798 ("[I]n an informal court in which an aggressive adversary attitude may well hurt his
client's interests, an attorney should probably conform to the reigning conventions as
much as possible; he might be wise to insist on a strict adherence to the rules of evidence
only in those particular instances when their relaxation would be clearly detrimental to
his client.").
118 Duffee & Siegel, supra note 114, at 548-53.
119 Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 304-06.
120 V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra note 66, at 64-65.
121 Hayeslip, The Impact of Defense Attorney Presence on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 30 Juv. &
FAM. CT.J. 9, 12 (1979).
122 M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 139-40.
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ported that juveniles with counsel are more likely to be incarcerated
than juveniles without counsel. Bortner, for example, found that:
[w]hen the possibility of receiving the most severe dispositions (place-
ment outside the home in either group homes or institutions) is ex-
amined, those juveniles who were represented by attorneys were more
likely to receive these dispositions than were juveniles not represented
(35.8 percent compared to 9.6 percent). Further statistical analysis
reveals that, regardless of the types of offenses with which they were charged,
juveniles represented by attorneys receive more severe
dispositions. 12 3
Feld's evaluation of the impact of counsel in six states' delin-
quency proceedings reported that:
it appears that in virtually every jurisdiction, representation by counsel
is an aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition .... In short, while
the legal variables [of seriousness of present offense, prior record, and
pretrial detention status] enhance the probabilities of representation,
the fact of representation appears to exert an independent effect on
the severity of dispositions. 124
III. THE PRESENT STUDY-DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The present study provides the first opportunity to systemati-
cally analyze variations in rates of representation for an entire juris-
diction and in subsets thereof. 25 These statistical analyses provide
a comparative examination of the circumstances under which law-
yers are appointed to represent juveniles, the case characteristics as-
sociated with rates of representation, and the effects of
representation on case processing and dispositions.
An earlier article extensively analyzed juvenile justice adminis-
tration in Minnesota and provides the legal background for the
present study.' 26 Typically, juvenile delinquency cases begin with a
referral to either the county attorney or a county's juvenile court or
a juvenile probation or intake department. Many of these referrals
are closed at intake with some type of informal disposition: dismis-
sal, counseling, warning, referral to another agency, or probation.
In some unknown proportion of cases, a petition-the formal initia-
123 Id. at 139-40 (emphasis added).
124 Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 393.
125 There have been remarkably few studies of the role of counsel injuvenile courts in
more than one courtroom or county. The few systematic comparative studies ofjuvenile
justice administration were conducted in the aftermath of.Gault. See V. STAPLETON & L.
TEITELBAUM, supra note 66; Chused, The Juvenile Court Process: A Study of Three New Jersey
Counties, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 488 (1973); Clarke & Koch, supra note 57.
126 See Feld, supra note 2. See alsoJ. SONSTENG & R. ScoTr, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JU-




tion of the juvenile process-is filed by the county attorney. A peti-
tion is comparable legally to the prosecutor's issuance of a
complaint or a grand jury's indictment in the adult criminal pro-
cess. 127 The relationship between the screening functions of ajuve-
nile court's intake staff and the charging functions in the county
attorney's office vary from county to county. 128 Because different
court intake or probation staff as well as county attorneys use differ-
ent criteria to decide whether or not to file a formal delinquency
petition, the selection of delinquent populations varies in different
counties. The common denominator of all these cases is that they
were formally charged in their respective counties.
A juvenile offender will be arraigned on the petition. Because
the constitutional right to counsel attaches in juvenile court only af-
ter the filing of the petition, 129 it is typically at this stage, if at all,
that counsel will be appointed to represent a juvenile. At the ar-
raignment, the juvenile may admit or deny the allegations in the pe-
tition. In many cases, juveniles admit the allegations of the petition
at the arraignment and have their cases disposed of without the
assistance of an attorney. In other cases, a public defender or court-
appointed lawyer who confers briefly with the juvenile before admit-
ting or denying the allegations is appointed at the arraignment. In
rare instances, a private attorney retained by the child's family may
appear to represent the juvenile. In the very small fraction of cases
that actually result in formal, contested hearings, counsel may be
present more routinely.
This study uses data collected by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's Judicial Information System ("SJIS") for delinquency and
status offense cases processed in 1986.130 The data files are housed
127 Feld, supra note 2, at 217. In other states, petitions are filed in about half the cases
referred to juvenile courts. See E. NIMICK, H. SNYDER, D. SULLIVAN & N. TIERNEY, JUVE-
NILE COURT STATISTICS 1982 12 (1985) (between 1957 and 1982, approximately half of
delinquency referrals were handled by formal petition, ranging from a high of 54% to a
low of 41%); Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 399 (proportion of petitions to
referrals is highly variable: California 46.3%; Nebraska, 62.8%; North Dakota, 10.7%;
and Pennsylvania 53.7%).
128 See MINN. R. P. Juv. CT. 17 (Intake, which provides that "[t]he discretionary deci-
sion as to whether a delinquency or petty matter should be initiated[,] lies with the
county attorney.").
While Rule 17 vests the authority to file formal delinquency petitions in the county
attorney, in those counties with intake units in the juvenile court, informal arrangments
or administrative guidelines govern the screening of cases with minor offenses typically
routed initially through intake.
129 In re M.A., 310 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. 1981) ("[T]he right to counsel attaches at
the time the formal petition is filed. At this point, there is a definite commencement of
the adversary proceedings.").
130 The Minnesota Supreme Court's Judicial Information System ("SJIS") compiles
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in the National Juvenile Court Data Archive ("NJCDA") at the Na-
tional Center for Juvenile Justice. 13 1 The sample in this study con-
sists of individual juveniles against whom petitions were filed for
delinquency and status offenses. It excludes all juvenile court refer-
rals for abuse, dependency, or neglect, as well as routine traffic vio-
lations. Only formally petitioned delinquency and status cases are
analyzed because the right to counsel announced in Gault attaches
only after the formal initiation of delinquency proceedings.13 2
More commonly, the NJCDA's unit of count is a "case dis-
posed" of by a juvenile court.133 The present study, however, is a
statewide statistical data on juvenile delinquency and status petitions filed annually, as
well as dependency, neglect and abuse cases. The data are based on the petitions filed;
there is no data base that includes the cases referred to intake, county probation, or
juvenile courts that were handled informally. The data collected on a case-specific basis
include offense behavior, representation by counsel, court processing information, en-
tries each time a court activity occurs, any continuation or change in the status of a case,
and types of dispositions. In most counties, this information is obtained from the juve-
nile courts' own automated computer system and is entered by each county's court ad-
ministrators who .are trained by the state court administrator. Because the juvenile
courts themselves rely upon this computerized information for record keeping, schedul-
ing hearings, maintaining court calendars, and monitoring cases, it is highly reliable.
131 The National Juvenile Court Data Archive ("NJCDA") is housed at the National
Center forJuvenileJustice ("NCJJ") which is the research arm of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family CourtJudges. The Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Pre-
vention, U.S. Department of Justice, has supported the juvenile court data archive for
the past decade. Currently, 30 states contribute their annual juvenile court data tapes to
the NJCDA.
132 The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether non-criminal status
offenders are constitutionally entitled to representation by counsel. The delinquency
proceeding in Gault involved conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult
and which could result in institutional confinement. The detention and institutionaliza-
tion of status offenders is barred by federal and state legislation. See H. RUBIN, JUVENILE
JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAw 70-73 (2d ed. 1985). Thus, if the issue arose, the
Supreme Court could distinguish Gault on the grounds that since status offenses do not
involve criminal behavior that could lead to incarceration, there is no constitutional
right to counsel. Under Minnesota state law, however, the right to counsel attaches in
status or "petty" matters as well as delinquency proceedings. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.155(2) (West 1986); MINN. R. P.Juv. CT. 1.01, 4.01(1).
133 The NJCDA unit of count is "cases disposed." Each "case" represents a youth
whose case is disposed of by the juvenile court for a new delinquency/status referral. A
case is "disposed" when some definite action is taken, whether dismissal, warning, infor-
mal counseling or probation, referral to a treatment program, adjudication as a delin-
quent with some disposition, or transfer to an adult criminal court. E. NIMICK, H.
SNYDER, D. SULLIVAN, & N. TIERNEY, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1983 6 (1985). As a
result of multiple referrals, one child may be involved in several "cases" during a calen-
dar year. Moreover, each referral may contain more than one offense or charge. The
multiple referrals of an individual child may tend to overstate the numbers of youths
handled annually. Multiple charges in one petition may appear to understate the vol-
ume of delinquency in a jurisdiction. Because the unit of count is case disposed, one
cannot generalize from the NJCDA data either the number of individual youths who are
processed by the courts or the number of separate offenses charged to juveniles.
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youth-based data file that analyzes the 17,195 individual juveniles
whose cases were formally petitioned in Minnesota's juvenile courts
in 1986. The annual data collected by the Minnesota SJIS do not
include any family, school, or socioeconomic status variables, or a
youth's prior record of offenses, adjudications, or dispositions.
However, each youth processed in a county's juvenile court receives
a unique identifying number which is used for all subsequent pur-
poses. The NJCDA created a youth-based file by merging the 1984,
1985, and 1986 annual data tapes and matching the county/youth
identification number across years to reconstruct a juvenile's prior
record of petitions, adjudications, and dispositions. Thus, the data
reported herein reflect a youth's most current referral to juvenile
court as well as all prior petitions, adjudications, and dispositions
for at least the preceding two years or more. 134
In this Article, the offenses reported by the SJIS were re-
grouped into six analytical categories. 135 The "felony/minor" of-
fense distinctions provide both an indicator of seriousness and are
legally relevant for the right to counsel. 3 6 Offenses are also classi-
fied as person, property, other delinquency, and status. Combining
person and property with the felony and minor distinctions pro-
134 The youth identification numbers are unique within a county, but not within the
entire state. A youth who has delinquency referrals in several different counties will
receive separate identification numbers in each county. Thus, the variable "prior refer-
rals" may be slightly inflated by a juvenile with multiple referrals in several counties, and
slightly reduced by juveniles whose prior records consist of only one referral in each of
several counties. Such multiple cases appear to be rare. A cross-tabulation of youths'
county of residence with the county of adjudication reveals between 95-98% overlap.
Because Minnesota lacks a statewide juvenile information system, a juvenile court at
sentencing normally has information regarding only prior referrals in its own county.
Thus, the variable "prior referrals" includes the information routinely available to and
relied upon by the courts themselves.
135 The National Juvenile Court Data Archive has developed a seventy-eight item cod-
ing protocol that recodes the raw offense data provided by the states into a uniform
format. This permits delinquency offense data from several different original formats to
be recoded for analysis using a single conversion program.
136 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony
proceeding) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (right to counsel where misde-
meanor leads to incarceration). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
The Minnesota Criminal Code contains three categories of offenses: felony (punish-
able by more than one year of imprisonment); misdemeanor (punishable by less than 90
days); and gross misdemeanor (an intermediate offense which is neither a felony nor a
misdemeanor). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(2)-(4) (West 1986). The Minnesota Sen-
tencing Guidelines treat misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors as one-quarter and
one-half units and felonies as one point in the computation of an offender's criminal
history score. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 103, at 27-28.
In the present coding schema, gross misdemeanors were classified as "minor" offenses
to preserve the felony distinction.
[Vol. 791212
19891 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
duces a six-item offense scale.' 3 7 When a petition alleges more than
one offense, the youth is classified on the basis of the most serious
charge.' 3 8 This study uses two indicators of the severity of disposi-
tions: out-of-home placement and secure confinement.'39 Out-of-
home placement includes any disposition in which the child is taken
from his or her home and placed, for example, in a group home,
foster care, in-patient psychiatric or chemical dependency treatment
facility, or a secure institution.' 40 Secure confinement is a substan-
tial subset of all out-of-home placement but includes only commit-
ments to the county-level institutions or state training schools.' 4 '
Both of these dispositions entail the types of infringements of lib-
erty that trigger the right to counsel under Gault and Scott.
The data presented in the tables include both the totals for the
137 The "felony offenses against person" generally correspond to the F.B.I.'s Uniform
Crime Report classification of Part I violent felonies against the person-homicide, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. "Felony offenses against property" generally include
Part I property offenses-burglary, felony theft, and auto theft. "Minor offenses against
person" consist primarily of simple assaults, and "minor offenses against property" con-
sist primarily of larceny, shoplifting, or vandalism. "Other delinquency" includes a
mixed-bag of residual offenses-drug offenses primarily involving possession of mari-
juana, public order offenses, as well as offenses against the administration of justice,
primarily contempt of court. "Status" offenses are the juvenile offenses that are not
criminal for adults-runaway, truancy, curfew, ungovernability, and the like.
138 When a petition contains multiple allegations, there is no way to separate whether
they are multiple charges arising out of the same offense transaction or whether they
represent several offenses committed on different occasions which were simply peti-
tioned in the same document.
139 The NJCDA has developed a twenty-two item conversion program that transforms
the state-specific dispositions into a uniform national format. The NJCDA staff speaks
directly with the states' data collectors and reporters to determine how specific disposi-
tions or programs should be classified-out of home and secure-within the national
format.
Using the severity of sanctions as a measure to evaluate an attorney's effectiveness
reflects an assumption that a verdict of "not guilty" is, at least in the defendant's opin-
ion, a positive result and the converse, removal or incarceration, a negative one. "In
evaluating attorney effectiveness with juvenile delinquents, a dismissal is considered
positive even though this might mean that children who had committed crimes were
released without sanction to the possible detriment of society." Kelley & Ramsey, Do
Attorneys for Children in Protection Proceedings Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Repre-
sentation under Conditions ofHigh Judicial Intervention, 21 J. FAM. L. 405, 416 (1982). See V.
STAPLETON & L. TErELBAUM, supra note 66, at 64-65.
140 While many in-patient psychiatric or chemical dependency placements are in se-
cure facilities, these commitments are classified as "out-of-home" to distinguish them
from more traditional institutional confinement in training schools.
141 In the juvenile justice context, secure confinement is somewhat of a misnomer,
because most juvenile training schools and institutions do not rely upon locks, bars,
fences, or armed guards to the same degree as do adult maximum security institutions.
Compare G. SYKES, SocIETY OF CAPTIVES (1956) (adult maximum security facility) with B.
FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS (1977)




entire state and those for the aggregated counties with high, me-
dium, and low rates of representation. While the overall rate of rep-
resentation in Minnesota in 1986 was 45.3%, there was substantial
variations among the eighty-seven counties. In four counties, more
than 90% ofjuveniles were represented, while in another six coun-
ties, less than 10% ofjuveniles had lawyers. Five counties in which
66.7% or more juveniles were represented were classified as "high"
representation.142 Fourteen counties in which more than 33.3% but
less than 66.7% of juveniles had lawyers were classified as "me-
dium" representation.' 43 The remaining sixty-eight counties in
which less than 33.3% of juveniles had lawyers were classified as
"low" representation. The counties differ in their methods of deliv-
ering legal services-public defender and court appointed coun-
sel-and some of the analyses will assess the impact of different
types of counsel. There is also some geographical pattern to the
variations in rates of representation with rural counties which rely
primarily on court appointed lawyers predominating in the "low"
representation category. 144
IV. DATA AND ANALYSES' 4 5
The following analyses attempt to answer two interrelated
questions. First, what case characteristics determine when lawyers
appear on behalf ofjuveniles? Second, what effect does representa-
tion have on the way that a case is handled and disposed? The for-
mer will examine the relationships between certain independent
variables such as offense seriousness, prior record, pretrial deten-
142 The "high" representation counties and their primary legal service delivery sys-
tems-public defender ("PD") or court appointed ("CA")-include: Anoka (97.9%,
PD), Dakota (100.0%, CA), Goodhue (92.7%, PD), LeSuer (68.5%, PD), and Ramsey
(St. Paul) (92.3%, PD).
143 The "medium" representation counties and their primary mechanism for deliver-
ing legal services include: Cass (45.2%, CA), Douglas (42.5%, CA), Hennepin (Minne-
apolis) (47.7%, PD), Lake (38.7%, CA), Lincoln (45.8%, CA), Lyon (42.9%, CA),
McLeod (43.3%, CA), Mille Lacs (40.1%, CA), Nobles (39.0%, CA), Pine (44.4%, CA),
St. Louis (49.9%, PD), Todd (37.0%, CA), Wadena (65.9%o, CA), and Washington
(40.1%o, CA).
144 A separate article will analyze the 1986 Minnesota data according to geographic
patterns and report on juvenile justice administration in urban, small urban/suburban,
and rural counties.
145 Tables 1-38 report row or column percentages and the sample size (N) where
appropriate for the entire state and separately for the aggregated counties with high,
medium, and low rates of representation. Because of the large overall sample size,
N= 17,195, and the non-random assignment of subjects to various categories, tests of
significance are omitted. Tables 39-53, which summarize the multiple regression
equations, do include levels of significance, and, as would be expected with such large
samples, virtually all of the results are highly statistically significant.
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tion, and variations in rates of representation. The latter will ex-
amine the impact of counsel on the sentences juveniles receive or
the ways in which their cases are processed, after controlling for the
influence of other independent variables.
A. OFFENSES, A'TORNEYS, AND DISPOSITIONS
The first group of tables introduce the juvenile justice system.
They examine the types of offenses juveniles commit, the sources of
referral to juvenile courts, rates of representation, and the effect of
counsel on juveniles' dispositions.
1. Petitions and Offenses
Initially, the appearance of counsel must be placed in the larger
context of juvenile justice administration in Minnesota. Table 1 re-
ports the total number of juveniles against whom petitions were
filed and the types of offenses with which they were charged in the
state and in the aggregated counties with high, medium, and low
rates of representation. Throughout the state, 18.4% of juveniles
were charged with offenses that would be felonies if committed by
adults, 54.4% were charged with minor offenses such as misde-
meanors and gross misdemeanors, and 27.2% were charged with
status offenses. 146 Within the felony category, offenses against
property, primarily burglary, predominated. Similarly, within the
minor offense category, property offenses such as shoplifting, theft,
and vandalism predominated. Less than ten percent of Minnesota's
delinquency cases involved felony or minor offenses against the per-
son, and slightly more than one-quarter of the cases involved non-
criminal status offenses.
When the juveniles' petitions are examined separately for the
counties with high, medium, and low rates of representation, differ-
ent offense patterns emerge. In general, the counties with low rates
of representation-primarily rural counties-encounter somewhat
less serious delinquency. They process proportionally fewer
juveniles charged with felonies and a correspondingly larger pro-
portion of status offenders. Only 7.4% ofjuveniles in counties with
low rates of representation were charged with offenses against the
person, as compared with 9.8% and 11.4% ofjuveniles in counties
with medium and high rates of representation. While minor of-
146 "Status Offenses" refer to those forms ofjuvenile misconduct which would not be
criminal if committed by an adult, such as truancy, runaway, alcohol or marijuana con-
sumption. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(19)-(24) (West 1982). See generally, H. RUBIN,
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fenses against property are the most prevalent form of delinquency
throughout the state, those and status offenses constitute about two-
thirds of the dockets of juvenile courts in low representation coun-
ties. As later analyses will demonstrate, there is a direct relationship
between the seriousness of the offense and rates of representa-
tion. 147 Counties with lower rates of representation handle some-
what less serious types of offenders which is consistent with their
predominantly rural character. 148 By contrast, the counties with
high rates of representation handle about 10% fewer juveniles
charged with status offenses and proportionally more youths
charged with misdemeanor and felony offenses.
2. Source of Referral
Juvenile delinquency cases are referred to juvenile courts from
147 See infra Tables 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
148 See E. NIMICK, H. SNYDER, D. SULLIVAN & N. TIERNEY, supra note 127, at 13.
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a variety of sources: police, probation officers, parents, schools,
welfare departments, and others. Table 2 reports the sources of re-
ferral to juvenile courts in Minnesota.
While police are the primary source of juvenile referrals in the
state for all offense categories, probation officers and "other"-pri-
marily schools-refer many juveniles in the "other delinquency"
and status offense categories. Other delinquency includes drug of-
fenses such as possession of marijuana, disorderly conduct and pub-
lic order offenses, and, most significantly, contempt of court and
violations of probation. This accounts for the predominance of pro-
bation officers as sources of referral. The status offense category
includes 1,187 cases of truancy which are referred primarily by the
schools. 149 The source of a referral, especially from a probation of-
ficer, strongly influences the actions of the courts.
The proportion of referrals by sources other than police differ
in the counties with high, medium, and low rates of representation.
While referrals by schools are the largest source of non-police refer-
rals in all three types of counties, they differ in the relative make-up
of probation and parental referrals. In the high representation
counties, about one out of eleven delinquents (10.9%) are referred
by probation officers, primarily in the "other delinquency" category
for probation violations (38.3%). By contrast, in the medium and
low representation counties, probation is an insignificant source of
referral, contributing only 0.1% of cases, with proportionally more
referrals by parents.
3. Rates of Representation
Tables 3 and 4 report the overall rates of representation by
counsel, the percentages of private attorneys and public attorneys-
court appointed or public defender-and the rates of representation
by type of offense. Although Gault held that every juvenile is consti-
tutionally entitled to "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him,"' 150 Gault's mandate remains unreal-
ized in Minnesota.
Overall, only 45.3% ofjuveniles in Minnesota receive the assist-
ance of counsel. However, in the counties with high rates of repre-
sentation, 94.5% ofjuveniles have counsel; in counties with medium
149 While schools are the most obvious source of truancy referrals, because school
districts in Minnesota receive state educational funding on a per capita basis, they have a
substantial fiscal incentive to keep the largest numbers of students enrolled in school.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.17 (West 1986).
150 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932)).
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rates, 46.8% have counsel; and in counties with low rates, only
19.3% have counsel. While these categories-high, medium, and
low-were created by classifying counties on the basis of their rates
of representation, the substantial differences in aggregate rates of
representation lend themselves to a variety of comparative analyses
of the determinants and impact of counsel in delinquency proceed-
ings in different types of juvenile courts within the state.
Table 3 reports aggregate rates of representation regardless of
the type of attorney. These summary rates will facilitate subsequent
analyses which report the effects of both representation versus non-
representation as well as different types of lawyers. It is noteworthy
to compare the rates of representation reported in Table 3 with
those for different types of petitioners reported in the last row of
Table 2. While the overall rate of representation ofjuveniles in the
state is 45.3%, a slightly lower proportion of juveniles referred by
police is represented. By contrast, when juveniles are referred by
probation officers, a much larger proportion, nearly double the
overall state rate, is represented. In part, the greater rate of repre-
sentation for probation referrals reflects the fact that such juveniles
have prior records and perhaps already have an on-going relation-
ship with an attorney from their prior appearances. The rate is in-
flated somewhat because a large proportion of cases referred by
probation officers are in high representation counties, although the
same pattern prevails in the medium or low representation coun-
ties.' 5 1 There are no other consistent patterns in the rates of repre-
sentation by remaining sources of referral: parents or schools.
The last row of Table 3 reports the rates of representation of
juveniles at the time of their disposition. Comparing the rates of
representation at adjudication (arraignment, plea, or trial), with
those at disposition (45.3% versus 38.9%), reveals that 6.4% fewer
juveniles have counsel when they are sentenced than at the earlier
stages of delinquency proceedings. Virtually all of the decrease in
representation at disposition occurs in the counties with high rates
of representation (94.5% versus 66.7%). Perhaps defense lawyers
are more comfortable functioning in a procedurally formal adjudica-
tive context than they are in the "messy" social services-dominated
dispositional setting. Or perhaps defense attorneys appreciate that
151 Subsequent analyses will show a consistent relationship between rates of represen-
tation and the severity of dispositions. See infra Tables 9, 14, and 18 and accompanying
text. Many referrals by probation officers involve juveniles who have failed in a previous
placement and are being brought back into court for a new disposition. Such juveniles
are already considerably more at risk to be removed from their homes and thus more




RATES OF REPRESENTATION AND OFFENSE
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
ATTORNEY: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OVERALL
% Counsel
at Adjudication 45.3 54.7 94.5 5.5 46.8 53.2 19.3 80.7
Felony Offense
Against Person 77.3 22.7 97.5 2.5 81.5 18.5 56.8 43.2
Felony Offense
Against Property 63.0 37.0 98.3 1.7 68.2 31.8 37.3 62.7
Minor Offense
Against Person 62.4 37.6 96.5 3.5 66.2 33.8 30.5 69.5
Minor Offense
Against Property 44.6 55.4 97.2 2.8 52.3 47.7 15.8 84.2
Other Delinquency 44.9 55.1 91.5 8.5 34.7 65.3 21.3 78.7
Status 28.9 71.1 89.1 10.9 27.2 72.8 9.3 90.7
OVERALL
% Counsel
at Disposition 38.9 61.1 66.7 33.3 45.3 54.7 20.0 80.0
their presence or participation at disposition may be an exercise in
futility or may even adversely affect the eventual disposition.
Throughout these analyses, juveniles are classified as represented if
an attorney appeared on their behalf during the adjudicatory phase
of the preceedings.
Table 3 clearly shows that it is possible to provide very high
levels of defense representation to all juveniles charged with delin-
quency. In the high representation counties which process more
than one-fifth of Minnesota's delinquents, more than 97% of youths
charged with felony offenses, and more than 90% of those charged
with minor criminal offenses are represented. While it may be
somewhat more difficult to deliver legal services easily in rural coun-
ties of the state, these aggregate county variations suggest that dif-
ferences in rates of representation reflect deliberate policy decisions
about the appointment of counsel by the juvenile court judges
rather than any inherent difficulty in providing counsel.
Table 3 also shows the rates of representation by type of of-
fense. One pattern that emerges is a direct relationship between the
seriousness of the present offense and rates of representation.
Juveniles charged with felonies-offenses against the person or
property-and offenses against the person-felony and minor-
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generally have higher rates of representation than the overall rate.
Thus, while only 45.3% ofjuveniles in the state have lawyers, 77.3%
of those charged with felony offenses against the person are repre-
sented by counsel, as are 63.0% of those charged with felony of-
fenses against property, and as are 62.4% of those charged with
minor offenses against the person. These types of offenses consti-
tute only about one-quarter of the juvenile courts' dockets (Table
1). However, in no other offense categories are even a majority of
youths represented. These variations in rates of representation by
offense further reinforce the view that the decision to appoint coun-
sel reflects deliberate judicial policies rather than differences in mi-
nors' competence to waive the assistance of lawyers.
In the high representation counties, as would be expected,
there is only minor variation by offenses with somewhat lower rates
of representation for juveniles charged with the least serious types
of delinquency. In the medium and low representation counties,
felony offenses and offenses against the person also garner the high-
est rates of representation. Indeed, in the low representation coun-
ties, the only offense category in which even a majority of juveniles
are represented (56.8%) are those charged with felony offenses
against person, which amount to 3.2% of the delinquency petitions
(Table 1). By contrast, nearly two-thirds of those charged with fel-
ony offenses against property, such as burglary, appear without
counsel. Even though Table 1 reported some differences in offense
patterns in high, medium, and low representation counties, Table 3
effectively controls for the seriousness of the present offense. Thus,
the variations in rates of representation clearly are not a function of
differences in the distribution of offenses in the counties.
The first row of Table 4 reports the proportion of private attor-
neys and public attorneys (court appointed and/or public defend-
ers) reflected in the overall rates of representation.1 52 While most
of Minnesota's juveniles are unrepresented (54.7%), when they do
have lawyers, their lawyers are most likely to be public defenders
(28.5%).153 Because privately retained counsel appear in only 5.1%
152 Private attorneys are those lawyers directly retained and paid for by the juvenile or
his or her parents. Because public defenders and court appointed counsel are ap-
pointed by the court and paid for by the county, juveniles have virtually no choice in
who will represent them. In rare instances in some counties, a court may appoint a
guardian ad litem, an adult who is neither a lawyer nor thejuvenile's parent, to appear on
behalf of thejuvenile. Since such guardians are not licensed attorneys, the few juveniles
on whose behalf they appear are classified as unrepresented.
153 See supra notes 142-43. Public defenders are the primary legal services delivery
system in most of the "high" and "medium" representation counties whereas the "low"
representation counties rely upon court appointed counsel. See also, Feld, In re Gault
1221
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
of all delinquency and status cases in the state, public defenders and
court appointed attorneys handle the bulk of lawyer-represented
juveniles.
While the seriousness of the offenses increases the likelihood of
representation, larger proportions of private attorneys appear on
behalf ofjuveniles charged with felony offenses-person and prop-
erty-and offenses against the person than appear in the other of-
fense categories. Comparing the overall rate of appearance of
private attorneys with the rates when juveniles are charged with
felonies against the person shows that the seriousness of the offense
doubles the presence of private attorneys. Perhaps, the greater seri-
ousness of those offenses and their potential consequences en-
courage juveniles and/or their families to retain the assistance of
private counsel. Conversely, parents are least likely to retain private
attorneys to represent the status offenders whom they have referred
and with whom they are often in conflict.
4. Representation by Counsel and Age ofJuveniles
One of the traditional explanations for why so many juveniles
are unrepresented is that they "waive" their right to counsel.154 Be-
cause legal competency-the capacity to make a "knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary" waiver of the right to counsel-presumably
correlates with age, one would expect younger juveniles to have
higher rates of representation than older youths.
Table 5 reports that for the state overall, juveniles aged sixteen
and seventeen, presumably the most mature and therefore compe-
tent to waive their rights, have somewhat lower rates of representa-
tion than do their younger counterparts, although the rate of
representation for the eighteen-year-old juveniles are somewhat
higher. 5 5 Moreover, the rate of representation for even the young-
estjuveniles-those twelve and under-is virtually indistinguishable
from the overall state average, 46.3% representation versus 45.3%
representation.
When the data are examined separately in counties with high,
Revisited, supra note 10, at 401, Table 2 (In all six states, public lawyers predominated in
the representation ofjuvenile offenders.).
154 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text; infra notes 280-86 and accompanying
text.
155 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(2) (West 1986) defines "child" as any person under
the age of 18 as well as any person who is alleged to have committed their offense prior
to age 18. In some instances, a person who commits an offense at age 17 may be 18 by
the time he or she is charged as a delinquent. The dispositional authority of Minne-





REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND AGE OF JUVENILE
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
12 > 46.3 92.8 56.3 18.6
13 48.9 97.8 49.3 19.9
14 47.7 94.6 45.7 20.9
15 47.4 93.2 45.0 19.2
16 44.1 94.8 46.2 19.8
17 41.9 94.9 46.1 17.8
18 45.0 91.2 45.5 22.8
medium, and low rates of representation, no clear patterns emerge.
In the counties with high rates of representation, there is no dis-
cernible relationship between ajuvenile's age and rates of represen-
tation which presumably reflects the general policy to appoint
lawyers in all instances. While juveniles aged twelve or younger
have the second lowest proportion of representation, those aged
thirteen have the highest. The sixteen and seventeen-year-old
juveniles have higher rates of representation than do the fourteen or
fifteen-year-olds. In the counties with medium rates of representa-
tion, the youngest juveniles-twelve and under, and thirteen-have
the highest rates of representation, followed by the sixteen and sev-
enteen year old juveniles, while juveniles fourteen and fifteen have
the lowest rates of representation. In the counties with low rates of
representation, there is no apparent relationship between age and
representation by counsel. The youngest juveniles, those twelve
and under, have the second lowest rates of representation (18.6%)
and only seventeen-year-old juveniles have a lower rate of represen-
tation. In short, any relationship between ajuvenile's age and aju-
venile court judge's determination that the minor is competent to
make a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver of constitu-
tional rights is purely coincidental. Later analyses will examine the
relationships between age, offenses, and dispositions to determine
whether other variables account for the high rates of waivers of
counsel by even the younger juveniles.15 6
5. Present Offense and Disposition
There is extensive research on juvenile court sentencing prac-
tices. However, "even a superficial review of the relevant literature
leaves one with the rather uncomfortable feeling that the only con-
156 See infra Tables 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
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sistent finding of prior research is that there are no consistencies in
the determinants of the decision-making process."' 57 The studies-
conducted in different jurisdictions at different times and employing
different methodologies and theoretical perspectives-yield contra-
dictory results.158
Juvenile court judges answer the question "what should be
done with this child," in part, by reference to explicit statutory man-
dates. However, practical and bureaucratic considerations influence
their discretionary decision-making as well.' 59 Juvenile justice prac-
titioners enjoy greater discretion than do their adult process coun-
terparts because of their presumed need to look beyond the present
offense to the "best interests of the child" and paternalistic assump-
tions about the control of children. 60
An obvious question, then, is to what extent legal factors such
as the present offense and prior record, or social characteristics,
such as race, sex, family status, or social class, influence judges' dis-
positional decision-making. Evaluations of dispositional practices
by police, intake and the juvenile court suggest that the principle of
offense' 6' pervades practical decision-making throughout the pro-
157 Thomas & Sieverdes,Juvenile Court Intake: An Analysis of Discretionary Decision-Mak-
ing, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 413, 416 (1975).
158 See Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile
Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224, 229-30 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptu-
alization of Discrimination in the Juvenile Justice Process: the Impact of Administrative Factors and
Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 43-47 (1986), for
methodological critiques of prior juvenile court sentencing research.
159 See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 38-58; A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
OFJUVENILEJUSTICE 292-327 (1968); R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND
PROCESS INJUVENILE COURTS 29-56 (1969); D. MATZA, supra note 17, at 101-52. See also,
authorities cited infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
160 Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 32, at 587. Thomas and Fitch note
that:
the juvenile justice system differs significantly from its adult counterpart in its ex-
press incorporation of highly differential processing of alleged delinquents. The
separate juvenile court system emerged from a pervasive belief that the goal of re-
habilitation best could be served by permitting juvenile courts to maximize flexibil-
ity, informality, and discretion, especially at the dispositional or sentencing stage.
Thus, the dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court are extremely
broad.
Thomas & Fitch, An Inquiry into the Association Between Respondents' Personal Characteristics
and Juvenile Court Dispositions, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 61, 64 (1975).
161 Matza has described the principle of offense as a principle of equality: the treating
of similar cases in a similar fashion based on a relatively narrowly defined frame of
relevance.
The principle of equality refers to a specific set of substantive criteria that are
awarded central relevance and, historically, to a set of considerations that were spe-
cifically and momentously precluded. Its meaning, especially in criminal proceed-
ings, has been to give a central and unrivaled position in the framework of relevance
to considerations of offense and conditions closely related to offense like prior rec-
ord, and to more or less preclude considerations of status and circumstance.
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cess.162 Although traditionally juvenile courts pursued substantive
justice in which characteristics of the offender determined disposi-
tional decisions, recent evaluation research suggests an increased
D. MATZA, supra note 17, at 113-14 (emphasis added). The emergence of the principle of
offense in juvenile courts is analyzed in Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 13; Feld, Pun-
ishment, Treatment, supra note 4.
162 Juvenile justice personnel make dispositional decisions throughout the process.
Police officers may refer a case to intake for formal processing, adjust it informally on
the street or at the station house, or divert it. Intake, in turn, may refer a youth to the
juvenile court for formal adjudication or dispose of the case through informal supervi-
sion or diversion. Finally, even after formal adjudication, the juvenile court judge may
choose from a wide array of dispositional alternatives ranging from continuing a case
without a finding of delinquency, probation, or commitment to a state training school.
See generally S. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2d ed. 1981); F.
MILLER, R. DAwsON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS (3d ed. 1985);
J. SENNA & L. SIEGEL, JUVENILE LAw (1976); Harris, Is the Juvenile Justice System Lenient?, 18
CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 104 (1986).
Recent research indicates that the dispositional decision-making process is cumula-
tive; decisions made by the initial participants-police or intake-affect the types of deci-
sions made by subsequent participants. See Barton, Discretionary Decision-Making in
Juvenile Justice, 22 CRIME & DELINq. 470 (1976); McCarthy & Smith, Conceptualization of
Discrimination, supra note 158; Phillips & Dinitz, Labelling and Juvenile Court Dispositions:
Official Responses to a Cohort of Violent Juveniles, 23 Soc. Q. 267 (1982).
Assessing judicial decision-making requires familiarity with decision-making by
other juvenile justice actors. Evaluations of police dispositional decisionmaking are re-
ported by: Bittner, Policing Juveniles: The Social Context of Common Practice, in PURSUING
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 69 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Black & Reiss, Police Control of
Juveniles, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 63 (1970); Ferdinand & Luchterhand, Inner-City Youth, the
Police, the Juvenile Court, and Justice, 17 Soc. PROBS. 510 (1970); Hohenstein, Factors Influ-
encing the Police Disposition ofJuvenile Offenders, in DELINQUENCY: SELECTED STUDIES 138 (T.
Sellin & M. Wolfgang eds. 1969); McEachern & Bauzer, Factors Related to Dispositions in
Juvenile Police Contacts, in JUVENILE GANGS IN CONTEXT 148 (M. Klein & B. Myerhoff eds.
1964); Pilliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM.J. Soc. 206 (1964); Terry,
Discrimination in the Handling ofJuvenile Offenders by Social Control Agencies, 4 J. RES. CRIME &
DELIN,. 218 (1967); Terry, The Screening ofJuvenile Offenders, 58J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 173 (1967)[hereinafter Screening]; Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status
and Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973); Wei-
ner & Willie, Decisions by Juvenile Officers, 77 AM.J. Soc. 199 (1970); Werthman & Pilliavin,
Gang Members and the Police, in THE POLICE 56 (D. Bordua ed. 1970); Williams & Gold,
From Delinquent Behavior to Official Delinquency, 20 Soc. PROBS. 209 (1972).
If the police refer a case to juvenile court, typically an intake probation officer will
screen it to decide whether to process the case formally or informally. About half of the
cases referred to intake are closed or informally adjusted. See E. NIMICK, H. SNYDER, D.
SULLIVAN & N. TIERNEY, supra note 127, at 12. Between 1957 and 1982, the percentage
of delinquency referrals resulting in formal petitions has ranged from 41%7 to 547o. In
1982, 44%o of referrals resulted in formal petitions, the lowest rate in a decade. Some
research suggests that a child's social characteristics, demeanor or race, rather than the
referral offenses, influence intake decision-making, thereby amplifying racial and class
disparities in processing youths referred to juvenile court. See Bell & Lang, The Intake
Dispositions of Juvenile Offenders, 22 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 309, 310-11 (1985); Fagan
Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 158, at 230; McCarthy & Smith, Conceptualization of
Discrimination, supra note 158, at 51; Thomas & Sieverdes,Juvenile Court Intake, supra note
157, at 425-26; Thornberry, supra, at 99; Williams & Gold, supra, at 226.
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emphasis on characteristics of the offense. 163 As a corollary of pro-
cedural formality, juvenile courts increasingly seek formal rational-
ity by using general rules applicable to categories of cases rather
than pursuing individualized substantive justice. 164
In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice provided a theoretical imprimatur for
offense-based sentencing when it explicitly acknowledged the puni-
tive character of juvenile court intervention.' 65 Subsequently, sev-
eral juvenile justice policy groups have recommended the abolition
of indeterminate sentences and their replacement with formal dis-
positional criteria and sentences proportional to the seriousness of
the offense, which in short, results in a shift from substantive justice
to formal legal rationality.166
The elevation of the principle of offense receives practical im-
petus from bureaucratic imperatives-the desires of juvenile and
163 See generally Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4.
164 See M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 7 (M. Rheinstein ed.
1954). Weber's typology of law distinguishes between formal legal rationality and sub-
stantive rationality. Formal rationality is characterized by the application of explicit, uni-
versal rules to legal problems. In contrast, substantive rationality prevails when
decisions are made on the basis of principles that are not derived from the legal system
but from some other authoritative source or belief system. See generally J. INVERARITY, P.
LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL
LAw 112-16 (1983).
The traditional juvenile court provides an instance of Weberian substantive ration-
ality. See D. MATZA, supra note 17, at 125-29; A. PLATr, supra note 13, at 152-63; Schultz,
The Cycle ofJuvenile Court Histoy, 19 CRIME & DELINq. 457, 461 (1973). Horowitz and
Wasserman noted that:
(d]ecision-making in systems of substantive justice is guided by reference to a sub-
stantive goal or by the best decision in the individual case, not by the application of
abstract rules. The ideal in the juvenile court has been one of "individualized"
justice whereby each offender should be treated as unique and as deserving such
treatment. The framework of relevant criteria of decision-making is far broader
than only the "legal" factors relevant in adult courts, and encompasses a variety of
social background variables that are indicative of the offender's personal, home, and
community situations.
Horwitz & Wasserman, Some Misleading Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An Example and
Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 417 (1980).
165 The Commission explained that:
[c]ourt adjudication and disposition of those offenders should no longer be viewed
solely as a diagnosis and prescription for cure, but should be frankly recognized as
an authoritative court judgment expressing society's claim to protection. While re-
habilitative efforts should be vigorously pursued in deference to the youth of the
offenders and in keeping with a general commitment to individualized treatment of
all offenders, the incapacitative, deterrent, and condemnatory aspects of the judg-
ment should not be disguised.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2 1, at 2.
166 See A.B.A.-IJ.A.,JUVENILEJusTICE STANDARDS RELATINGTO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND SANCTIONS Stds. 5.1-5.2 (1980) [hereinafterJUVENiLE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS];
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STAN-
DARDS FOR THE ADMIN. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE Std. 3.181 (1980).
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criminal justice agencies to avoid scandal and unfavorable political
and media attention. 167 These factors encourage courts to attach
more formal and restrictive responses to more serious forms ofju-
venile deviance. 168 "[W]hether a juvenile goes to some manner of
prison or is put on some manner of probation.., depends first, on a
traditional rule-of-thumb assessment of the total risk of danger and
thus scandal evident in the juvenile's current offense and prior rec-
ord of offenses ...,,169
Finally, juvenile courts necessarily develop bureaucratic strate-
gies to cope with the requirements of contradictory formal goals
and highly individualized assessments. 170
167 Several scholars have noted the constraint that "fear of scandal" imposes on juve-
nile court dispositions. See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 63-92; A. CICOUREL, supra note
159, at 170-242; R. EMERSON,JUDGING DELINQUENTS, supra note 159, at 29-56; D. MATZA,
supra note 17, at 120-23. Emerson observes that:
juvenile court decision-making comes to be pervaded by a sense of vulnerability to
adverse public reaction for failing to control or restrain delinquent offenders ....
[Fear of scrutiny and criticism increases pressures] to impose maximum restraints
on the offender-in most instances incarceration. Anything less risks immediate
criticism. But more than this, it also exposes the court to the possibility of even
stronger reaction in the future. For given any recurrence of serious illegal activity,
former decisions that can be interpreted as "lenient" become difficult to defend.
R. EMERSON, ROLE DETERMINANTS IN JUVENILE COURT, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 624
(D. Glaser ed. 1974) (emphasis added).
168 Matza notes that the juvenile court judge is
ultimately responsible to the public. He will have to explain... why the 17-year-old
murderer of an innocent matron was allowed to roam the streets, on probation,
when just last year he was booked for mugging. This is no easy question to answer.
Somehow, an invoking of the principle of individualized justice and ajustification of
mercy on the basis of accredited social-work theory hardly seems appropriate on
these occasions.
D. MATZA, supra note 17, at 122.
169 Id. at 125.
170 Internal and external organizational factors constrain judicial autonomy. While
exercising discretion, the judge
is restricted by the peculiar bureaucratic setting in which it appears. His judgment
and wisdom may reign but only precariously since he is simultaneously the manager
of the court and must thus concern himself with public relations, internal harmony,
efficient work flow, and the rest .... Within the limits set by the demands of time,
efficiency, and work flow, the kadi's wisdom and judgment may operate. He must
decide which portion of the wide frame of relevance to invoke in each case, and in
every case he is subjected to the remaining cross-pressures; one calling for severity,
the other for mercy; one emanating from far-off and occasional critics, the other
from nearby and ever-present underlings with whom he must work; one irrelevant
to the day-to-day administration of an efficient court, the other crucially relevant;
but one representing what he takes to be public opinion, the other what he takes to
be professional opinion; and one holding the sanction of public scandal, the other
of professional criticism.
Id. at 122-23. While balancing these internal and external considerations, the juvenile
court restores the principle of offense, at least in part, as a form of decisional rule.
Matza argues that:
[t]he court's solution [to its dispositional dilemma] contains two elements. One, the
main part of the solution, is to more or less reinstore-sub rosa-the principle of offense
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Time after time after time procedures emerge which permit officials in
these organizations to classify and categorize those who come to their
attention as swiftly and simply as they can. The form of these categori-
zation processes is commonly defined by the types of information
which organizations routinely capture as a basis for forming or,
equally often, defending the decisions they are obligated to make. 17 1
Since the present offense and the prior record of delinquency are
among the types of information routinely and necessarily collected
in juvenile court processing, it is hardly surprising that they provide
a type of decisional rule.
Since the SJIS data tape unfortunately does not include infor-
mation on several of the social variables characteristically used in
sentencing research, this study cannot explain fully the determi-
nants of dispositions. However, the data do lend themselves to an
exploration of the relationships between offenses, dispositions, and
representation by an attorney. Table 6 uses two measures of juve-
nile court dispositions: 1) out-of-home placements, and 2) secure
confinement. Out-of-home placement involves any disposition in
which the child is removed from his or her home and placed, for
example, in a group home, foster care, in-patient psychiatric or
chemical dependency treatment facility, or secure institution. Se-
cure confinement is a substantial subset of all out-of-home place-
ment and consists exclusively of commitments to the county-level
institutions or state training schools. While out-of-home placement
is not the exact equivalent of adult penal confinement, it constitutes
a very severe intervention in the life of a child and family which may
continue for a significant period. Both of these forms of interven-
tion provide clear-cut delineations that lend themselves to cross-
county comparisons. They are legally significant for the appoint-
ment of counsel, because the Supreme Court has held, at least for
adults, that all persons charged with felonies must be afforded the
right to counsel and that no person convicted of a misdemeanor
may be incarcerated unless he or she was afforded or waived the
assistance of counsel.1 72
Table 6 reports both the overall rates of out-of-home place-
.... [The concern with individual characteristics and with treatment is not com-
pletely surrendered by the court ... but they are transformed .... The workable
bureaucratic equivalents of the stress on extraordinary individual characteristics-
equity-and the philosophy of treatment are the doctrines of parental sponsorship and
residential availability.
Id. at 124-25 (emphasis in original).
171 Marshall & Thomas, Discretionary Decision-Making and the Juvenile Court, 34 Juv. &
FAM. CT.J. 55-57 (1983).
172 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
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ment and secure confinement dispositions in the state and in the
respective counties, as well as by categories of offenses. The high,
medium, and low representation counties differ markedly in their
use of out-of-home placements and secure confinement. For the
whole state, 18.5% of all petitioned juveniles are removed from
their homes, and 11.1 % of all juveniles are incarcerated in state or
local institutions. However, in high representation counties, about
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one of four juveniles is removed from his or her home, in medium
representation counties, about one of five, while in low representa-
tion counties, only about one out of seven is removed. Juveniles
prosecuted in the high representation counties are nearly twice as
likely to be removed or confined as those in low representation
counties.
As might be expected, the seriousness of the present offense
substantially alters a youth's risk of removal and confinement. De-
spite the juvenile court's theoretical commitment to individualized
dispositions in which there is no necessary relationship between a
juvenile's offense, his or her "real needs," and the ultimate sen-
tence, the actual practices evidence a strong element of proportion-
ality. Juveniles charged with felony offenses-person and
property-and lesser offenses against the person have the highest
rates of out-of-home placements and secure confinement. For the
state as a whole, of all the juveniles charged with a felony offense
against the person, 42.2% are removed from their homes, and
27.5% are incarcerated. Overall, about one-third of all juvenile of-
fenders charged with felony offenses are removed from their homes;
about one-quarter of all juveniles charged with felony offenses are
confined.
Conversely, minor property offenses, primarily theft and shop-
lifting, result in substantially lower rates of removal and confine-
ment. As a result of legal restrictions on the placement of status
offenders, 173 they have the lowest proportion of removal from the
home or secure confinement. Significantly, however, even though
institutional confinement of status offenders is not authorized, 7 4
3.5% of the status offenders in the state and nearly 10% of those in
the high representation counties still are being incarcerated in
county or state institutions. The sentences imposed on juveniles
charged with "other delinquency" are inflated by the substantially
higher rates of out-of-home placement and confinement disposi-
tions imposed in the counties with high rates of representation. In
those counties, 38.3% of "other delinquency" referrals, primarily
for contempt or probation violations, were made by probation of-
ficers (Table 2). As Table 6 indicates, referrals by probation officers
in all counties characteristically garner higher rates of severe
sentences.
While there is a clear and direct relationship between the seri-
173 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.194 (West 1982). See also State v. Hammergren, 294
N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980) (uses of contempt power to convert status offender who vio-
lates court order into a delinquent).
174 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185(1)(c)(5)(d) (West 1986).
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ousness of the present offense and the severity of disposition, there
are also marked differences between the sentences imposed in the
high and medium representation counties when compared with
those in the low representation counties. At nearly every level of
offense, the judges in the low representation counties impose less
severe dispositions. These differences are most conspicuous in the
sentencing of juveniles charged with the most serious offenses, in
which about 10% fewer juveniles charged with felony offenses re-
ceive secure confinement dispositions than do those in the medium
or high representation counties.
Table 6 also reports on the rates of out-of-home placement and
secure confinement dispositions by sources of referral. Table 2 re-
ported that most of the non-police referrals occurred in the catego-
ries of other delinquency and status offenses, that in the counties
with high rates of representation, probation officers referred a sub-
stantial proportion ofjuveniles for probation violations and schools
referred a large proportion of status offenders as truants, and that in
the medium and low rates of representation counties, school refer-
rals for truancy predominated.
Comparing the rates of out-of-home placement and secure con-
finement by the type of petitioner with the overall rates of disposi-
tions and, especially, with the disposition rates for the "other
delinquency" and status offense categories indicates that the source
of a petition strongly influences the disposition of a case. In gen-
eral, somewhat fewer referrals by police than other sources of peti-
tions result in significant interventions by juvenile courts even
though police predominate in the referrals of serious criminal of-
fenses (Table 2). By contrast, courts react very severely to referrals
by probation officers with over half of all such juveniles removed
from their homes and more than one-quarter incarcerated.1 75 Be-
cause probation referrals are generally for less serious types of of-
fenses-other delinquency and status (Table 2)-than those by
police, these differences are even more substantial. Similarly, com-
plaints by parents and schools are given great credence by juvenile
courts. About one-third of all referrals by parents result in the re-
moval of the juvenile from the home as do more than one-fifth of
the referrals from schools.
6. Age, Offense, and Disposition (Home/Secure)
As might be expected, juveniles aged fifteen to seventeen
predominate in the juvenile court, and the length of a youth's prior
175 See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
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record increases with age. Table 7 summarizes the relationships be-
tween age, delinquency, and prior referrals.
For the state as a whole, juveniles aged fourteen and under con-
stitute 27.7% of all delinquents. In the counties with high, medium,
and low rates of representation, these younger juveniles constitute
27.7%, 30.6%, and 25.1%, respectively, of the juvenile court dock-
ets. Comparingjuveniles' proportional contributions to the juvenile
courts' population with their contribution to the various offense cat-
egories indicates that these younger juveniles are charged with
about as many felony offenses against the person and against prop-
erty as their overall percentage of the court population. If anything,
the younger juveniles tend to be underrepresented only in the less
serious categories of offenses. This suggests that the seriousness of
the offense influences the pre-petition screening and charging deci-
sions in the cases of younger juveniles. By contrast, the eighteen-
year-old juveniles contribute slightly less than their proportional
make-up of the juvenile court's population to the more serious
offenses.
Although slightly more younger juveniles are charged with seri-
ous offenses, they tend to have fewer prior referrals. This is primar-
ily a function of age. Thus, in the state, about 10% fewer juveniles
aged twelve and under have prior referrals when compared with fif-
teen-year-old youths, the group with the most extensive record of
prior referrals. The relationship between age and prior record is
the same in the state overall and in the counties with high, medium,
and low rates of representation with the youngest juveniles having
fewer prior referrals and the older juveniles having more.
Subsequent analyses will show a strong relationship between
the seriousness of a juvenile's present offense, the length of the
prior record, and the eventual sentence that is imposed. While
younger juveniles' present offenses are often comparable with those
of their older colleagues, their somewhat less extensive prior
records and their extreme youth may provide some protection at the
time of sentencing.
Table 8 shows the relationship between juveniles' age and dis-
position. A comparison of the overall rates of out-of-home place-
ment (18.5%, Table 6) and secure confinement dispositions
(11.1 %, Table 6) with the rates by age indicates that substantially
fewer juveniles twelve or younger are removed from their homes or
confined. However, by age fourteen, youthfulness is no longer a
mitigating factor in the sentencing ofjuveniles. In addition, the ra-
tio of out-of-home placement to secure confinement decreases with
age. Thus, for twelve-year-old juveniles about one of three who is
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TABLE 8
AGE AND DISPOSITION (HOME/SECURE)
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Twelve or Younger
% Home 13.4 16.8 15.2 10.4
% Secure 4.4 8.4 3.9 3.4
13
% Home 21.5 27.0 22.9 16.7
% Secure 9.4 12.6 10.3 6.5
14
% Home 21.0 26.7 21.6 16.8
% Secure 11.6 16.5 12.1 8.1
15
% Home 21.2 29.3 20.3 16.8
% Secure 12.7 19.5 12.2 8.8
16
% Home 18.8 26.7 21.4 13.4
% Secure 11.7 15.9 14.6 7.6
17
% Home 15.8 20.8 18.5 11.9
% Secure 11.4 .14.7 13.4 8.6
18
% Home 10.8 9.5 14.9 8.3
% Secure 9.3 8.4 13.0 6.9
removed from home is confined. For the eighteen-year-old
juveniles, if a sentence is imposed, in about nine of ten cases it will
be for secure confinement. The likely explanation is that for older
juveniles with prior referrals, previous non-institutional placements,
and only a limited time remaining within juvenile court jurisdiction,
a more severe consequence is required.
7. Offenses and Dispositions By Counsel
Table 9 amplifies the information contained in Table 6 and pro-
vides the first assessment of the impact of counsel on delinquency
dispositions. Within each offense category, Table 9 shows the dis-
position rates-out-of-home placement or secure confinement-for
those juveniles who were represented and those who were not.
Thus, Table 6 reports that for the entire state, 18.5% and 11.1% of
all juveniles receive out-of-home placement and secure confinement
dispositions. The same cell in Table 9 shows that youths with counsel
are substantially more likely to receive severe dispositions than are
those without counsel-28.17% versus 10.3% out-of-home placement
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and 17.6% versus 5.2% secure confinement-nearly three times as
much.
TABLE 9
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND DISPOSITION
(HOME/SECURE)
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW


























10.3 25.9 12.9 29.4 10.8 30.5 9.9
5.2 16.2 7.5 18.6 5.6 18.8 5.0
29.5 43.4 100.0' 49.0









13.6 29.5 0.0 31.4 11.7 31.5











9.5 34.8 20.9 21.8 8.0 29.2 10.5
4.8 20.8 14.0 13.7 3.9 19.4 5.3
8.1 25.2 9.4 23.5 9.2 26.6 7.3
1.7 10.7 3.1 3.8 1.7 10.6 1.6
Of the 123 juveniles charged with a felony offense against person, only I (or 0.8% of
the total) was unrepresented and received an out-of-home placement.
2 Of the 454 juveniles charged with felony offenses against property, 4 (or 0.9% of the
total) were unrepresented. Two of them (or 1.8% of the total) received institutional
confinement dispositions.
Of the 1058juveniles charged with minor offenses against property, only 25 (or 2.4%
of the total), were unrepresented of whom 5 (or 2.4% of the total) received out of
home placements.
A comparison of the two columns in the state and in the high,
medium, and low representation counties at each offense level
reveals that youths with lawyers consistently receive more severe
dispositions than do those without attorneys. In twelve possible
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comparisons-six offense categories times two dispositions-repre-
sented youths received more severe dispositions than unrepre-
sented youth at every offense level in the state overall and in the
counties with medium rates of representation, and in eleven out of
twelve comparisons in the counties with low rates of representation.
Although a similar pattern was revealed in the counties with high
rates of representation (eight out of twelve comparisons), as the
footnotes in Table 9 indicate, in several cells there were so few un-
represented youths that any out-of-home placement or secure con-
finement disposition produced anomalous results. Because the data
reported in Table 9 control for the seriousness of the present of-
fense, it appears that youths with attorneys are between two and
three times more likely to receive severe dispositions than are those
youths without counsel.
While the relationship between representation and more severe
disposition is consistent, the explanation of this relationship is not
readily apparent. It may be that the presence of lawyers antagonizes
traditional juvenile court judges and subtly influences the eventual
disposition imposed. Conversely, while not necessarily "punishing"
juveniles who appear with counsel, judges may exhibit more leni-
ency to a youth who is not represented. However, the pattern also
prevails in the counties with high rates of representation where the
presence of counsel is not unusual. Perhaps judges discern the
eventual disposition early in the proceedings and appoint counsel
more frequently when an out-of-home placement or secure confine-
ment is anticipated. Still another possibility is that other variables
beside the seriousness of the present offense may influence both the
initial decision to appoint counsel as well as the ultimate disposition.
While Table 9 reports the rates of disposition for represented
and unrepresented juveniles, Table 10 reports the proportions of
juveniles who receive out-of-home placement and secure confine-
ment dispositions who were represented. Thus, Table 6 reports
that for the state as a whole, 18.5% and 11.1% ofjuveniles received
out-of-home and secure confinement dispositions. Table 10 reports
that of the 18.5% of juveniles who were removed from their home,
69.3% were represented and 30.7% were not. Similarly, of the
11.1% ofjuveniles who were incarcerated, 73.5% had counsel and
26.5% did not. In short, more than one-quarter of the juveniles in
secure confinement and nearly one-third of those removed from
their homes did not have counsel.
In light of the differences in counties with high, medium and
low rates of representation as well as in rates of representation by
offense (Table 3), the results reported in Table 10 follow predict-
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TABLE 10
DIsPOSMON (HOME/SECURE) OF JUVENILES AND
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW


























69.3 30.7 97.2 2.8 70.4 29.6 42.4 57.6
73.5 26.5 97.4 2.6 74.6 25.4 47.4 52.6
83.2 16.8 98.1 1.9 88.5 11.5 59.3 40.7
82.6 17.4 100.0 - 88.3 11.7 50.0 50.0
76.5 23.5 98.6 1.4 83.3 16.7 52.1 47.9









- 83.3 16.7 46.0 54.0
- 80.0 20.0 46.9 53.1
2.4 67.8 32.2 37.7 62.3
2.1 67.8 32.2 39.5 60.5
96.1 3.9 60.6 39.4 46.0 54.0
95.6 4.4 66.3 33.7 53.2 46.8
55.3 44.7 96.2 3.8 48.8 51.2 27.2 72.8
66.9 33.1 97.0 3.0 45.7 54.3 40.8 59.2
able patterns. Overall, less than 3% of unrepresented juveniles in
the high representation counties were removed from their homes or
incarcerated. In the medium representation counties, more than
one-quarter of the juveniles, and in the low representation counties,
more than half of the juveniles who were removed and incarcerated
did not have counsel. Indeed, in the low representation counties,
only a bare majority of the juveniles charged with felony offenses
who received home removal or confinement dispositions were rep-
resented. In every other offense category, the majority of juveniles
who were removed or incarcerated did not have attorneys.
Table 3 reported higher rates of representation for juveniles
charged with more serious offenses. When the disposition rates are
analyzed by offense, it appears that the largest proportions of un-
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represented juveniles who are removed or incarcerated are those
who are charged with the less serious offenses. For the state, only
17.4% of unrepresented juveniles charged with a felony offense
against the person were incarcerated. By contrast, 33.5% of the
juveniles charged with minor offenses against property-the most
common delinquency allegation in the state-and 33.1% of unrep-
resented status offenders were incarcerated. Only 18.4% of Minne-
sota's juveniles were charged with felony offenses and the greatest
concentrations of delinquents were in the minor property offense
category, such as shoplifting, theft, and vandalism and status offense
categories (Table 1). Juveniles charged with these offenses had
lower rates of representation (Tables 3 and 4), and, as a result, these
were the offense categories in which the largest proportions of un-
represented juveniles were removed from their homes and
incarcerated.
These findings are especially important in light of the United
States and Minnesota Supreme Courts' rulings in Scott and Borst that
adult misdemeanor defendants should not be incarcerated without
the assistance of counsel or a valid waiver. 176 There are many coun-
ties in the state in which half or more of the youths who are charged
with seemingly minor, misdemeanor offenses are removed from
their homes or incarcerated without the assistance of counsel. It is
questionable whether the juvenile court judges who sentenced the
young juveniles in these minor nuisance cases engaged in the type
of "penetrating and comprehensive examination" that must precede
a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of the right to counsel. 177
Tables 9 and 10 report the proportions of represented and un-
represented juveniles charged with different types of offenses who
received out-of-home placement and secure confinement disposi-
tions. Table 11 reports on juveniles' dispositions when represented
by different types of attorneys-private, public defender, county at-
torney, or none. Thus, Table 9 reports that in the state overall, of
thosejuveniles who were represented by counsel and charged with a
felony offense against the person, 44.8% and 28.3% respectively re-
ceived out-of-home placement and secure confinement dispositions.
Table 11 indicates that the 44.8% overall rate differs by type of at-
torney, with 30.3% of juveniles represented by private counsel re-
moved from their homes as compared with 49.0% of those
176 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888,
894 (1967).
177 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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BARRY C. FELD
represented by public defenders and 44.3% of those represented by
court appointed lawyers.
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of different types of at-
torneys because the method of delivering legal services is associated
closely with counties, which in turn vary in rates of representation
(Table 3) and in other dimensions. While private attorneys are a
relative rarity in juvenile courts, they appear least frequently in the
county courts with high rates of representation. By contrast, public
defenders predominate in the counties with high and medium rates
of representation-primarily urban and suburban county courts-
while court appointed lawyers predominate in the rural counties
with lowest rates of representation. Despite these variations in legal
services systems by county rate of representation, rank ordering the
different types of attorneys within an offense category by disposi-
tions provides a crude indicator of the effectiveness of counsel.
Table 9 reported that generally smaller proportions of unrepre-
sented juveniles than represented juveniles received the most intru-
sive dispositions. For the state as a whole, juveniles represented by
private attorneys have the lowest rates of out-of-home placement
and secure confinement dispositions of represented juveniles; those
represented by court appointed attorneys have intermediate rates;
and those represented by public defenders appear to have the high-
est rates of removal. Of course, these findings are only suggestive,
because court appointed lawyers predominate in the rural counties
with low rates of representation where the judges also impose less
severe sentences for offenses of comparable severity (Table 6).
When the data are examined separately by county, according to
the rates of representation, the pattern remains. In counties with
high rates of representation, the 2.4% of juveniles who retain pri-
vate counsel have the lowest rate of out-of-home placement and se-
cure confinement of all represented juveniles. In the counties with
medium rates of representation, juveniles with private counsel have
the lowest rates of out-of-home placement, but the highest propor-
tion who receive secure confinement dispositions. In the counties
with low rates of representation, the 3.4% of juveniles who retain
private counsel have the lowest proportions of out-of-home place-
ment or secure confinement dispositions and enjoy a distinct advan-
tage over their counterparts who are represented by other types of
attorneys. Despite the relative success of private attorneys as com-
pared to other types of lawyers, unrepresented juveniles in the state
and in all types of counties still have lower rates of removal and
confinement.
The comparative success of private attorneys in juvenile courts
1242 [Vol. 79
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is somewhat surprising., Private attorneys are not attracted to juve-
nile court practice for a variety of reasons. 178 As an arcane legal
specialty area marked by informality and confidentiality, juvenile
courts are typically closed, in-bred, and inhospitable to the occa-
sional outsiders who invade their province. In the present study,
however, this may be a blessing in disguise. A private attorney with
relatively little regular involvement in juvenile court proceedings
may have a smaller stake in conforming to the expectations of the
court or social services personnel and thus may be more independ-
ent on behalf of his client. 7 9 By contrast, attorneys immersed more
routinely in the juvenile justice process may be more responsive to
institutional expectations and more inclined to value stable long-
term relations with the court and its personnel.
Although the SJIS data do not include information on parental
socioeconomic status, later analyses suggest that the presence of a
private attorney-may be an indirect indicator of a somewhat more
178 See A. PIxrr, supra note 13, at 163-75. The disincentives for private attorneys to
represent juveniles are substantial: juveniles are not a significant source of fee-paying
clients. If a private attorney is retained, most likely it will be by the child's parents, a
situation which potentially puts the attorney in the middle of a conflict between the
interests of the juvenile client and those of the fee-paying parent. Moreover, most juve-
nile courts do not give private practitioners priority on the calendar and they may have
less access to court personnel than do the public lawyer regulars. Platt & Friedman, The
Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1156, 1169-79
(1968)[hereinafter Limits of Advocacy]. Finally, private lawyers may be discouraged from
juvenile practice because of the inherent difficulty of working with unpredictable young
people and the frustration of practicing law in a highly discretionary, alegal environ-
ment. See Feld, supra note 2, at 272-75.
In light of the amorphous nature of a delinquency charge, there are few opportuni-
ties for outright "victory" and these are further diminished by the unreliability of young
witnesses and the comparative credibility of adults versus juveniles. Ultimately, lawyers
manipulate symbols and create an appearance of action which justifies their fees. See
Blumberg, supra note 114, at 18-19. In juvenile court, there is less opportunity for that
type of mystification because there are fewer rules or administrative guidelines to ma-
nipulate and less opportunity for plea and sentence bargaining than in the adult system.
See M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 46-60; R. EMERSON, supra note 159, at 172-216; D.
MATZA, supra note 17, at 121-25. Finally, private attorneys, as adults, share the juvenile
court's view of their clients as children, experience dilemmas when representing young-
sters that do not occur when defending adults, and internalize the court's nominal com-
mitment to the rehabilitative ideal.
179 See Kelley and Ramsey, supra note 139, at 438-39. See also Nardulli, "Insider"Justice:
Defense Attorneys and the Handling of Felony Cases, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLGY 379, 415
(1986) (impact of different types of defense attorneys on criminal justice administra-
tion); Wheeler & Wheeler, Reflections on Legal Representation of the Economically Disadvan-
taged: Beyond Assembly Line Justice, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 319, 326-27 (1980) ("[lIt appears
that clients of retained and appointed attorneys have similar conviction rates but the
retained attorneys' clients receive less serious dispositions. These findings indicate that
type of attorney has a greater impact on sentencing than on conviction.").
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affluent family background. 180 If so, then the relative success of pri-
vate practitioners may be less a tribute to their legal acumen than to
the parental wherewithal that led to their retention. When the par-
ents pay the fees, a private attorney may be more responsive to their
interests. In the juvenile court context, this may mean that the pri-
vate attorney shares the parents' interest in seeking a disposition
that will further the child's best interest. The coalition of a private
attorney and parents pursuing the child's welfare may provide evi-
dence of "family sponsorship" that justifies a more lenient disposi-
tion. 18' Thus, the variations in rates of disposition may reflect social
characteristics of juveniles for which this study cannot account and
for which the type of attorney is an indirect indicator.
B. PRIOR REFERRALS, ATTORNEYS, AND DISPOSITIONS
In addition to the seriousness of the present offense, a prior
history of delinquency referrals effects the eventual disposition that
a juvenile receives. 18 2 The next analyses control for the present of-
fense and assess the relationships between prior referrals and dispo-
sitions, prior referrals and representation by counsel, and prior
referrals, representation by counsel, and dispositions. A juvenile's
prior record in 1986 was constructed by merging 1984, 1985, and
1986 annual data tapes and matching a youth's identification num-
bers across the years. ' 83 In these analyses, the record of prior refer-
rals are coded as 0, 1 or 2, 3 or 4, and 5 or more. Prior referrals
include only previous cases that wereformally petitioned and does not
reflect ajuvenile's contacts that were referred to court but which did
not result in the filing of formal charges.
180 See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. See also M. BORTNER, supra note 59,
at 172-74.
181 D. MATZA, supra note 17, at 125-28. Matza concludes that dispositional decision-
making is strongly influenced by the ability of parents to supervise their child to avoid
subsequent "scandal." Matza noted that:
this initial reckoning is then importantly qualified by an assessment of the potential-
ities of "out-patient supervision" and the guarantee against scandal inherent in the
willingness and ability of parents or surrogates to sponsor the child .... If the
reckoning of danger [of scandal] is moderate then the decision will turn on an as-
sessment of the presence, the amount, the quality, and the dependability of parental
sponsorship .... [T]hose with adequate sponsorship will be rendered onto proba-
tion, and those inadequately sponsored to prison.
Id. at 125.
182 See Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 297; Henretta, Frazier & Bishop, The Effects of
Pior Case Outcomes on Juvenile Justice Decision-Making, 65 Soc. FORCES 554, 560 (1986).
183 See supra note 134. Hennepin County (Minneapolis) is the most populous county
in Minnesota and processes more than one-quarter of all delinquency cases. Its comput-
erized court processing data was integrated into the SJIS data system in 1984 thereby
providing statewide totals.
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1. Prior Referrals and Dispositions
Table 12 reports both the overall percentages ofjuveniles with
prior records as well as the relationship between the present of-
fense, prior referrals, and out-of-home placement and secure con-
finement dispositions. For the entire state, 71.9% of the youths
against whom petitions were filed appeared in juvenile court for the
first time. When the prior referrals in the counties with high, me-
dium, and low representation are examined separately, however,
about 10% more of the juveniles in the low representation counties
were making their first appearance with correspondingly fewer re-
cidivists than in the other types of counties. This reinforces the ob-
servation based on Table 1 that the juveniles in the low
representation, predominantly rural, counties were relatively less in-
volved in criminal activity.
Table 12 also reports the relationship between a prior record of
delinquency and out-of-home placement and secure confinement
dispositions. Quite clearly, both overall and within categories of of-
fenses, a record of previously petitioned offenses substantially alters
a youth's likelihood of receiving a more severe disposition. In the
aggregate, each additional one or two prior referrals increases the
proportion of juveniles' receiving out-of-home placements and se-
cure confinements with the largest increase occurring between those
juveniles with one or two prior referrals and those with three or
four. Regardless of the nature of the present offense, by the time a
juvenile appears in juvenile court on his or her third or fourth delin-
quency petition, more than half (52.9%) will be removed from the
home and more than one-third (39.9%) will be confined.
Within each offense level, there appears to be a nearly perfect
linear relationship between additional prior referrals and more se-
vere dispositions. For example, Table 6 reports that of those
juveniles who commit a felony offense against the person, 42.2%
receive out-of-home placement dispositions. Table 12 shows that
the 42.2%o overall rate is composed of 35.7% of those with no prior
referrals, 51.9% of those with one or two, 84.8% of those with three
or four, and 100% of those with five or more priors. The same pat-
tern prevails at all offense levels, prior referrals, and for both types
of dispositions.
Even though there is a direct relationship between prior refer-
rals and increasing severity of intervention in all types of counties,
the juvenile court judges in the low representation counties consist-
ently remove and confine smaller proportions of juveniles than do
their counterparts in the medium and high representation counties.
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This pattern, initially observed in Table 6, persists. After control-
ling simultaneously for the seriousness of the present offense and
prior referrals, the juvenile court judges in the low representation
counties generally sentence less severely.' 8 4
Examining the ratios of out-of-home placement to secure con-
finement indicates that as a juvenile accumulates prior referrals the
likelihood that the eventual disposition will entail secure confine-
ment increases. For example, for the state overall, of the juveniles
with no prior referrals who were removed from their home, 54.8%
received institutional commitments (6.8/12.4%). By contrast, of
those with five or more priors, 79.2% were confined in secure set-
tings (48.8/61.6%). Comparing the dispositions of juveniles mak-
ing their first appearance with those of juveniles with five or more
prior referrals suggests that prior referrals exert a stronger influ-
ence on the sentences received by juveniles charged with less seri-
ous offenses than those charged with more serious offenses.
Table 12 provides a strong indicator that despite the juvenile
court's nominal commitment to individualized sentencing, the
judges have reintroduced defacto the principle of offense as a dispo-
sitional guideline. The seriousness of the present offense and the
length of the prior record both exert substantial influences on a
youth's eventual disposition. These are also the primary factors in-
cluded in the Minnesota Adult Sentencing Guidelines. 8 5
2. Prior Referrals and Rates of Representation
Tables 3 and 4 report that for the state as a whole, 45.3% of
juveniles were represented. In the counties with high, medium, and
low rates of representation, the rates were 94.5%, 46.8%, and
19.3% respectively. The aggregate rates and the rates for the differ-
ent offenses are the composites for all juveniles. Table 13 shows,
overall and within each offense level, the relationship between prior
delinquency referrals and representation.
There is a direct relationship between additional prior referrals
and increased rates of representation. For example, while, for the
state as a whole, the rate of representation is 45.3%, only 39.3% of
juveniles appearing for the first time have counsel, as contrasted
with 57.8% of those with one or two prior referrals, 74.0% of those
with three or four, and 80.8% of those with five or more prior refer-
184 Juvenile court judges' dispositions may also reflect budgetary considerations, be-
cause the costs of placements are borne by the welfare funds of the county. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.251 (West 1986). In rural counties, with small populations and tax
bases, extensive and therefore expensive intervention simply may be fiscally prohibitive.
185 See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 103.
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rals. The relationship between prior referrals and rates of represen-
tation prevails at all offense levels and in all types of counties. The
minor deviations that occur only appear for those juveniles with five
or more referrals and can be attributed to the diminishing numbers
in those cells. The relationship between prior referrals and appoint-
ment of counsel occurs even in the high representation counties
where there is very little overall variation in rates of representation.
Because larger proportions of juveniles charged with serious of-
fenses are represented in all types of counties, the influence of pri-
ors on rates of representation appears to be stronger for youths
charged with less serious types of offenses.
The findings in Tables 12 and 13 also implicate the United
States and Minnesota Supreme Courts' rulings in Baldasar and
Edmison that prohibit the use of prior uncounselled convictions to
enhance subsequent sentences. 86 Overall, more than half the
juveniles in the state are unrepresented. If, as Table 13 indicates,
even lower proportions of first-offenders are represented by coun-
sel, then many of those who are sentenced subsequently as repeat
offenders have had their dispositions based, at least in part, on un-
counselled prior convictions. Because the use of prior uncounselled
convictions at later sentencing is prohibited for adults, one can only
speculate about juvenile court judges' apparent heavy reliance on
uncounselled prior adjudications as a major determinant of many
juveniles' subsequent sentences.
3. Dispositions by Attorneys by Priors
Tables 12 and 13 show that a record of prior referrals is associ-
ated with receiving more severe dispositions as well as with a greater
likelihood of having an attorney. Table 14 examines the relation-
ship between prior referrals and receiving an out-of-home place-
ment or secure confinement disposition when an attorney is present
or absent. The row percentages within offense categories, disposi-
tions, and prior referrals are those for youths receiving an out-of-
home placement or secure confinement disposition when an attor-
ney is present and when one is not.
As can be seen by row comparisons at each offense level and
type of disposition across priors, youths with attorneys are more
likely to receive out-of-home placement and secure confinement dis-
positions than are those without counsel. In Table 14, which con-
trols for the seriousness of the present offense and the prior record
186 See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d
85, 87 (Minn. 1985).
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1989] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
simultaneously, larger proportions of youths with lawyers receive
out-of-home placements and secure confinement than do those
without counsel. For the state as a whole, with fourty-eight possible
comparisons-six categories of offenses times two types of disposi-
tions times four degrees of priors-represented youths received
more severe dispositions in forty-four instances, or 93.3% of the
cases.
When the effects of representation are analyzed separately in
the counties with high, medium, and low rates of representation, the
same pattern prevails-represented youths consistently fare worse
than unrepresented ones. In the counties with high rates of repre-
sentation, one would expect very little variation in dispositions be-
cause nearly all juveniles had attorneys and virtually no
unrepresented youths were removed or confined. Of the fourty-
eight comparisons, there were only seven instances in which a larger
proportion of unrepresented juveniles received more severe dispo-
sitions than their represented counterparts. Further, as Table 14
indicates, in five of those seven instances, only one unrepresented
juvenile in the comparison cell received an out-of-home or secure
disposition. What is especially impressive about the dispositional
practices in the high representation counties is the extremely low
percentages and absolute numbers of juveniles who were removed
from their homes or confined without the assistance of counsel (see
Table 10).
The same pattern of represented youths receiving more severe
sentences than unrepresented youths prevailed in the medium and
low representation counties as well. In the medium rate counties, in
thirty-six of forty-eight comparisons, or 75% of the cases, repre-
sented juveniles fared worse. Further, in five of the twelve compari-
sons in which larger proportions of unrepresented juveniles
received more severe sentences, there was only one case in the un-
represented cell. In the low rate counties, the pattern was some-
what less strong, probably because there were proportionally so few
represented juveniles, only 19.3% of the total. Even so, there were
only fifteen comparisons in which unrepresented juveniles received
more severe sentences, and in four of those instances, there were no
represented juveniles in the comparison cell.
Thus, for juveniles in Minnesota, the presence of an attorney
seems to be an aggravating factor at sentencing after controlling for
the seriousness of the present offense and prior record. Both in the
state as a whole, as well as in the counties with high, medium and
low rates of representation, the same pattern prevails: larger pro-
portions of represented juveniles than unrepresented youths re-
1251
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ceived severe dispositions. Since many of the deviations from this
pattern are the result of small numbers-only one juvenile in the
unrepresented comparison cell-the apparently adverse impact of
counsel probably is even stronger.
Although a lengthy prior record increases both the likelihood of
representation and probability of receiving a severe disposition, the
absence of counsel by no means protects a juvenile from harsh dis-
positions. While larger proportions of represented youths may be
removed from their homes or confined, a substantial proportion of
unrepresented juveniles, including many with extensive records of
delinquency, are also removed or confined (Tables 12 and 13).
Since Argersinger, Scott, and Borst alerted trial judges to the need to
appoint counsel when incarceration is anticipated, it is difficult to
explain why so many youths charged with a serious present offenses
and with extensive prior records appear in court without counsel
when a severe sentence appears so likely.
While the relationship between representation and more severe
dispositions is consistent in the state and in the different types of
counties, the explanation of this relationship is not readily apparent.
Perhaps still other variables besides the seriousness of the present
offense and the length of the prior record influence both the initial
appointment of counsel and the eventual disposition.
C. PRETRIAL DETENTION, ATrORNEYS, AND DISPOSITIONS
Several studies have examined the determinants of detention
and the relationship between a child's pretrial detention status and
subsequent disposition. 187 These studies report that while several
of the same variables affect both rates of detention and subsequent
disposition, after appropriate controls, detention per se exhibits an
independent effect on dispositions. 188 It may be, therefore, that the
187 See Clarke & Koch, supra note 57; Frazier & Bishop, The Pretrial Detention ofJuveniles
and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1132 (1985); Krisberg &
Schwartz, RethinkingJuvenileJustice, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 333 (1983); McCarthy, Preventive
Detention and Pretrial Custody in the Juvenile Court, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 185 (1987).
188 Clarke and Koch note that:
[after controlling for the effects of present offense and prior record,] the commit-
ment rate remained much greater for children held in detention, except at the high-
est level of record and offense seriousness .... We conclude that being detained
before adjudication had an independent effect on the likelihood of commitment,
entirely apart from the fact that both detention and commitment had some common
causal antecedents.
Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 294. Professors Clarke and Koch suggest that the in-
dependent effects of detention on rates of adjudication and commitment stem from the
fact that "[t]he child's ability to defend himself may have been impaired by detention,
either because he was preudged by the same court that later decided his case, or because it was
1252 [Vol. 79
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apparent relationship between representation by counsel and more
severe dispositions is influenced by differences in rates of pretrial
detention. The next set of analyses, therefore, examine the relation-
ships between detention and offenses, detention and counsel, de-
tention and dispositions, and detention, counsel, and dispositions.
1. Detention by Offense
Table 15 shows the overall numbers and percentages of
juveniles against whom petitions were filed and who were detained.
It also shows the rates of pretrial detention by present offense cate-
gory and the number of prior referrals. Detention, as used here,
refers to a juvenile's custody status following arrest or referral but
prior to formal court action-adjudication or disposition. Deten-
tion, as distinguished from shelter care, connotes a physically re-
stricting facility which may include a county or regional detention
center, state institution, or adult jail. 89 The Minnesota detention
statutes and Juvenile Court Rules governing detention procedures
authorize pretrial preventive detention if "the child would endanger
self or others, not return for a court hearing, nor remain in the care
or control of the person to whose lawful custody the child is re-
leased, or that the child's health or welfare would be immediately
endangered." 190 The specific offense that a juvenile allegedly com-
mitted is not an explicit statutory criterion for detention except in-
harder for him to talk to his lawyer and otherwise prepare his defense." Id. at 295 (em-
phasis added).
189 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(16)-(17) (West 1986); Schwartz, Harris & Levi, The
Jailing ofJuveniles in Minnesota: A Case Study, 34 CRIME & DELINQ 133 (1988).
190 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171(1). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.172(1) (West 1986);
MINN. R. P.Juv. GT. 18.02(2)(A)(i), 18.06(5)(b)(i), 18.09(2)(D)(i). See generally Feld, supra
note 2, at 191-209. Professor Feld has criticized the Minnesota juvenile detention stat-
ute extensively:
In Minnesota, the detaining court need only find "probable cause that.., others
would be endangered if [the defendant were] released," and eligibility for detention is
neither limited to the type of crime charged nor based on an examination of the
accused's individual circumstances. Although continued detention is authorized
based on an individual judge's conclusion that the community would be "endan-
gered" by a youth's release, "endangerment" is not statutorily defined or circum-
scribed. The Minnesota rule lacks even the New York statutory requirement
[upheld in Schall v. Martin] that the risk be that of "an act which if committed by an
adult would constitute a crime." Furthermore, as distinguished from the "substan-
tial probability" of "dangerous crimes" requirement in Edwards, Minnesota requires
only a finding of probable cause that a youth committed a delinquent act, which can
include a violation of "any state or local law" as well as of many ordinances. Pre-
sumably, every juvenile court judge in the state may apply this same lower standard
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sofar as ajuvenile court judge views it as evidence of "endangering"
others.
While Minnesota appears to have a low overall rate of pretrial
detention, '91 only 7.6%, the SJIS uses a very restrictive definition of
"detention." Juveniles in Minnesota are coded as detained only if a
detention hearing is held within thirty-six hours-about two court
days-after the juvenile was placed in custody. 192 Many more
juveniles who are detained briefly pending the arrival of their par-
191 In 1984, the Minnesota rate of pretrial detention was 9.4%, the lowest in a six
state comparison. See Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 409-11, Table 5.
192 See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.171(1), 260.172(1) (West 1986), MINN. R. P.
Juv. CT. 18; Feld, supra note 2, at 191-209. Because the detention statute excludes week-
ends and holidays from the 36-hour time limit, a child taken into custody on a Friday
could be held for four days or more prior to a detention hearing.
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ents or released within one or two days but prior to a detention
hearing are not counted as detained.
The use of pretrial detention follows a similar pattern in the
state as a whole as well as in the counties classified on the basis of
rates of representation. While only a small proportion of all
juveniles in the state receive a detention hearing (7.6%o), the seri-
ousness of the present offense and the length of the prior record
both appear to alter substantially a youth's likelihood of being de-
tained.193 For the entire state, nearly one-quarter of youths charged
with a felony offense against the person are detained. Juveniles
charged with felony offenses against property in addition to those
charged with minor offenses against the person also have higher
than baseline rates of detention. 194 While there is some relationship
among the seriousness of the offense, prior referrals, and rates of
detention, it does not appear to be a strong one. Even when youths
are charged with the most serious offenses, the vast majority are not
detained.
When the data are examined separately for counties with high,
medium, and low rates of representation, similar patterns emerge.
Youths charged with felony offenses, offenses against the person,
and those with lengthier prior records are consistently detained at
higher rates than their less delinquent counterparts. While the pat-
tern is the same, the overall use of detention differs substantially.
Detention is used most heavily in the counties with medium rates of
representation in which Hennepin County predominates. By con-
trast, the counties with low rates of representation employ pretrial
detention far less often. Their rates of detention are typically only
193 The significance of a prior record for the detention decision has been noted in
several studies. See Bailey, Preadjudicatoty Detention in a Large Metropolitan Juvenile Court, 5
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 19 (1981) (a youth's previous court experience was found to be an
important predictor of detention); Cohen & Kluegel, The Detention Decision: A Study of the
Impact of Social Characteristics and Legal Factors in Two Metropolitan Juvenile Courts, 58 Soc.
FORCES 146 (1979) (prior record is a major determinant of detention); McCarthy, supra
note 187 (youths detained to protect the community are more dangerous than other
offenders).
194 The bivariate analyses presented here suggest a greater degree of "legal rational-
ity" than do other studies which report insignificant relationships between legal vari-
ables and detention decisions. See, e.g., R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, DIvERsrIv IN
A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SYsTEM 65-67, 101-04 (1978) (current offense, offense history,
and prior experience in youth corrections do not appear to be strongly related to the
detention decision); Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 293-94 (initial detention decision is
not based on offense criteria or other rational factors); Frazier & Bishop, supra note 187,
at 1143 ("[N]either legal variables nor sociodemographic characteristics can predict the
probability of being detained."). However, the regression analyses of the detention de-
cisions, infra Tables 43-46, are much more consistent with the other research that sug-
gests that there is no apparent rationale for the initial decision to detain a juvenile.
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one-third to one-half of those in the medium representation coun-
ties. The most likely explanation for differences in overall rates of
detention is the availability of detention facilities. There is substan-
tial evidence that the primary determinant of rates of detention in a
state or county is the availability of detention bed space. 195
2. Pretrial Detention and Representation by Counsel
Table 16 examines the relationship between juveniles' deten-
tion status and rates of representation by counsel. Detention, par-
ticularly if it continues for more than a day and results in a hearing,
is a legally significant juvenile court intervention which also requires
the assistance of counsel. 96 Every jurisdiction provides for a
prompt detention hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause, the presence of substantive grounds for detention, and the
child's custody status pending trial.
TABLE 16
PRETRIAL DETENTION AND REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
DETENTION: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OVERALL
% COUNSEL 75.4 43.0 96.0 94.4 73.7 43.4 60.6 17.8
Felony Offense
Against Person 87.2 74.5 96.9 97.7 86.7 79.0 76.9 54.0
Felony Offense
Against Property 82.0 60.8 100.0 98.2 84.2 65.0 68.9 35.0
Minor Offense
Against Person 77.5 60.6 100.0 96.2 73.0 64.6 75.0 28.5
Minor Offense
Against Property 72.3 42.9 97.4 97.2 71.9 49.6 55.8 14.9
Other Delinquency 76.1 43.2 91.8 91.5 66.7 32.8 70.4 19.7
Status 62.3 27.2 95.3 88.4 53.3 25.5 37.3 8.6
195 A penological paraphrase of Parkinson's Law is that "bodies expand to fill the bed-
space allotted." See Bookin-Weiner, Assuming Responsibility: Legalizing PreadjudicatoryJuve-
nile Detention, 30 CRIME & DELINq. 39 (1984); Kramer & Steffensmeier, The Differential
Detention/Jailing of Juveniles: A Comparison of Detention and Non-Detention Courts, 5 PEP-
PERDINE L. REv. 795 (1978); Krisberg & Schwartz, supra note 187; Lerman, Discussion of
Differential Selection of Juveniles for Detention, 14 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 166 (1977);
Pawlak, Differential Selection of Juveniles for Detention, 14 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 152
(1977). Frazier and Bishop summarize these studies, noting that "a juvenile's detention
status may be based on illegitimate factors such as the organization of the decision-
making process or the philosophies ofjustice held by officials." Frazier & Bishop, Pre-
trial Detention, supra note 187, at 1136.
196 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275-77 (1984); Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice,
supra note 2, at 191-209.
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Table 16 reports the rates of representation overall and at each
offense level for juveniles who were detained and for those who
were not. While only 45.3% of juveniles in the state were repre-
sented (Table 3), the rate of representation for the 7.6% who were
detained was 75.4%, as contrasted with 43.0% for those who re-
mained at liberty. Similarly, 77.3% of all juveniles charged with a
felony offense against the person were represented (Table 3) and
nearly a quarter of them were detained (Table 15). Of those who
were detained, 87.2% were represented, as contrasted with 74.5%
of those who were not detained. A comparison of the two columns
for the state as a whole and for the counties grouped by rates of
representation reveals a very consistent pattern-youths who were
held in detention had substantially higher rates of representation
than did juveniles who were not (compare Table 3 with Table 16).
While there is virtually no difference between detained and non-de-
tained youths in the counties with high rates of representation, in
the other types of counties as well as for the state as a whole, the
differences in rates are considerable, especially as the seriousness of
the offense decreases. While a majority of all the juveniles charged
with minor offenses against property, other delinquency, and status
offenses are unrepresented (Table 3), the situation is reversed for
the small group who are held in detention. In the low representa-
tion counties, where only 19.3% of all juveniles have counsel, for
the 4.0% of youths who are detained, more than 60% are
represented.
Comparing the overall rates of representation at different of-
fense levels (Tables 3) with the rates of representation for detained
youths (Table 16) shows that detention provides a significant addi-
tional impetus for the appointment of counsel, particularly for less
serious offenders. For example, while only 15.8% of juveniles in
low representation counties charged with a minor offense against
property have counsel (Table 3), 55.8% of those held in detention
do have counsel.
3. Detention and Dispositions
Several studies that examined the determinants of detention
and the relationship between pretrial detention and subsequent dis-
positions report that while the two decisions share common vari-
ables, detention appears to exhibit an independent effect on the
severity of dispositions.197 Table 17 shows the relationship between
a youth's present offense, detention status, and eventual disposition.
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15.3 56.7 22.8 56.6 15.0 59.7 12.0
9.1 32.0 14.6 35.7 9.0 36.6 6.6
35.0
21.7
62.5 40.0 61.5 37.9 80.8 29.1
41.7 26.7 48.4 23.6 42.3 16.9
71.0 26.8 85.7 30.7 69.9 26.9 69.0 24.3
53.3 19.5 57.1 23.5 53.4 21.2 51.7 15.6
54.2 19.8 64.3 26.6 48.5 18.6 68.8 16.6
32.3 12.0 35.7 18.3 30.3 8.7 37.5 11.2
53.4 13.6 60.5 17.8 49.3 15.4 63.5 10.7
33.9 9.4 36.8 12.5 30.3 11.6 44.4 6.7
59.7 15.9 60.0 31.3 58.6 10.3 61.5 12.4
36.4 9.4 36.4 19.0 36.4 6.1 36.5 7.0
47.9 10.6 51.7 20.4 49.0 10.2 42.1 8.0
11.4 3.1 17.2 9.0 6.3 2.0 14.0 2.1
It reports the percentages of youths within each offense category
who were detained and who were not detained who received out-of-
home placement and secure confinement dispositions.
Again, the results are remarkably consistent; in the state as a
whole, in the counties grouped by rates of representation, and at
every offense level, substantially larger proportions of youths who
were detained received more severe dispositions than did those who
were not detained. When compared with the overall disposition
rates by offense (Table 6), detained youths were about three times
more likely to receive severe dispositions than their counterparts
who were not held in detention. Again, while 18.5% of all juveniles
were removed from their homes (Table 6), 57.3% of detained
juveniles were removed as contrasted with 15.3% of those who were
not detained. In part, the differences in rates of dispositions may
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reflect the somewhat larger proportion of juveniles with prior
records being held in pretrial detention. 98 This suggests that simi-
lar factors influence both the initial detention decision and the ulti-
mate disposition as well. However, when one compares the
relationship between present offense and disposition (Table 6) with
the relationship between offense/detention and disposition (Table
17), it is apparent that detained youths are substantially more at risk
of receiving out-of-home placement and secure confinement dispo-
sitions than are non-detained youths. While pretrial detention in-
creases a youth's probability of receiving more severe dispositions,
the impact of detention on dispositions increases as the seriousness
of the offense declines (compare Table 6 with Table 17).
4. Representation by Counsel of Detained Juveniles and Disposition
Table 15 reported the percentages of youths who were detained
at each offense level. Table 16 examined the relationship between
detention status and representation and reported that detention
substantially increased the likelihood of representation. Table 17
examined the relationship between detention status and disposition
and showed that detention increased the likelihood of a youth re-
ceiving more severe dispositions. Table 18 reports the relationship
between offense and disposition of detained youths when youths are
represented by counsel and when they are not, to investigate
whether the presence of counsel affects their sentence.
Even though pretrial detention increases the likelihood that a
youth will have counsel (Table 16), Table 18 indicates that a de-
tained youth who is represented by counsel remains more likely to
receive a severe disposition than a detained youth who is not repre-
sented. For the state as a whole, out of twelve comparisons-six
offenses times two dispositions-larger proportions of detained
juveniles who were represented received more severe dispositions
in ten instances. In the counties with high rates of representation,
the represented/detained youths received more severe dispositions
simply because there were so few cases of unrepresented detained
juveniles (Table 9). In the counties with medium rates of represen-
tation, in 75% of the comparisons, detained juveniles with lawyers
received more severe sentences than did their unrepresented coun-
terparts, as was also the case in 62.5%o of the counties with low rates
or representation. When the focus is only on the most severe dispo-
sition-secure confinement-larger proportions of detained
juveniles with lawyers than those without lawyers were institutional-
198 Compare Table 12 (overall priors) with Table 15 (detention ofjuveniles with priors).
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TABLE 18
REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED JUVENILES AND
DISPOSITION (HOME/SECURE)
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
ATTORNEY: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Felony Offense
Against Person
% Home 64.8 53.3 59.1 - 63.2 40.0 80.0 80.0
% Secure 43.8 40.0 36.4 - 48.5 30.0 33.3 60.0
Felony Offense
Against Property
% Home 70.0 59.4 83.4 - 68.3 52.2 69.7 70.5
% Secure 52.2 43.2 55.6 - 51.2 43.5 54.5 42.9
Minor Offense
Against Person
% Home 57.1 45.0 58.3 - 51.1 41.1 87.5 66.6
% Secure 31.7 25.0 33.3 - 30.2 23.5 37.5 33.3
Minor Offense
Against Property
% Home 51.7 59.0 60.0 100.0* 47.9 50.0 60.0 84.2
% Secure 34.3 29.5 37.1 - 29.7 25.9 53.3 42.1
Other Delinquency
% Home 56.2 59.5 66.7 20.0 50.0 61.6 51.6 72.7
% Secure 35.4 26.2 37.8 20.0 29.6 30.8 41.9 18.2
Status
7o Home 55.8 35.5 52.7 33.3 56.3 38.1 64.7 32.4
% Secure 13.3 8.9 18.2 - 4.2 7.1 23.5 11.8
* There was only one (1) unrepresented juvenile in this cell.
ized in twenty-two out of the twenty-four comparisons. Thus, the
presence of counsel appears to be an "aggravating" factor in the
sentencing of detained youths, although it may also reflect the influ-
ence of other factors, such as prior record, which influence both the
initial detention decision, rates of representation, and the ultimate
disposition.
The data in Table 18 also reinforce the findings reported in Ta-
ble 9; in the counties with high rates of representation, there was
very little detention, removal from home, or incarceration of unrep-
resented juveniles. By contrast, even allowing for the "aggravating"
effect of counsel, substantial proportions of youths in the other
counties in Minnesota were being detained and removed from their
homes or incarcerated without the assistance of counsel.
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D. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS-RACE AND SEX-AND RATES OF
REPRESENTATION
Thus far, the analyses have focused on the relationships be-
tween three legal variables-present offense, prior record, and pre-
trial detention-and rates of representation and dispositions. Many
sentencing studies also examine the effects of demographic vari-
ables, such as sex and race, on juvenile justice administration.
1. Race, Representation, and Sentencing
The wide frame of relevance associated with individualized jus-
tice raises concerns about the impact of discretionary decision-mak-
ing on lower class and nonwhite youths who are frequently
overrepresented in the juvenile justice system.1 99 When practition-
ers of "individualized justice" base discretionary judgments on so-
cial characteristics which indirectly mirror race, rather than on legal
variables, their decisions frequently redound to the disadvantage of
the poor and minorities and raise issues of fairness, equality, and
justice.200 Their decisions may result in differential processing and
more severe sentencing of minority youths relative to whites.20'
An alternative explanation of the disproportionate overrepre-
199 See Dannefer & Schutt, Race and Juvenile Justice Processing in Court and Police Agencies,
87 AM. J. Soc. 1113 (1982); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 158, at 229-30;
Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, The Incarceration of Minority
Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 179 (1987); McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158, at 63-65;
Thornberry, supra note 162, at 168.
200 Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 32, at 591. Thornberry also noted
that:
[s]uch a finding [of discrimination] would raise questions about the ability of the
American criminal justice system to dispense fair and equitable justice for all. In
turn, that unfairness would raise questions about the ability of correctional institu-
tions to rehabilitate offenders who doubt the legitimacy of the system because of its
perceived bias.
Thornberry, supra note 162, at 164. See Chiricos,Jackson, & Waldo, Inequality in the Impo-
sition of a Criminal Label, 19 Soc. PROBs. 553, 556 (1972); Green, Race, Social Status, and
Criminal Arrest, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 476, 481 (1970). See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS SER-
VICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971). Some research reassessing earlier studies
which found racial differentials in sentencing practices reports "clear and consistent evi-
dence of a racial differential operating at each decision level. Moreover, the differentials
operate continuously over various decision levels to produce a substantial accumulative
racial differential which transforms a more or less heterogeneous racial arrest popula-
tion into a homogeneous institutionalized black population." Liska & Tausig, Theoretical
Interpretations of Social Class and Racial Differentials in Legal Decision-MakingforJuveniles, 20
Soc. Q. 197, 205 (1979). See McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158, at 56-61; Thornberry,
Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System, 70J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164, 168
(1979) [hereinafter Sentencing Disparities].
201 See Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 158, at 231-34; Krisberg, Schwartz,
Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman &Joe, supra note 199, at 179; McCarthy & Smith, Conceptu-
alization of Discrimination, supra note 158, at 56-61.
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sentation of minorities in the juvenile justice process is that despite
the juvenile system's nominal comniitment to individualized justice,
dispositional decisions are based on the principle of offense rather
than on an assessment of individual needs. In that case, the over-
representation of minority and lower class youths in the juvenile sys-
tem may be a function of differences in rates of delinquent activity
by these youths rather than discrimination by decision-makers. 20 2
Recent research notes some racial differences in the sentencing
ofjuveniles which cannot be accounted for by the legal variables. 203
Two general findings emerge from this research. The first is that
the principle of offense accounts for most of the variance in disposi-
tions that can be explained. 20 4 The second is that after controlling
for present offense and prior record, discretionary individualization
may be synonymous with racial discrimination. These studies report
that minority or lower class youths receive more severe dispositions
than do white youths after controlling for legally relevant vari-
ables.20 5 McCarthy and Smith report that while screening, deten-
202 M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972),
note that "official delinquents," those whose contacts with law enforcement personnel
resulted in official records, are disproportionately concentrated in poor and minority
communities and that in every socioeconomic category, black youths engaged in delin-
quency to a greater extent than their white counterparts. Id. at 135-40. See also Hinde-
lang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. REv. 93 (1978)
(racial differentials in criminal justice system may reflect real differences in behavior
rather than effects of discriminatory decision-making). However, Huizinga & Elliot,Ju-
venile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and Arrest Rates by Race, 33 CRIME & DELINQ.
206 (1987), conclude that:
it does not appear that differences in incarceration rates between racial groups can
be explained by differences in the proportions of persons of each racial group that
engage in delinquent behavior. Even if the slightly higher rates for more serious
offenses among minorities were given more importance than is statistically indi-
cated, the relative proportions of Whites and minorities involved in delinquent be-
havior could not account for the observed differences in incarceration rates.
Id. at 212. See also Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, supra note
199, at 196 ("[D]ifferences in incarceration rates by race cannot be explained by the
proportions of each racial group that engage in delinquent behavior.").
203 See Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 158, at 241-46; Krisberg, Schwartz,
Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, supra note 199, at 181; McCarthy & Smith, supra
note 158, at 55-58.
204 See McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158, at 55; Terry, Discrimination in the Handling of
Juvenile Offenders by Social Control Agencies, 4 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 218, 229-30
(1967)[hereinafter Discrimination in Handling of Juvenile Offenders]; Terry, Screening, supra
note 162, at 177; Thomas & Cage, The Effects of Social Characteristics on Juvenile Court Dispo-
sitions, 18 Soc. Q. 237, 242-44 (1977). See also infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text,
which report that the principle of offense only accounts for about 25% of the variance in
sentencing.
205 See Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile Court Dispositions, 77
AM. J. Soc. 211, 219 (1971) (influence of juveniles' race on dispositions); Dannefer &
Schutt, supra note 199, at 1129-30 (evidence of substantial bias in police referrals, but
less evidence of bias in subsequent court decisions); Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra
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tion, charging, and adjudication decisions are strongly influenced by
the principle of offense, as cases penetrate further into the process,
race and class directly affect dispositions, with minority youths re-
ceiving more severe sentences. 20 6 Thomas and Cage conclude that
when legal variables are held constant, the juvenile court's individu-
alized justice "typically applies harsh sanctions to blacks, those who
have dropped out of school, those in single parent or broken
homes, [and] those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds ... ,"207
Moreover, examining the effects of race or social class only at
the time of sentencing may mask the more significant effect that
these personal characteristics may have had in the initial screening
stages of juvenile justice administration. Fagan examined the im-
pact of extra-legal factors, especially race, on decision-making at six
points in the juvenile process and reported that "minority youth re-
ceive consistently harsher sentences. '208 They concluded that:
The evidence for racial discrimination in this study is compelling. Its
sources may lie in the individual attitudes of decision makers in the
system's independent agencies, but it is unlikely that these seemingly
isolated decision makers of substantially different backgrounds would
produce such consistent, systemic behaviors. Rather than a chance
convergence of independent behaviors, they seem to reflect a socio-
logical process, if not a generalized perspective, shared across decision
makers of disparate backgrounds. Like other societal institutions, the
justice system is not blind to ethnic and racial differences. 20 9
Other research reports that juveniles' race only affects the dis-
positions of minor offenders, while for serious or repeat offenders,
sentencing disparities between the races decline.210 Contrary to ex-
note 158, at 224 (racial disparities at each decision point with minorities receiving har-
sher sentences); Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman &Joe, supra note 199,
at 179 (effect of race on institutional commitments); McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158,
at 55-58 (minority youths receive more severe sentences); Thomas & Cage, supra note
204, at 247 (blacks treated more harshly than whites); Thomas & Fitch, supra note 160, at
80 (blacks more likely to be confined for their offenses than whites); Thornberry, Sentenc-
ing Disparities, supra note 200, at 170 (blacks receive more severe dispositions than
whites). Cf. Carter,Juvenile Court Dispositions: A Comparison of Status and Nonstatus Offenders,
17 CRIMINOLOGY 341, 356 (1979) ("social class bias at all juvenile court disposition
levels") [hereinafterJuvenile Court Dispositions]; Carter & Clelland, A Neo-Marxian Critique,
Formulation and Test ofJuvenile Dispositions as a Function of Social Class, 27 Soc. PROBS. 96,
104-06 (1979) (discrimination against youths from unstable working class backgrounds
in moral crime categories)[hereinafter Neo-Marxian Critique].
206 McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158, at 56.
207 Thomas & Cage, supra note 204, at 250. See Thomas & Fitch, supra note 160, at 82-
83.
208 Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note 158, at 252.
209 Id. at 253.
210 See Carter, Juvenile Court Dispositions, supra note 205, at 355 (number of previous
court referrals and multiple petitions increase likelihood of more severe disposition);
Clarke & Koch, supra note 57 (controlling for present offense and prior record accounts
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pectations, a few studies report that white youths receive more se-
vere dispositions than blacks. 21' Some studies report that
substantive factors such as "family and school problems," along
with legal criteria, explains some of the racial variations in sentenc-
ing.21 2 Summarizing this research, the principle of offense appears
to be the most significant factor influencing juvenile court disposi-
tions ofjuveniles along with an additional amount of sentencing va-
riation related to a juvenile's race. 213
The present study provides a limited opportunity to analyze the
relationships between a juvenile's race, representation by counsel,
and sentences. Although the Minnesota SJIS code forms include
the variable "race," racial information is omitted by court personnel
in most counties in the state. Fortunately, however, in Hennepin
County (Minneapolis), which has the highest proportion of minority
youths in Minnesota, 2 14 ajuvenile's race is coded more routinely. 21 5
Thus, the following analyses provide an opportunity to examine the
for disparities); Cohen & Kluegel, Determinants ofJuvenile Court Dispositions: Ascriptive and
Achieved Factors in Two Metropolitan Courts, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 162, 174-75 (1978) (little
support for racial bias on sentencing); Ferdinand & Luchterhand, supra note 204, at 521
(same); Terry, Screening, supra note 162, at 177 (legal variables most significant).
211 See Ferster & Courtless, Pre-Dispositional Data, Role of Counsel and Decisions in ajuve-
nile Court, 7 LAw & Soc'y REV. 195, 205 (1972); Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenile Court
Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making Process, 17 CRIME & DELIN. 142, 148 (1971).
212 See Horwitz & Wasserman, supra note 164, at 421; Thomas & Fitch, supra note 160,
at 74-75.
213 See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text. Phillips and Dinitz report that in
addition to present offense and the number of prior arrests, prior court responses tend
to predict subsequent dispositions; prior institutionalization is a strong predictor of sub-
sequent institutionalization independently of both present and past behavior. Phillips
and Dinitz, supra note 162, at 275-76. Kowalski & Rickicki, Determinants of Juvenile Post-
adjudication Dispositions, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 66, 72 (1982), report that correc-
tional administrators in a postadjudication context also use present offense and prior
record for making institution/community placements.
214 See U.S. DEPT. OF COM., BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GEN-
ERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS MINNESOTA 25-198 (1982) [hereinafter 1980
CENSUS].
215 In Hennepin County, a juvenile's race is reported in 79.8% of all petitions, or
3385 cases. Thus, the data reported here constitute a very large subset of the total cases
in the county. However, comparing this "race" subsample with the county totals sug-
gests that it is representative. Thus, the cases missing information on race do not ap-
pear to introduce any systematic bias. For example, for the Hennepin County
population as a whole (4243) and the "race sample," the proportion of offenses are
respectively: felony against person, 4.1% and 4.4%; felony against property, 12.9% and
13.3%; minor offense against person, 5.2% and 5.5%; minor offense against property,
26.8% and 28.1%; other delinquency, 21.8% and 20.6%; and status, 29.0% and 28.0%.
Similarly, for Hennepin County as a whole and for the "race sample", the proportions of
juveniles with priors are: 0=66.7% and 66.5%; 1-2=26.1% and 26.0%; 3-4=5.6%
and 5.8%; and 5+ = 1.6% and 1.7%.
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TABLE 19
RACE, PRESENT OFFENSE, AND PRIOR RECORD
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
WHITE BLACK OTHER
7o DELINQUENTS: 65.9 23.6 10.4
PRESENT OFFENSE
Felony Offense Against Person 3.1 7.8 4.5
Felony Offense Against Property 13.4 12.4 15.0
Minor Offense Against Person 4.0 10.1 4.8
Minor Offense Against Property 27.5 31.1 24.9
Other Delinquency 24.5 14.5 9.9
Status 27.5 24.0 40.8
PRIOR RECORD
0 70.6 58.1 59.8
1-2 23.6 31.3 29.5
3-4 4.5 8.0 8.8
5+ 1.3 2.6 2.0
effects of race on rates of representation as well as dispositions only
in Hennepin County.
Based on the 1980 census, there were approximately 115,000
youths aged ten to seventeen living in Hennepin County of whom
slightly more than 105,000 were white, 5,300 were black, and the
remainder were "other"-primarily Native American with a smatter-
ing of Hispanic and oriental. 216 While blacks and other racial mi-
norities constitute about 5% each of the county youth population,
they constitute a substantially larger proportion of the clientele of
the Hennepin County juvenile court. As indicated in Table 19,
more than one of five (23.6%) youths against whom petitions were
filed were black and one of ten (10.4%) were from other minorities.
Thus, the characteristic disproportionate overrepresentation of mi-
norities reported in other studies appears in Hennepin County as
well.
An examination of juveniles' race, present offense, and prior
record suggests that at least part of the overrepresentation of mi-
nority youths may be attributed to differences in their offense pat-
terns. As a group, a larger proportion of blacks and other
minorities are charged with felony offenses and offenses against the
person than are whites. Proportionately, twice as many blacks as
whites are charged with offenses against the person (3.1% vs. 7.8%
216 See U.S. DEPT OF COM., 1980 CENSUS, supra note 214, at 25-198, 25-246.
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for felony, and 4.0% vs. 10.1% for minor offense against the per-
son). Black and other minority youths are significantly under-
represented relative to whites only in the category of "other
delinquency," which includes misdemeanor public order offenses,
drug offenses, and probation violations.
Blacks and other minority youths also had more extensive
records of prior delinquency involvement than did their white coun-
terparts. Approximately 10% more whites than blacks and others
appeared in juvenile court for the first time. Conversely, blacks and
other minorities were nearly twice as likely as whites to have records
of chronic recidivism. Of course, the prior record variable reflects
every previous discretionary decision made by every juvenile justice
operative.2 1 7 While the more extensive record of prior referrals
may reflect real differences in rates of behavior by race, it may also
indicate the cumulative differential selection of juveniles by race
over time.
2. Race and Representation by Counsel
For all juveniles whose cases included information on race, the
rates of representation in Hennepin County were: private attorneys,
10.3%; public defenders, 37.5%; and unrepresented, 52.1%.218
Thus, even in the most populous county in Minnesota, which has a
well established public defender system, the majority of juveniles
still were unrepresented.
Table 20 reports on representation by counsel and race. Exam-
ining the relationship between race and rates of representation
reveals that larger proportions of blacks and other minorities are
routinely represented at every level of offense than are white
juveniles. When compared with white juveniles, 15.4% more black
youths overall and 10% more youths of other racial minorities had
counsel. Since a serious present offense and prior record increases
the likelihood of representation (Tables 3 and 13), the greater pres-
ence of counsel is consistent with blacks and other minority youths'
somewhat more extensive delinquency involvements. Because Ta-
ble 20 controls for the seriousness of the present offense, the differ-
ences in the rates of representation by race remain.
After examining the type of attorney involved, statistics reveal
217 See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 32, at 585-601; McCarthy and
Smith, supra note 158, at 56-58.
218 For the entire population in Hennepin County juvenile court, the rates of repre-
sentation were: private attorneys, 10.4%; public defenders, 37.3%; and unrepresented,
52.3%. These proportions are nearly identical with the sample containing information
on juveniles' race. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 20
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND RACE
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
WHITE BLACK OTHER
PRIV PD NONE PRIV PD NONE PRIV PD NONE
OVERALL
. ATTORNEY 11.5 31.7 56.7 7.9 50.7 41.3 8.1 45.2 46.7
Felony Offense
Against Person 30.3 51.5 18.2 10.2 72.9 16.9 28.6 71.4 0.0
Felony Offense
Against Property 20.9 50.9 28.2 10.6 65.9 23.5 9.1 63.6 27.3
Minor Offense
Against Person 12.5 51.1 36.4 12.8 64.1 23.1 5.9 58.8 35.3
Minor Offense
Against Property 15.1 35.6 49.3 7.4 56.6 36.0 10.5 58.1 31.4
Other Delinquency 9.5 19.8 70.7 10.1 45.9 44.0 14.3 48.6 37.1
Status 2.4 23.4 74.2 2.9 24.6 72.5 2.4 24.0 73.6
that larger proportions of white youths retain private counsel while
black and other minority youths are more likely to be represented by
a public defender. As noted in earlier analyses, while only 5.1% of
Minnesota's delinquents retained private counsel, 11.2% of those
charged with a felony offense against the person did retain private
counsel (Table 3). Examining the use of private counsel by race
reveals that proportionately, white youths are three times more
likely than blacks to have private counsel when charged with felony
offenses against the person and twice as likely to have private coun-
sel when charged with a felony offense against property. Con-
versely, blacks are most likely to be represented by the public
defender.2 19 Juveniles of other minorities are nearly as likely as
white juveniles to retain private counsel when charged with a felony
offense against the person, but less likely than blacks to retain pri-
vate counsel when charged with a felony involving property. Unfor-
tunately, the SJIS data tapes do not include information on
juveniles' family status, socioeconomic status, or the like. However,
black and other minority delinquents' greater use of public defend-
ers rather than private attorneys may be an indirect indicator of
their comparatively lower socioeconomic status than that of white
219 This finding is consistent with the only other study to examine the relationship
between race and type of representation. See Fagan, Slaughter & Hartstone, supra note
158, at 242 ("Anglo youth are more likely to have private counsel.., whereas minority




RACE, DISPOSITION, AND REPRESENTATION
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
WHITE BLACK OTHER
ATTORNEY: YES NO YES NO YES NO
Felony Offense
Against Person
% Home 49.1 22.2 57.4 50.0 25.0 -
% Secure 39.6 11.1 48.9 37.5 16.7 -
Felony Offense
Against Property
% Home 47.7 25.8 50.0 31.3 58.8 16.7
% Secure 39.0 25.8 46.9 25.0 44.1 16.7
Minor Offense
Against Person
% Home 30.8 16.7 34.5 17.6 36.4 20.0
% Secure 15.4 8.3 16.4 - 18.2 20.0
Minor Offense
Against Property
7o Home 31.7 20.3 23.2 14.9 25.0 35.0
% Secure 24.8 14.8 16.6 13.4 17.9 20.0
Other Delinquency
% Home 21.2 10.7 27.1 15.2 21.1 8.3
% Secure 11.6 6.7 22.0 4.3 15.8 8.3
Status
% Home 27.5 12.4 26.7 6.5 14.7 9.2
% Secure 5.1 1.4 11.1 - 2.9 1.1
delinquents. 2 20
Table 9 reported that juveniles with counsel consistently re-
ceived more severe dispositions than did those without representa-
tion. Table 11 suggested that youths represented by private counsel
perhaps received somewhat more lenient sentences than did those
who were represented by public defenders or court appointed attor-
neys. A larger proportion of minority youths than white juveniles
were represented by public defenders (Table 20). Table 21 com-
pares the disposition rates of represented and unrepresented youths
of different races. The pattern of larger proportions of represented
juveniles than unrepresented ones receiving more severe sentences
prevails within each racial group. It is unlikely that the small varia-
tions in the type of representation account for differences in the
ways that white and minority youths' cases are processed.
220 Fagan, Slaughter and Harstone noted that "[p]ublic defenders are more likely to
represent minority youth, an artifact of the race/social class interaction." Id.
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TABLE 22




% Home 21.0 25.8 23.5
% Secure 13.3 18.5 15.0
Felony Offense Against Person
% Home 45.7 57.4 33.3
7o Secure 34.3 49.2 26.7
Felony Offense Against Property
% Home 41.8 50.0 58.5
% Secure 34.3 44.9 43.4
Minor Offense Against Person
% Home 22.5 30.8 29.4
% Secure 11.2 14.1 17.5
Minor Offense Against Property
% Home 23.4 20.2 27.9
% Secure 17.8 15.8 19.8
Other Delinquency
% Home 12.3 23.9 14.3
% Secure 7.5 16.2 11.4
Status
7o Home 13.8 10.4 9.1
7o Secure 2.1 2.6 1.4
3. Race, Offense, Prior Record, Detention, and Disposition
Table 22 examines the dispositions received by juveniles of dif-
ferent races on the basis of their present offense. In the aggregate,
about 5%o more black youths and 2% to 3% more youths of other
minorities than whites received out-of-home placement and secure
confinement dispositions.
The racial differences in sentencing are most conspicuous for
black juveniles charged with felony offenses and offenses against the
person. For those offenses, about 10%o more blacks than whites re-
ceived severe dispositions. Forjuveniles of other races, the pattern
is more complicated with less severe sentencing than whites for
those charged with felony offenses against the person, but higher
rates for those charged with felony offenses against property, such
as burglary. While "other delinquency" was the only offense cate-
gory in which minority youths were underrepresented compared to








PRIORS: 0 1-2 3+ 0 1-2 3+ 0 1-2 3+
Felony Offense
Against Person
% Home 44.4 27.3 100.0 55.6 50.0 85.7 20.0 16.7 75.0
% Secure 35.2 18.2 60.0 47.2 44.4 71.4 20.0 16.7 50.0
Felony Offense
Against Property
7 Home 32.1 48.0 89.7 41.2 45.2 87.5 42.9 72.2 85.7
% Secure 28.5 34.7 72.4 33.3 41.9 87.5 32.1 44.4 85.7
Minor Offense
Against Person
7 Home 16.7 29.4 66.7 13.3 48.0 75.0 10.0 50.0 100.0
% Secure 6.1 17.6 50.0 6.7 16.0 50.0 - 33.3 100.0
Minor Offense
Against Property
7 Home 19.9 31.5 36.8 8.1 27.1 61.5 23.4 28.6 45.5
% Secure 15.3 24.4 23.7 5.9 23.5 42.3 14.9 17.9 45.5
Other Delinquency
% Home 9.4 19.5 33.3 12.5 35.0 46.2 13.6 12.5 20.0
% Secure 4.7 13.8 33.3 6.3 22.5 46.2 13.6 - 20.0
Status
% Home 9.7 20.2 29.7 7.0 14.3 28.6 6.2 16.7 10.0
% Secure 1.0 3.6 8.1 0.8 4.1 14.3 1.0 2.8 -
out-of-home and secure confinement dispositions in
well.
this category as
The apparent racial differences in sentencing may be the result
of differences in the white and minority juveniles' prior records. Ta-
ble 12 summarized the nearly linear relationship between additional
priors and increased sanctions; judges' sentencing practices con-
formed to informal sentencing guidelines. The more extensive
prior records of delinquency of black and other minority juveniles
than their white counterparts (Table 19) may account for the appar-
ent differences in their dispositions.
Table 23 summarizes juveniles' dispositions-out-of-home and
secure confinement-while controlling for the seriousness of the
present offense and the prior record simultaneously. Even with con-
trols, larger proportions of black juveniles charged with felony of-
fenses against the person and property and "other delinquency"
1270 [Vol. 79
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
received out-of-home placement and secure confinement disposi-
tions than did similarly situated white offenders. These differences
are most conspicuous for black juveniles charged with felony of-
fenses who receive sentences of secure confinement. Of the
juveniles charged with a felony offense against the person, 12%
more black juveniles than white youths with no prior record, 24.2%
with one or two priors, and 11.4% more of those with three or more
prior petitions were incarcerated. Similarly, 4.8%, 7.2%, and
15.1% more blacks than whites charged with felony offenses against
property received secure confinement sentences. For youths
charged with "other delinquency," -1.6%, 8.3%, and 12.9% more
blacks than whites were incarcerated. There were no consistent pat-
terns in the sentencing of youths of other races or in other catego-
ries of offenses.
The previous analyses of the effects of detention on disposi-
tions (Tables 15 and 17) indicated that pretrial detention exerted a
significant independent influence on a juvenile's ultimate disposi-
tion. It may be that the racial disparities in the sentencing of black
juveniles reported above are the function of differences in rates of
pretrial detention.221
Table 24 reports the rates of detention for Hennepin County
overall as well as separately for white youths, black youths, and
other minority youths. Overall, 14.1% of the juveniles referred to
the Hennepin County juvenile court received one or more detention
hearings. This rate of detention is nearly double the state average
and reflects a higher rate of detention for every offense category
except status offenses (compare Table 24 with Table 15, Statewide
and Medium Representation).
Although 14.1% of all referrals are detained, the rates of deten-
tion differ substantially by race: only 10.6% of white juveniles are
detained as compared with 22.6% of blacks and 17.3% of other mi-
nority youths. The earlier analyses reported higher rates of deten-
tion for youths charged with more serious present offenses and
those with records of prior referrals (Table 15). Somewhat larger
proportions of minority youths were charged with serious offenses
and had more extensive prior records than did their white counter-
parts (Table 19). Thus, it is necessary to control for the effects of
the present offense and prior record on the decision to detain
221 See Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman &Joe, supra note 199, at 179;
Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, The Watershed ofJuvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME &




RACE, OFFENSE, PRIORS, AND DETENTION
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
WHITE BLACK OTHER




% DETENTION 14.1 10.6 22.6 17.3
Felony Offense
Against Person 42.6 24.1 27.3 60.0 52.8 72.2 71.4 40.0 33.3 50.0
Felony Offense
Against Property 27.9 15.0 30.1 54.7 33.3 42.0 75.0 25.0 33.3 100.0
Minor Offense
Against Person 23.2 9.1 35.2 66.7 17.8 28.0 50.0 10.0 50.0 -
Minor Offense
Against Property 15.8 7.1 20.4 23.7 18.4 24.7 38.4 19.1 14.3 45.5
Other
Delinquency 7.9 5.2 9.3 20.0 9.4 22.5 15.4 4.5 25.0 -
Status 5.4 3.9 5.4 18.9 2.4 10.2 14.3 5.1 8.4 20.0
before attributing the racial disparities in sentencing to differential
rates of detention.
Table 24 reports the rates of detention separately for juveniles
of different races while controlling simultaneously for the serious-
ness of the present offense and prior record. Thus, 42.6% of all
Hennepin County juveniles charged with a felony offense against
the person are detained. While a larger proportion of black youths
than white youths commit felony offenses against the person (Table
19), it is readily apparent that proportionately more black and mi-
nority youths than white youths are detained for the same offense.
For juveniles charged with a felony offense against the person ap-
pearing in juvenile court for the first time, more than twice as many
blacks as whites are detained, 52.8% versus 24.1%. For juveniles
charged with a felony offense against the person with one or two
prior referrals, again more than twice as many black youths as white
youths are detained, 72.2% versus 27.3%. Even for youths with
three or more prior referrals charged presently with a felony offense
against the person, 11.4% more blacks youths than white youths are
detained. Comparisons of rates of detention across races while con-
trolling for the present offense and prior record suggest that at least
some of the differences in the sentencing of minority youths
charged with felony offenses against person and property probably
1272 [Vol. 79
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TABLE 25
RACE, DETENTION, AND DISPOSITION (HoME/SECURE)
(HENNEPIN COUNTY)
WHITE BLACK OTHER
DETENTION: YES NO YES NO YES NO
Felony Offense
Against Person
7o Home 70.0 38.3 63.9 50.0 50.0 12.5
% Secure 50.0 31.9 55.6 40.9 50.0 -
Felony Offense
Against Property
% Home 73.8 35.6 70.7 36.5 85.0 46.7
% Secure 55.7 30.6 63.4 32.7 75.0 26.7
Minor Offense
Against Person
% Home 56.3 18.0 52.6 25.0 50.0 23.1
% Secure 31.3 8.2 36.8 7.1 25.0 15.4
Minor Offense
Against Property
% Home 56.9 22.0 38.9 16.5 47.1 23.3
7 Secure 33.8 17.8 25.9 14.1 35.3 15.0
Other Delinquency
% Home 61.1 11.5 50.0 18.9 66.7 10.7
% Secure 38.9 6.8 31.3 12.6 33.3 10.7
Status
% Home 53.1 12.8 40.0 8.9 40.0 7.0
7o Secure 12.5 1.7 10.0 2.2 - 1.6
result from the variations in rates of pretrial detention.222
Table 25 summarizes the disposition rates of white and minor-
ity youths who were detained. The relationship between pretrial de-
tention and more severe sentences prevails for both white and
minority juveniles. Although about 5% more detained black
juveniles than detained white youths charged with felony offenses
against person and property and minor offenses against the person
received secure confinement dispositions, it is unlikely that these
differences account for the more substantial disparities observed in
Table 23.
Black and other minority youths share certain characteristics
that increase their likelihood of receiving more severe sentences
compared with whitejuveniles. Their more serious present offenses
222 The findings are consistent with other evaluations of the effects of race on pretrial




and prior records (Table 19) generally are associated with more se-
vere dispositions (Table 12). These offense patterns are also associ-
ated with higher rates of representation by counsel (Table 20)
which, in turn, is associated with more severe sentences (Tables 14
and 21). Black and other minority juveniles are held in detention at
somewhat higher rates than are white youths, even after controlling
for the present offense and prior record (Table 24), and detention
of any juveniles, regardless of race, is associated with more severe
sentences (Tables 17 and 25). Finally, after controlling for the seri-
ousness of the present offense (Table 22) and the length of the prior
record (Table 23), it appears that black and minority youths are still
somewhat more likely to receive severe sentences than their white
counterparts. As later analyses suggest, however, these modest dif-
ferences in sentencing by race are not necessarily evidence of racial
discrimination.
4. Sex, Representation, and Sentencing
The next analyses examine the relationships between juveniles'
sex, rates of representation, and dispositions. Table 26 reports the
distribution of offenses by sex in the state and in the counties with
high, medium, and low rates of representation. For the state as a
whole, approximately three-quarters (74.5%) of the delinquents
were male and about one-quarter (25.5%) were female. With some
variation, similar proportions obtained in the high, medium, and
low representation counties as well.
When the relationship between a juvenile's sex and offense is
analyzed separately, however, a very different pattern emerges. In
the state and in the high, medium, and low representation counties
separately, male delinquents predominate in the felony offense cate-
gories by about a nine to one ratio. Males predominate in the other
categories of delinquency by about a three to one ratio. It is only in
the status offense categories that the sexes approach parity with
about a six to four ratio of males to females. Tables 6, 9, and 13
report a relationship between the seriousness of the offense, rates of
representation, and dispositions. Given the skew in the distribution
of offenses by sex, a similar pattern should prevail on these other
dimensions as well.
Table 26 also reports the relationship between juveniles' sex
and prior referrals. While Table 12 summarizes the impact of prior
referrals on dispositions, Table 26 provides the separate breakdown
of prior referrals by sex. About 5% more females than males made
their first appearances in juvenile court and there are conversely
fewer female recidivists than males. On the basis of their preserit
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TABLE 26
OFFENSES AND PRIOR REFERRALS BY SEX
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
OVERALL % 74.5 25.5 75.8 24.2 71.4 28.6 76.6 23.4
N = 12806 4385 2691 860 4538 1817 5577 1708
Felony Offense
Against Person
90.6 9.4 89.9 10.1 89.5 10.5 92.3 7.7
Felony Offense
Against Property
91.2 8.8 91.5 8.5 91.7 8.3 90.5 9.5
Minor Offense
Against Person
72.7 27.3 79.1 20.9 65.8 34.2 75.6 24.4
Minor Offense
Against Property
76.3 23.7 77.5 22.5 74.7 25.3 77.0 23.0
Other Delinquency
77.2 22.8 70.5 29.5 75.5 24.5 84.8 15.2
Status Offense
59.9 40.1 62.6 37.4 51.9 48.1 65.3 34.7
PRIOR REFERRALS
0 70.4 76.1 63.1 67.1 66.8 74.2 77.0 82.6
1 - 2 24.0 20.2 27.9 27.1 26.8 21.7 19.9 15.2
3 -4 4.3 2.8 6.5 4.7 5.1 3.3 2.5 1.4
5+ 1.3 0.9 2.6 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.8
offenses and prior records, f,
than their male counterparts.
emales are somewhat less delinquent
5. Representation by Counsel and Sex ofJuvenile
Table 27 provides the overall rates of representation of male
and female delinquents as well as by type of offense. While 45.3%
of alljuveniles in Minnesota were represented (Table 3), this is the
composite of 46.7% representation for males and 41.1% represen-
tation for females. In light of the relationships between more seri-
ous present offenses, more extensive prior records, and rates of
representation (Table 13), and the pattern of offenses and sex (Ta-
ble 26), the 5.6% disparity in representation is not necessarily indic-
ative of discrimination in the appointment of counsel on the basis of
sex.
When the relationships between offense, sex, and rates of rep-
resentation are analyzed, the only clear difference that emerges is
for the small group ofjuveniles charged with felony offenses against




REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND SEX OF JUVENILE
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
OVERALL
% COUNSEL 46.7 41.1 95.1 92.3 49.5 39.8 20.4 15.7
Felony Offense
Against Person 78.1 69.5 97.3 100.0 82.7 71.4 58.8 28.6
Felony Offense
Against Property 62.3 60.3 98.3 97.6 68.2 68.8 37.7 34.1
Minor Offense
Against Person 62.0 63.6 95.6 100.0 66.1 66.4 29.6 33.3
Minor Offense
Against Property 45.1 42.3 97.2 97.1 53.5 48.9 16.0 15.0
Other
Delinquency 43.8 48.4 92.8 88.6 34.9 34.0 21.9 17.5
Status 27.8 30.5 89.7 88.0 26.5 27.9 8.1 11.8
low representation counties, a substantially larger proportion of
males than females are represented. Of course, this offense only
constitutes 4.0% of the state's delinquency (Table 1) and male de-
linquents account for nearly all of it (Table 26). For the other of-
fense categories, the rates of representation are approximately
equal, although somewhat larger proportions of girls than boys are
represented for status offenses and other delinquency.
6. Pretrial Detention, Disposition, and Sex ofJuvenile
The apparent relationship between offenses and detention (Ta-
ble 15) coupled with the patterns of offenses for male and female
juveniles (Table 26) suggests that proportionately fewer females
than males should be detained. Table 28 reports on the rates of
detention for male and female offenders overall and while control-
ling for the seriousness of the offense.
In the state as a whole, a slightly larger proportion of female
delinquents than male delinquents are detained. Comparing the
rates of detention by sex (Table 28) with the rates of detention (Ta-
ble 15) indicates that the discrepancies in rates of detention occur
for females in all offense categories except offenses against the per-
son. Even though female juveniles have less extensive prior records
and are involved in less serious types of delinquency than are male
offenders (Table 26), still a larger proportion of female juveniles are
detained. 223
223 The sexual disproportionality in the detention and sentencing of female status of-
fenders and minor offenders has been reported by many researchers. See, e.g., R. SARRI,
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TABLE 28
DETENTION BY SEX OF JUVENILE
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE
OVERALL
. DETENTION 7.4 8.3 6.0 9.1 12.6 11.2 3.8 4.8
Felony Offense
Against Person 24.2 25.0 21.1 17.6 34.8 37.9 14.3 11.1
Felony Offense
Against Property 12.0 16.1 5.4 6.5 20.2 23.8 7.3 14.1
Minor Offense
Against Person 11.6 10.7 7.6 2.0 21.0 17.6 5.6 5.3
Minor Offense
Against Property 5.7 6.9 3.3 4.3 12.3 12.9 2.3 3.5
Other
Delinquency 5.1 9.4 5.4 12.9 6.4 7.9 3.3 7.2
Status 3.2 7.1 6.7 12.0 3.6 8.2 1.8 4.2
Previous analyses identified the detrimental impact of pretrial
detention on dispositions (Table 17). Because female offenders ap-
pear to be disproportionately detained relative to males, Table 29
illustrates the relationships between pretrial detention and
sentences separately for male and female offenders. It will be useful
to compare the relationship between detention and dispositions
(Table 17) with the dispositions received by detained male and fe-
male offenders. First, smaller proportions ofjuveniles charged with
less serious, albeit far more numerous, offenses are detained (Table
15). When those juveniles are detained, however, they experience
considerably higher rates of home removal and secure confinement
than do youths charged with those less serious offenses who are not
detained (compare Table 6 and 17). Finally, when the disposition
rates of detained males and females charged with less serious of-
fenses-minor property offenses, other delinquency, and status of-
fenses-are examined, a gender-related pattern emerges. Larger
proportions of detained female juveniles receive more severe
sentences than do their male counterparts. For the state as a whole,
slightly more detained females than males charged with minor prop-
erty offenses are removed from their homes; 5.7% more detained
females charged with other delinquency; and 9.4% more detained
females charged with status offenses. While these minor offenses
UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAIL AND DETENTION (1974); Chesney-Lind, Girls in
Jail, 34 CRIME & DEL!NQ. 150 (1988); Chesney-Lind, Judicial Paternalism and the Female
Status Offenders: Training Women to Know their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121 (1977);




DISPOSITION OF DETAINED JUVENILES BY
SEX OF JUVENILE
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW


























55.0 59.6 54.8 58.4 52.8 56.9 60.0
23.6 37.8 21.9 40.4 22.3 39.4 27.8
81.8 62.5
45.5 41.7
- 61.4 75.0 73.9 100.0
- 49.4 50.0 39.1 33.3
70.0 94.7 50.0 69.5 68.4 67.9 85.7
40.0 57.9 50.0 55.1 36.8 53.6 42.9
47.8 66.7 100.0 51.1 44.4 64.3 50.0
26.1 41.7 - 31.9 27.8 35.7 25.0
53.8 57.7 72.7 51.3 45.8 57.1 66.7
28.6 42.3 27.3 31.1 25.4 44.9 38.1
63.6 65.6 57.1 57.7 61.5 51.4 73.7
36.4 37.5 38.1 36.6 34.6 35.1 36.8
51.6 48.1 54.8 43.3 51.5 34.6 48.4
9.4 25.9 9.7 6.7 6.1 11.5 16.1
typically are associated with somewhat less severe sentences (Table
6), the combined effect of being detained and female appears to al-
ter a juvenile's likelihood of home removal.
A similar pattern prevails when examined in the counties with
high, medium, and low rates of representation where, in half or
more of the comparisons, a larger proportion of detained females
are removed from their homes than are males. This is most conspic-
uous in the low representation counties where a larger proportion
of detained females are removed from their homes in five out of six
offense comparisons.
One possible explanation for the pattern may be a gender-
linked parental influence on both pretrial detention and eventual
dispositions. If the parents of female juveniles are more likely than
those of males to express their frustration with their child's miscon-
duct by refusing to accept the juvenile's return to the home, then
both pretrial detention and subsequent home removal may become
more likely. 224 Explaining why parents would react differently to
224 See Table 6 which reports the rates of disposition and the source of referral. Pa-
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similar minor misdeeds when committed by female than male
juveniles is beyond the scope of this data.
7. Disposition and Sex ofJuvenile
Table 6 summarizes the relationship between juveniles' of-
fenses and dispositions. A comparison of Table 6 and Table 30
shows the impact of ajuvenile's sex on the disposition. For the state
overall as well as in the high, medium, and low representation coun-
ties separately, proportionately fewer females than males are re-
moved from their homes or incarcerated. The disparities are most
striking for the use of secure confinement: nearly twice as many
males as females are incarcerated. The male bias in the use of incar-
ceration probably reflects the male predominance in the felony of-
fenses against the person and property and in the minor offenses
against the person categories which have higher rates of secure con-
finement. In addition, there are fewer beds available for female of-
fenders in the juvenile institutions in Minnesota.
By contrast, the rates of out-of-home placement of female of-
fenders consistently exceed those of their male counterparts for the
least serious offenses-other delinquency and status offenses.
These were the offenses for which larger proportions of girls than
boys had attorneys (Table 27). These were also the offense catego-
ries for which proportionately more female offenders than males
were held in pretrial detention (Table 28) and in which the impact
of gender and detention on dispositions appeared (Table 29). Be-
cause only a small proportion of juveniles charged with these of-
fenses are detained (Tables 15, 28, and 29), however, differential
rates of detention alone do not explain all of the variation in sen-
tencing. The disproportionate intervention with female offenders
charged with other delinquency and status offenses may reflect the
"double standard" and "paternalistic" attitudes for which scholars
have criticized juvenile courts.225
rental referrals are second only to those of probation officers in resulting in out of home
placement ofjuveniles. Because the offenses for which parents refer their children are
typically less serious than those, for example, of police referrals , this high rate provides
an indirect indicator of family dysfunction. The SJIS data provide no basis for inferring
why this would be more the case for female than for male juveniles.
225 See Anderson, The Chivalrous Treatment of the Female Offender in the Arms of the Criminal
Justice Systems: A Review of the Literature, 23 Soc. PROBS. 50, 55 (1976); Armstrong, Females
Under the Law-Protected But Unequal, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 109, 115-18 (1977); Chesney-
Lind,Judidal Enforcement of the Female Sex Role: The Family Court and the Female Delinquent, 8
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 51, 54-59 (1973); Chesney-Lind,Judicial Paternalism and the Female
Status Offenders, supra note 223, at 221; Datesman and Scarpetti, Unequal Protection for
Males and Females in the Juvenile Court, in WOMEN, CRIME AND JUSTICE 314 (S. Datesman




DISPOSION (HOME/SECURE) BY SEX
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
OVERALL
7 Home 19.1 16.4 24.8 25.9 22.1 14.9 14.1 13.5
7 Secure 12.7 6.5 16.9 12.2 15.1 5.2 8.5 5.5
Felony Offense
Against Person
% Home 42.8 36.4 43.2 54.5 47.5 33.3 36.5 29.4
% Secure 27.9 23.6 28.0 45.5 33.2 22.2 21.0 11.8
Felony Offense
Against Property
T Home 32.3 30.3 34.9 15.9 36.1 34.1 26.7 34.8
% Secure 24.5 14.1 26.4 11.4 29.2 15.3 18.4 14.5
Minor Offense
Against Person
% Home 25.9 19.1 32.9 17.5 27.1 19.8 19.9 18.8
% Secure 16.2 10.0 22.4 10.0 14.7 9.9 13.6 10.1
Minor Offense
Against Property
7 Home 16.6 13.9 19.0 20.6 21.6 13.8 12.3 11.2
7 Secure 11.7 7.9 13.6 12.3 16.0 7.7 8.0 6.2
Other Delinquency
% Home 18.2 21.4 31.0 40.1 14.7 11.8 14.4 18.4
% Secure 11.6 10.3 21.0 18.8 9.6 5.2 8.2 10.4
Status
% Home 10.7 15.0 20.5 27.6 11.3 13.7 7.2 12.0
% Secure 3.7 3.1 10.3 8.7 2.9 1.6 2.3 2.8
E. ADDITIONAL INDICATORS OF THE IMPACT OF COUNSEL ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION
This Article analyzes the legal variables associated with the ini-
tial decision to appoint and the ultimate impact of counsel on
juveniles' dispositions. These analyses indicate that each legal vari-
able-seriousness of present offense, prior referrals, and pretrial
detention status-appears to be associated with both receiving a
more severe disposition and higher rates of representation. While
the legal variables enhance the probabilities of representation, the
presence of an attorney makes an additional contribution to the se-
verity of dispositions.
1. Representation by Counsel and Number of Offenses at Disposition
The next analyses seek additional ways of measuring the deter-
minants and impact of representation in juvenile court proceedings.
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Table 31 reports on the number of charges that remain at the time
of a juvenile's disposition. As the note to Table 31 indicates,
juveniles are acquitted or have all charges dismissed in a very small
proportion of delinquency and status cases, only 3.3% of the total.
In most instances, a delinquency determination is based on only one
sustained charge, and two or more offenses occur in only 14.0% of
the cases. A substantially larger proportion of cases involving fel-
ony offenses and offenses against the person involve multiple of-
fenses at disposition: 30.4% of felony offenses against the person;
30.2% of felony offenses against property; and 18.0% of minor of-
fenses against the person. By contrast, for the state overall, only
3.3% of juveniles charged with status offenses have more than one
offense at disposition.
Table 31 reports that more serious offenses often are associated
with several offenses remaining at disposition. More serious of-
fenses also engender higher rates of representation (Table 4).
Thus, a comparison of juveniles with multiple offenses at disposi-
tions both with and without counsel provides an additional opportu-
nity to assess the determinants and the impact of counsel.
Although the differences are often quite small, for the counties
with high, medium, and low rates of representation, a larger propor-
tion of juveniles who are represented by attorneys had multiple
charges at disposition than did the unrepresented youths. The
number of petitions with sustained charges at disposition are re-
duced by those resulting in acquittals or dismissals. The note to
Table 31 reported that in the counties with high rates of representa-
tion, 6.3% of all juveniles were acquitted or had all charges dis-
missed. These dismissals were confined primarily to those few
juveniles who appeared without counsel. While only 5.0% of repre-
sented juveniles had all charges dismissed, 23.8% of the unrepre-
sented ones had all charges dismissed. While the counties with
medium and low rates of representation did not differ as dramati-
cally in the rates of dismissal for represented and unrepresented
juveniles, 5.7% and 10.4% more, respectively, of the represented
juveniles in those counties had multiple charges at disposition than
did their unrepresented counterparts. Thus, represented juveniles
had somewhat more complex cases than did unrepresented youths
as evidenced by multiple charges. 226
Comparing the proportion of represented and unrepresented
226 This finding is consistent with other studies that attempted to identify the factors
that influenced juveniles to seek representation and to gauge the complexity of cases as
they influenced the severity of dispositions. See V. STAPLETON & L. TErrELBAUM, supra




NUMBER OF OFFENSES AT DISPOSITION
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
# OFFENSES: 1 2+ 1 2+ 1 2+ 1 2+
OVERALL % 82.7 14.0 85.7 8.0 84.8 13.8 79.4 17.1
Felony Offense
Against Person 69.6 30.4 79.8 21.2 68.3 31.7 64.7 35.3
Felony Offense
Against Property 69.8 30.2 83.0 17.0 70.4 29.6 61.5 38.5
Minor Offense
Against Person 82.0 18.0 91.3 8.7 81.5 18.5 76.5 23.5
Minor Offense
Against Property 85.0 15.0 90.0 10.0 86.3 13.7 82.0 18.0
Other Delinquency 85.0 15.0 95.2 4.8 85.8 14.2 76.4 23.6
Status 96.7 3.3 97.8 2.2 97.9 2.0 95.5 4.5
The overall percentages for the total number of offenses at disposition do not
equal 100% because of the small fraction of cases in which there were no offenses
at disposition, i.e. acquittal or dismissal of all charges. For the state as a whole, and
the high, medium, and low representation counties, the rates were, respectively:
3.3%, 6.3%, 1.4%o and 3.5%.
juveniles with two or more charges at disposition in the counties
with high, medium, and low rates of representation also confirms
that represented juveniles had somewhat more complex cases. In
the counties with high and medium rates of representation, a larger
proportion of represented juveniles had more charges than their un-
represented colleagues in four of six comparisons. In the counties
with low rates of representation, the represented juveniles exceeded
their unrepresented counterparts in all six comparisons.
2. Representation by Attorneys and Reduction in Charges
Whether or not a juvenile was convicted of the original and
most serious offense for which the petition was filed provides an-
other way to assess the performance of attorneys. Unfortunately,
the SJIS data tapes do not permit direct tracking of each discrete
offense from filing to disposition. Fortunately, however, for the vast
majority of juveniles-82.7%--only one offense is alleged (Table
31).
Table 33 compares the most serious offense initially alleged in
the petition with the offense at the time of disposition to determine
in what proportion of cases the original charge was reduced. Quite
clearly, juveniles charged with a serious offense have a greater likeli-
hood of having their charges reduced than do those charged with
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TABLE 32
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND NUMBER
OF OFFENSES AT DIsPOSMON
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
ATTORNEY: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OVERALL %






















83.8 86.9 7.25 81.6 87.4 69.8 82.1
13.5 8.1 3.7 17.0 11.3 25.6 15.2
69.5 80.3 100.0** 66.7 76.1 64.9 65.5
30.5 19.7 - 33.3 23.9 35.1 34.5
63.5 82.5
36.5 17.5
75.0 71.9 66.3 59.3 61.9
25.0** 28.1 33.7 40.7 38.1
80.4 92.1 100.0 80.2 82.9 74.3 78.7





92.3 85.8 87.0 72.4 83.7
7.7 14.2 13.0 27.6 16.3
95.6
4.4
86.0 85.8 76.5 76.7
14.0 14.2 23.5 23.3
Status
1 97.0 96.6 98.0 96.9 97.1 98.0 93.6 95.6
2+ 3.0 3.4 2.0 3.1 2.9 2.0 6.4 4.4
* The overall percentages for the total number of offenses at disposition do not equal
100% because of the small fraction of cases in which there were no offenses at
disposition, i.e., acquittal or dismissal of all charges. See Table 31, n.l. For the
state as a whole and the high, medium, and low representation counties, the
acquittal/dismissal rates for represented and unrepresented youth were,
respectively: 3.5% and 2.7%; 5.0% and 23.8%; 1.4% and 1.3%; and 4.6% and
2.8%.
** There was only I unrepresented juvenile in this cell.
less serious offenses. Thus, about 15% of the juveniles charged
with a felony offense against the person have their top charge re-
duced as compared with only about 5% of those charged with a sta-
tus offense. In part, the greater reduction of serious offenses
reflects the fact that the more serious offenses encompass a greater
number of "lesser included" offenses and include a larger propor-
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tion of cases with multiple allegations (Table 31), both of which per-
mit pleas to other less serious offenses.
TABLE 33
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND REDUCTION OF
CHARGES
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
ATTORNEY: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Felony Offense
Against Person 82.9 88.9 73.0 25.0 93.4 95.8 77.7 88.0
Felony Offense
Against Property 86.8 89.5 84.6 44.4 93.6 94.0 77.6 87.9
Minor Offense
Against Person 84.5 91.8 77.2 25.0 92.4 95.6 82.6 92.3
Minor Offense
Against Property 92.3 94.1 90.6 80.6 96.0 95.7 88.4 93.7
Other Delinquency 91.5 94.6 90.1 72.4 95.4 97.3 87.2 93.4
Status 94.2 96.4 93.9 82.1 95.8 97.0 92.2 96.7
Comparing the proportions of reduced charges when juveniles
are or are not represented by counsel provides another basis for
assessing the performance of attorneys. In the state overall and in
the counties with medium and low rates of representation, a larger
proportion of juveniles who appear with counsel are convicted of
offenses less serious than those with which they were originally
charged (Table 33). As expected, the amount of reduction is great-
est for those charged with felony offenses and offenses against the
person and less for those charged with the more numerous but less
serious minor offenses against property, other delinquency and sta-
tus violations.
When the counties with high, medium, and low rates of repre-
sentation are examined separately, attorneys show the greatest im-
pact in those counties where they are least common, such as low
representation counties, and the least impact in the counties where
they appear most frequently. In the counties with high rates of rep-
resentation, the 5.5% of unrepresented juveniles (Table 4) have
much greater rates of charge reduction than do their represented
colleagues. The greater rate of charge reduction and dismissal (Ta-
ble 32) suggests that the juvenile court judges in the high represen-
tation counties are especially conscious of these juveniles' lack of
representation, indulge a presumption for leniency in their favor,
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and impose very few out-of-home placement or secure confinement
dispositions on them (Tables 9 and 10).
By contrast, the presence of lawyers has the greatest impact on
charge reduction in the low representation counties where attorneys
appeared in less than 20% of cases. Forjuveniles charged with the
most serious felony offenses, attorneys were able to effect about a
10% reduction when compared with the unrepresented juveniles.
Even for the less serious offenses, represented juveniles enjoyed
about a 5% reduction in charges as compared with the unrepre-
sented youths. In the counties with medium rates of representation,
there was a modest 1% to 2% difference in reduced charges in favor
of represented juveniles.
Table 34 reports the proportional reduction in charges by the
type of attorney. Slightly more than 5% of juveniles had a private
attorney while the bulk ofjuveniles were represented either by pub-
lic defenders or court appointed attorneys depending upon the legal
services delivery system in the particular county (Table 3). In exam-
ining charge reduction by type of attorney for the state as a whole, it
appears that ajuvenile fares somewhat better when represented by a
public attorney rather than a private attorney. For the six offense
comparisons, in no instance did a private attorney garner a greater
proportion of charge reductions than did at least one of the public
attorney types, and in two-thirds of the comparisons private attor-
neys did worse than both. Setting aside the data from the counties
with high rates of representation where there were very few private
attorneys (2.4%, Table 3) or unrepresented juveniles, it appears
from the medium and low representation counties that if a juvenile
seeks counsel at all, a public sector attorney who is more familiar
with the system may provide greater assistance. Interestingly, in
many of the comparisons, unrepresented juveniles enjoyed a larger
proportional reduction in charges than did those who retained pri-
vate counsel. It must be recalled, however, that private attorneys
were somewhat more effective than public attorneys when measured
by the dispositions their clients received (Table 11).
3. Finding of Delinquency
A juvenile court judge in Minnesota may, as one of his or her
dispositional options, find the facts to be proven but continue a case
"before a finding of delinquency has been entered ."227 Even
227 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185(3) (West 1982) provides:
When it is in the best interests of the child to do so and when the child has admitted
the allegations contained in the petition before the judge or referee, or when a
hearing has been held.., and the allegations contained in the petition have been
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without finding delinquency, a judge may order many of the same
dispositions.228 The option of continuing a case without a formal
finding of delinquency provides a dispositional alternative to intake
screening for those county juvenile courts that do not screen cases
prior to the filing of a petition. A finding of delinquency, however,
constitutes a more formal determination with some additional
consequences. 229
An obvious question is what factors influence ajudge's decision
of whether or not to make a formal finding of delinquency. The
obvious candidates are the seriousness of the present offense, pre-
trial detention, the severity of the eventual disposition, and the pres-
ence of an attorney. Table 35 summarizes the relationships between
these variables and a finding of delinquency.
For the state as a whole and in the counties with high, medium,
and low rates of representation, juvenile court judges make a find-
ing of delinquency in slightly more than half of all petitioned cases,
55.2%. All the legal variables influence the judges' propensity to
make a formal finding of delinquency in the expected directions.
Judges make a finding of delinquency in about 10% more of the
cases in which a juvenile is convicted of a felony offense than for a
less serious offense. The only surprising result is the very high rate
of findings of delinquency, 75.9%, for juveniles convicted of status
offenses in the counties with high rates of representation.
Similarly, a juvenile's pretrial detention status influences the
judge's eventual decision to make a finding of delinquency. Recall
from Table 15 that while only 7.6% of juveniles in the state were
detained, the rates of detention were higher for those charged with
more serious offenses and with more extensive prior records. Thus,
in the state as a whole, 78.3% of those juveniles held in detention as
compared with 53.4% of those who were not held in detention were
formally found to be delinquent. While pretrial detention was asso-
ciated with a greater likelihood of a finding of delinquency in all
types of counties, the impact was greatest in the counties with me-
duly proven but, in either case, before afinding of delinquency has been entered, the court
may continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 days on any one order. Such a
continuance may be extended for one additional successive period not to exceed 90
days and only after the court has reviewed the case and entered its order for an
additional continuance without a finding of delinquency ....
Id. (emphasis added).
228 Id.
229 See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 103, at 29 (findings of
delinquency may count as part of the adult criminal history score for subsequent sen-
tencing purposes). They may also contribute to a "prima facie" case for transfer to
adult criminal court. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125(3) (West 1986); Feld, Dismantling




FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH A FINDING OF DELINQUENCY
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
FINDING OF DELINQUENCY
OVERALL % 55.2 53.3 56.0 55.5
OFFENSE
Felony Offense Against Person 65.0 63.6 67.2 63.1
Felony Offense Against Property 65.9 57.1 70.3 66.1
Minor Offense Against Person 54.8 46.4 59.0 55.3
Minor Offense Against Property 55.2 48.8 60.6 54.3
Other Delinquency 54.4 49.1 55.1 57.2
Status 54.6 75.9 44.3 55.8
DETENTION
Yes 78.3 69.0 83.9 71.2
No 53.4 52.3 52.1 54.8
DISPOSITION OVERALL
% Home 79.1 76.5 82.6 77.0
% Secure 84.6 80.4 89.6 81.7
ATTORNEY
Present 61.2 56.0 66.3 63.0
Absent 53.3 40.7 48.4 56.5
dium rates of representation
more extensively (Table 15).
where pretrial detention was used
There was also a direct relationship between a formal finding of
delinquency and the severity of the eventual disposition a juvenile
received. In the state as a whole, judges made a formal finding of
delinquency in 79.1% of cases in which juveniles were removed
from their homes, and in 84.6% of cases in which a secure confine-
ment disposition was imposed.
In light of the previously described relationships between of-
fenses, dispositions, detention, and representation by counsel (Ta-
bles 3-18), it is not surprising that judges entered findings of
delinquency in larger proportions of cases in which juveniles were
represented by an attorney than in cases in which they were not. In
the state as a whole, judges made a formal finding of delinquency in
nearly two out of three cases (61.2%) when juveniles were repre-
sented as contrasted with just over half (53.3%) the cases when they
were not represented. In the counties with high, medium, and low
rates of representation the same pattern prevailed with larger pro-
portions of represented juveniles than unrepresented juveniles
found delinquent. In light of the associations between the legal
1288 [Vol. 79
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
variables and rates of representation, and the legal variables and
formal delinquency determinations, it is difficult to attribute the dif-
ferences in rates of finding delinquency to the presence of counsel
as such. Rather, the presence of lawyers probably mirrors the other
variables that increase the likelihood of a formal delinquency
determination.
4. Case Processing Time and the Impact of Counsel
An important question is whether the presence of attorneys ex-
pedites or retards the rapidity of juvenile justice administration.
The next analyses summarize the relationships between offenses
and the amount of time it takes to process a case, detention and the
amount of time it takes to process a case, and the presence of an
attorney and the amount of time it takes to process a case. The
amount of time a juvenile spends in the system is measured from the
date the petition is filed to the date of disposition. Throughout
these analyses, time in the system is reported for cases that take less
than eight weeks to process and those that take more than twenty-
one weeks.
Table 36 reports on the amount of time it takes to process de-
linquency cases by the type of offense. Overall, juvenile justice ap-
pears to be very expeditious-more than half of the cases are
disposed of in less than two months and only about one case in five
is still pending five months after the petition was filed. The counties
with low rates of representation appear to dispose of cases some-
what faster than the counties with medium and high rates of repre-
sentation, with about 8% more cases disposed of within eight weeks
and about 5% percent fewer still pending in the system five months
later.
There is a direct relationship between the amount of time a
youth spends in the juvenile justice process and the seriousness of
the offense. A smaller proportion of felony offenses and offenses
against the person are disposed of quickly and a larger proportion
of those cases are still active twenty-one weeks later. For example,
ofjuveniles charged with a felony offense against the person, about
one-third (33.4%) have their cases resolved in less than two months,
while an even larger proportion (37.3%) of those cases are still ac-
tive five months later. By contrast, more than half of the juveniles
charged with minor property offenses, and other delinquency, and
more than two-thirds of those charged with status offenses have
their cases resolved quickly, and only about one out of six are still in
the system five months later. When the processing times are ana-




OFFENSE AND CASE PROCESSING TIME
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
TIME: 8 wks 21 wks 8 wks 21 wks 8 wks 21 wks 8 wks 21 wks
less more less more less more less more
OVERALL % 57.9 18.3 54.1 20.4 54.4 20.6 62.8 15.4
Felony Offense
Against Person 33.4 37.3 43.4 20.9 27.5 44.2 34.8 38.8
Felony Offense
Against Property 47.3 25.5 54.6 21.2 41.9 27.7 49.0 25.6
Minor Offense
Against Person 43.3 26.6 48.4 22.3 34.0 32.8 50.9 22.0
Minor Offense
Against Property 56.3 18.5 54.1 19.5 50.0 24.6 61.7 13.9
Other Delinquency 61.1 16.9 56.6 21.2 64.6 14.1 59.8 17.7
Status 68.8 11.6 54.3 20.9 65.9 11.5 75.7 8.6
of representation, it appears that the high representation counties
dispose of felony cases most efficiently and the counties with low
rates of representation dispose of the less serious cases most
expeditiously.
Analyses discussed above reported the relationship between of-
fenses and rates of representation (Tables 3 and 4) as well as be-
tween detention and rates of representation (Tables 15 and 16). In
order to ascertain the impact of attorneys on case processing time, it
is also necessary to analyze the effects of detention on case process-
ing. Table 37 reports the amount of time it takes to process cases in
which juveniles are held in detention and in which they are at lib-
erty. Recall Table 15 indicates that 7.6% of juveniles received one
or more detention hearings and that the seriousness of the present
offense affected rates of detention. Table 37 controls for the pres-
ent offense and reports the processing time of detained and non-
detained juveniles.
Quite clearly, detaining a juvenile dramatically alters the rapid-
ity with which juvenile courts process his or her case. For the state
overall, only 35.1% of detained juveniles have their cases disposed
of within eight weeks, as contrasted with 59.8% of those who were
not detained. Conversely, detention more than doubles the propor-
tion of cases that are still active five months later, 38.6% versus
16.7%. The finding that detention substantially slows the processing
of a case is especially troubling. Minnesota juvenile court rules re-
quire that juveniles held in detention should be tried within 30 days
of denying the allegations of a petition as contrasted with a 60 day
[Vol. 791290
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TABLE 37
OFFENSE, DETENTION, AND CASE PROCESSING TIME
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW
DETENTION: YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OVERALL %
> 8 Weeks 35.1
21 Weeks > 38.6
Felony Offense
Against Person
> 8 Weeks 35.7
21 Weeks > 38.5
Felony Offense
Against Property
> 8 Weeks 40.7
21 Weeks > 34.4
Minor Offense
Against Person
> 8 Weeks 32.7
21 Weeks > 49.0
Minor Offense
Against Property
> 8 Weeks 27.6
21 Weeks > 47.4
Other Delinquency
> 8 Weeks 36.7
21 Weeks > 36.7
Status
> 8 Weeks 29.9
21 Weeks > 33.2
59.8 40.2 55.1 29.5 57.9 45.8 63.5
16.7 33.5 19.5 42.6 17.5 32.2 14.7
32.7 41.7 43.8 30.8 25.9 46.4 32.9
36.9 33.3 18.1 41.8 45.4 32.1 39.9
48.2
24.3
52.4 54.7 37.8 43.0 45.8 49.2
14.3 21.5 36.8 25.3 33.9 24.9
44.8 46.7 48.5 25.8 36.1 47.1 51.2
23.4 40.0 20.7 53.0 27.8 41.2 20.8
58.2
16.7
34.2 54.8 22.2 54.0 42.2 62.2
42.1 18.7 52.0 20.7 34.4 13.4
63.0 44.1 57.7 32.3 67.3 36.5 61.1
15.5 32.2 20.2 37.4 12.1 40.4 16.4
70.7 23.0 57.3 22.9 68.5 49.1
10.5 39.3 19.1 34.4 10.1 24.6
76.4
8.2
time limit for juveniles not detained. 230 Similarly, the Juvenile Jus-
tice Standards recommend the expedited hearing and disposition of
cases of detained juveniles. 23'
When the impact of detention on case processing is analyzed
230 MINN. R. P.Juv. CT. 27.02(1). See generally, Feld, supra note 2, at 165-67 n.87:
The Rules establish two timetables for processing juvenile offenders through the
various stages of the justice system. The timetables vary depending upon whether
the youth is being held in detention .... For a youth who is taken into custody and
held in detention, the sequence and timing of the stages of the process are acceler-
ated and a detention hearing is required .... Following arraignment, a detained
youth must be brought to trial within 30 days rather than the 60 days provided for
youths who remain at liberty, and the various notice, discovery, and pretrial pro-
ceedings must be completed during this period.
Id.
231 See A.B.A.-IJ.A., PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 83, Std. 7.1 B.2;
A.B.A.-IJ.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS Std. 7.10
(1980) [hereinafter INTERIM STATUS].
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for the high, medium, and low representation counties, the deleteri-
ous effect of detention is most conspicuous in the counties with me-
dium rates of representation. In those counties, about 10% fewer
cases are disposed of quickly and about 10% more are still active
later than in the high or low representation counties. Recall also
that the counties with medium rates of representation had the high-
est rates of pretrial detention (Table 15, 12.2% versus 6.7% for
high and 4.0% for low).
Although the seriousness of ajuvenile's offense substantially al-
ters the likelihood of detention (Table 15), the fact of detention as
such exerts a relatively constant effect on the time required to pro-
cess cases: roughly the same proportion of cases are still active five
months later at all levels of offense. However, when detained cases
are compared with non-detained cases, the retarding effect of deten-
tion on processing is most apparent for juveniles charged with less
serious types of offenses. Thus, for juveniles charged with minor
property and status offenses, about three times as many cases of
those who were detained initially as contrasted with those who were
not detained were still active after five months (compare Table 36
with 37).
Throughout these analyses, many of the indicators that a case is
more complex-seriousness of present offense (Table 4), a prior
record (Table 13), pretrial detention (Table 16), the number of of-
fenses at disposition (Table 32)-have been associated with higher
rates of representation. Table 38 reports on the effects of an attor-
ney on case processing time while controlling for the seriousness of
the offense.
For the state overall, 57.9% of all delinquency cases were re-
solved in less than eight weeks and only 18.3% were still active after
twenty-one weeks (Table 36). Table 38 reports those rates for
juveniles with and without counsel. Quite clearly, the presence of
an attorney substantially slows the speed with which a case is dis-
posed. While 57.9% of all cases are disposed of in less than two
months, only 45.6% of represented cases as contrasted with 66.7%
of unrepresented cases are disposed of in less than two months.
Similarly, nearly twice as many of the cases of represented youths as
unrepresented youths are still active five months later. Although
Table 36 reported that much larger proportions of the less serious
cases-minor property, other delinquency and status offenses-
were resolved quickly, when juveniles were represented by counsel,
nearly twice as many cases remained active after five months as com-
pared with the unrepresented youths.
The impact of an attorney differs when the data are examined
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TABLE 38
TIME IN SYSTEM AND REPREsENTATION BY COUNSEL
STATEWIDE HIGH MEDIUM LOW


























45.6 66.7 54.4 42.9 39.2 65.5 37.8 68.2
25.3 13.0 20.2 26.5 29.8 13.3 28.5 12.3
28.1 39.7 41.8 - 23.0 34.8
41.0 32.1 20.5 100.0* 48.0 32.6
21.3 42.9
52.1 31.0
42.1 53.3 54.0 25.0 35.6 52.0 35.7 54.2
28.7 21.2 20.8 50.0 32.0 19.0 34.6 22.1
35.6 55.4 47.5 50.0 25.6 50.5 35.1 58.5
30.1 20.9 22.0 50.0 36.7 24.3 31.1 18.6
45.1 64.8
24.3 14.0
54.6 26.9 39.1 60.9 33.8 66.9
19.5 26.9 30.5 18.4 23.1 12.0
49.3 70.5 57.1 44.4 43.7 76.2 37.8 65.6
23.7 11.6 21.0 26.7 24.8 8.1 29.5 14.5
53.2 73.7 53.3 60.9 52.8 67.3 53.7
19.9 8.5 21.8 12.5 18.5 10.2 17.0
78.0
7.4
* There was only I unrepresented juvenile in this cell
separately for counties with high, medium, and low rates of repre-
sentation. In counties where virtually all juveniles have lawyers, it
takes somewhat longer to process the cases of unrepresented
juveniles. In those counties, a larger proportion of unrepresented
cases are still active after five months for juveniles charged with all
offenses except status offenses. In the counties with medium and
low rates of representation, however, about 25% more of the cases
of unrepresented juveniles are closed early while twice as many
cases of represented juveniles remain active five months later.
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F. MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL, PRE-TRIAL DETENTION, OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
AND SECURE CONFINEMENT DISPOSITIONS
The preceding analyses have focussed on bivariate relationships
between selected variables while controlling for the effects of one or
more other variables. The next analyses use ordinary least squares
multiple regression procedures to analyze the relationships among a
number of independent variables and to assess the relative impact of
each independent variable on the dependent variable while control-
ling for the effects of other variables. Using regression techniques
allows one to estimate and evaluate the strength and significance of
the independent contributions of a number of factors to the expla-
nation or prediction of a dependent variable. 232 Multiple regression
estimates the relationships between the dependent variable and the
independent variables by extracting from each variable the effects of
the others. Thus, for example, the unique effect of the presence of
an attorney on dispositions can be measured while taking into ac-
count or controlling for the effect of other variables.
The standardized regression coefficient for each independent
variable ("beta" in Tables 39-53) expresses the relationship be-
tween each independent variable and the dependent variable, after
the effects of the other variables have been taken into account. The
relative importance of each independent variable in predicting the
dependent variable is determined by the size of the beta, or stan-
dardized regression, coefficient. Where two or more independent
variables are measured in different units, standardized coefficients
provide the only way to compare the relative effect on the depen-
dent variable of each independent variable. Tables 39-53 also re-
port the zero-order correlation coefficient ("r") between each
independent variable and the dependent variable, the multiple re-
gression correlation coefficient ("R"), and R2. The R2 summarizes
the amount of variation in the dependent variable that is explained
by the independent variables included in the regression equation.
The R2 has the additional virtue of being interpretable as a straight-
forward percentage. For example, an R2 = .20 means that 20 per-
cent of the variation in a dependent variable is explained by the
joint operation of the independent variables.
Forward, stepwise regression equations 233 were computed us-
232 See generally F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZUR, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH (1973); D. KLEINBAUM & L. KUPPER, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND
OTHER MULTIVARIABLE METHODS (1978); M. LEWIS-BEcK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN IN-
TRODUCTION (1980).
233 See N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, SPSS: STATISTICAL
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ing SPSS for the entire state and separately for counties with high,
medium, and low rates of representation for the following dichoto-
mous dependent variables: attorney; detention; out-of-home place-
ment; and secure confinement. 23 4 The independent variables and
their coding, which effects the signs of the beta coefficients, include:
attorney (1=yes, 2=no); secure confinement (1=yes, 2=no); a pre-
vious secure confinement disposition (1 =yes, 2=no); out-of-home
placement (1=yes, 2=no); a previous out-of-home placement
(1=yes, 2=no); age (1=12 or younger, through 7=18 years of
age); gender (1=male, 2=female); detention (1=no, 2=yes); pri-
ors (1 =none, through 4=5 or more); present offense (1 =felony of-
fense against person, through 6=status); number of offenses at
disposition (1 =none, through 6=five or more); and a "dummy" va-
riable for race with race/black (1 =not black, 2 =black); race/Native
American (1 =not Native American, 2=Native American). As previ-
ously noted, the SJIS data includes only court-processing variables.
Thus, the study cannot control for the influence of many of the sub-
stantive factors that juvenile courts deem relevant such as family sta-
tus, socioeconomic status, clinical evaluations, and school or work
involvement.
1. Regressing Appointment of Counsel for Independent Variables
The first regression equations are designed to determine which
factors relate to the initial decision to appoint an attorney for ajuve-
nile. Tables 39-42 summarize the regression equations for the state
and for the counties with high, medium, and low rates of representa-
tion. In the state and in all types of counties, the most significant
PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975). Using standard regression tech-
niques, each variable is added to the regression equation in a separate step after the
influence of all other variables has been calculated. The increment in R due to the
addition of that variable is taken as the component of variation attributable to that varia-
ble. Forward stepwise inclusion enters independent variables only if they meet certain
statistical criteria, for example p<.05, and the order of inclusion is determined by the
respective contribution of each variable to the explained variance. Id. at 345.
234 Since the four dependent variables analyzed in this Article are dichotomous, cate-
gorical variables rather than interval variables, log linear or Iogit approaches to mul-
tivariate analyses may be preferable to ordinary least squares regression. For example,
Cohen and Kluegel criticized earlier research on juvenile justice decision-making for
using inadequate data-analytic techniques. Cohen & Kluegel, Determinants, supra note
210, at 165. Thornberry reanalyzed the data in his earlier study and concluded that the
findings "are remarkably similar to the ones reached in this author's earlier study, even
though the earlier work was based on less sophisticated analytic techniques."
Thornberry, supra note 200, at 170. Because the sample size in this study is very large
(N= 17,195), the data robust, and the complexity of the data requires multivariate analy-









INDEPENDENT ZERO-ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R
2
Offense Severity .253* .216* .253 .064
Prior Record -. 205* -. 128* .320 .102
Home .229* .120* .350 .122
Detention -. 164* -. 082* .359 .129
Prior Out-of-Home
Disposition .193* .039* .360 .130
Age .040* .017*** .361 .130
* p < .001
** p < .01
p < .05
TABLE 40




INDEPENDENT ZERO-ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R
2
Offense
Severity .115* .101* .115 .013
Prior Record -. 102* -. 071* .156 .024
Home .111* .077* .170 .029
Gender .077* .051** .177 .031
* p < .001
** p < .01
p <.05
independent variable affecting the appointment of counsel is the se-
riousness of a juvenile's present offense. The length of the prior
record, a juvenile's pretrial detention status, and eventually receiv-
ing an out-of-home placement disposition also influence the ap-
pointment of counsel.
For the state as a whole, the present offense and prior record
explain most of the variance that can be accounted for in rates of
representation (10.2%). The beta coefficient indicates that the seri-
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ousness of the present offense (.216) has almost twice the influence
of the prior record (-.128). Whether a juvenile eventually is re-
moved from his or her home accounts for an additional 2% of the
variance in rates of representation and has nearly the same impact
as the prior record (.120) does on the appointment decision. Obvi-
ously, an event such as removal from the home, which may occur
several months after the initial decision to appoint counsel, does not
cause that earlier decision. Regression simply describes the associa-
tion between the eventual disposition, such as removal from the
home, and the presence of counsel. While the present offense and
prior record are also associated with removal from the home,235
multiple regression has already factored those variables into the
equation and the impact of the disposition represents the residual
effect after accounting for the partial influence of those other
variables.
The relationship between the initial decision to appoint counsel
for a juvenile and the later decision to remove him or her from
home may reflect a process in which the initial appointment decision
is dictated by the anticipated home removal decision. Finally, as
earlier analyses suggested (Table 16), ajuvenile's pretrial detention
status is also associated with the appointment of counsel. Here, the
causal ordering is clearer-if a juvenile is detained initially, then an
attorney is more likely to be appointed both for the detention hear-
ing as well as for subsequent proceedings. The cumulative R2 for
the statewide regression equation is .130, which means that 13% of
the variance in the appointment of counsel can be explained by the
six independent variables in this equation.
Because nearly 95% of the juveniles in the counties with high
rates of representation had attorneys (Table 3), there is very little
variation in the dependent variable. While the present offense,
prior record, and home removal disposition enter the regression
equation, together they explain very little of the variance in the ap-
pointment of counsel, only 2.9%, and the beta weights for those
variables are only about half of those for the entire state. There is
also a slight tendency for male delinquents to have higher rates of
representation than females (Table 27).. However, when nearly
every juvenile has a lawyer, there is very little systematic variation
that explains those few who do not.









INDEPENDENT ZERO-ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R
2
Offense Severity .324* .291* .324 .105
Prior Record -. 169* -. 116* .366 .133
Home .208* .091* .383 .147
Detention -. 172* -. 066* .388 .151
Prior Out-of-
Home Disposition .178* .041** .389 .152
* p < .001
** p < .01
p <.05
TABLE 42




INDEPENDENT ZERO-ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Offense Severity .248* .207* .248 .062
Home .236* .144* .318 .101
Detention -. 195* -. 133* .343 .118
Prior Record -. 175* -. 122* .361 .130
Age .008* -.027*** .362 .131
* p <.001
** <.01
*** p < .05
The regression equation for the appointment of counsel in
counties with medium rates of representation mirrors that for the
state as a whole. The independent variables of present offense,
prior record, home removal disposition, and pretrial detention
enter the equation in the same order and account for more of the
variance in appointment of counsel, 15.1%. Of these factors, the
seriousness of the present offense is clearly the most influential
(.291 versus .116 for prior record).
In the counties with low rates of representation, the order in
which the independent variables enter the equation is somewhat dif-
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ferent from those in the high and medium representation counties.
While the seriousness of the present offense remains the strongest
influence on the appointment of counsel, removal from the home is
second, detention is third, and a prior record is fourth. Moreover,
the beta weights of home removal, detention, and prior record are
about the same, indicating that each has about the same association
with variance in representation. While the length of the prior rec-
ord is associated with ajuvenile's age (Table 7), after controlling for
that relationship, older youths are somewhat more likely to be rep-
resented than their younger counterparts (Table 5). If age provides
a surrogate for competence to waive counsel, then this relationship
is the opposite of what would be expected.
The multiple regression equations confirm the earlier bivariate
analyses. In the state and in all types of counties, juveniles charged
with more serious offenses are more likely to be represented (Tables
3 and 4), as are those with lengthier prior records (Table 13), those
who are held in pretrial detention (Table 16), and those who are
removed from their homes following adjudication (Tables 10, 11,
and 14). What is somewhat surprising, however, is that after factor-
ing into the regression equation all of the legally relevant vari-
ables-present offense, prior record, pretrial detention, and post-
adjudication disposition-only 13% of the variance in appointment
of counsel can be explained. While the very low R2 in the high rep-
resentation counties is understandable, even in the medium repre-
sentation counties, only 15.2% of the variance in representation can
be explained. While it is possible that other variables for which this
study cannot account-parental socioeconomic status, family struc-
ture, educational attainment, or the like-may explain some addi-
tional variance in representation, a very large amount of the
variation in representation seems to be random. The very substan-
tial aggregate county variations in rates of representation suggest
that after identifying the relevant legal variables, idiosyncratic judi-
cial policies regarding waivers of rights are the major, albeit un-
measurable, factor in the appointment decision.
2. Regressing Pretrial Detention on Independent Variables
In the next set of regression equations, the dependent variable
is pretrial detention (1 =no, 2=yes). The independent variables are
those used in the preceding analysis as well as the presence of an
attorney. The regression equations attempt to identify which fac-
tors influence the decision to place a juvenile in pretrial detention.
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As the earlier analyses of detention indicated,236 while a juvenile's
detention status exerts a strong influence on case processing and
dispositions, identifying the factors that lead to the initial decision
to detain juveniles is more problematic. Several studies suggest that
there is no formal rationale for the detention decision or that the
primary determinate is the availability of detention bedspaces. 23 7
Tables 43-46 summarize the regression equations for pretrial
detention for the state and the counties with high, medium, and low
rates of representation. As will be seen in the regression analyses
for out-of-home placement and secure confinement, after control-
ling for the present offense and prior record, a juvenile's pretrial
detention status is a significant factor in dispositions.2 38 Given the
impact of pretrial detention on subsequent sentencing, the issue is
what factors influence the initial decision to detain.
TABLE 43




INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Out-of-Home Disposition -. 265* -. 211* .265 .070
Attorney -. 164* -. 086* .285 .081
Offense Severity -. 117* -. 068* .290 .084
Prior Record .140* .048* .296 .087
Gender .020** .046* .299 .090
Age -.039* -.019*** .300 .090
* p < .001
** p < .01
p < .05
Table 43 reports the independent variables entering the regres-
sion equation for pretrial detention for the entire state. Recall that
7.6% of all juveniles in Minnesota had one or more detention hear-
ings (Table 15). Interestingly, a subsequent event, receiving an out-
of-home placement, accounts for most of the variance in pretrial de-
tention, 7% (beta= -. 211). The next most influential variable is
the presence of an attorney, which accounts for an additional 1.1 %
236 See Tables 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, supra note 194, at 65-67, 101-04; Fra-
zier & Bishop, supra note 187, at 1149-50.
238 See Tables 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
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of variance (beta= -. 086). While both out-of-home placement and
the appointment of counsel are influenced by the seriousness of the
present offense and the prior record,239 the residuals of those vari-
ables also enter the regression equation for pretrial detention. Fi-
nally, it appears that juveniles who are female and those who are
younger are somewhat more likely to be detained than male or older
juveniles after controlling for the influence of those other variables.
Because the eventual disposition occurs weeks or months after
the initial detention decision, one possible inference is that out-of-
home placement and pretrial detention share underlying common
elements. The detention statute focuses on a juvenile's danger to
others, danger to self, or likelihood of absconding. 240 While the dis-
position statute does not include specific sentencing criteria, 241 one
interpretation is that the same factors that animate the initial deten-
tion decision later influence ajudge's decision to remove ajuvenile
from the home. An equally plausible interpretation which draws on
the findings of other research is that there is very little rationale for
the initial detention decision, 242 but that it, in turn, may exert an
independent effect on eventual dispositions apart from any common
elements. A comparison of the beta coefficient for out-of-home
placement with the betas of the other variables indicates that the
eventual disposition exerts three or more times as much influence as
any of the other variables on detention. Similarly, the association
between representation and detention probably results from deten-
tion increasing the likelihood of representation, rather than from
representation increasing a juvenile's likelihood of being de-
tained243 (Tables 16, 39, and accompanying text). Being female ex-
plains an additional .3% of the variance in pretrial detention. While
239 See Tables 39-42 supra and accompanying text (appointment of counsel); Tables
47-50 infra and accompanying text (out-of-home placement).
240 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.171-260.172 (West 1986); Feld, supra note 2, at 191-209.
241 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (West 1986).
242 See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. Frazier and Bishop, for example,
provide alternative interpretations for their inability to explain the detention decision.
The fact that we were unable to model detention decisions in these data may mean
that courts detain juveniles based on legitimate considerations supplied to the
judge in ad hoc fashion, although we have no evidence to suggest that this occurs.
Alternatively, this inability to model detention decisions may mean that the process
is idiosyncratic, causing some juveniles to suffer significant deprivations of liberty
based on considerations that are irrelevant to the approved purposes of detention.
If this latter explanation is correct, the problem may lie in the fact that statutory
detention criteria are too broad and/or that detention statutes offer too little gui-
dance regarding whether youths meet the stated criteria.
Frazier & Bishop, supra note 187, at 1150-51.
243 See supra Tables 16, 39 and accompanying text.
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the beta for gender is small (.046), it is comparable in influence to a
prior record (.048) or a more severe offense (-.068).
TABLE 44




INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Out-of-Home Disposition -. 189* -. 193* .189 .036
Prior Out-of-Home
Disposition -. 146* --.139* .198 .039
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 082* .119* .212 .045
Gender .050** .041*** .217 .047
Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 106* .062*** .220 .048
Prior Record .128* .056*** .224 .050
Age -. 047** -.033*** .226 .051
* p < .001
** p < .01
p < .05
In the counties with high rates of representation, the regression
equation can only account for 5.1 % of the variance in rates of deten-
tion, and most of that is explained by the eventual sentence imposed
in the present proceeding or by previous out-of-home or secure
confinement dispositions. A relationship between previous sen-
tences, current pretrial detention, and the eventual disposition is
understandable. A record of prior referrals influences a juvenile's
present detention status (Table 15). A prior out-of-home placement
or secure confinement disposition represents a previous judicial de-
termination that the juvenile should not remain at home, whether
because of the nature of the prior offense or perceived treatment
needs. Thus, when a juvenile on probation or parole is reap-
prehended, police and probation officers as well as the juvenile
courtjudge are likely to incorporate their earlier decisions into their
current ones.
Table 45 reports the regression equation for pretrial detention
in the counties with medium rates of representation where nearly
twice as many juveniles were detained as in other parts of the state
(12.2% versus 6.7% and 4.0%, Table 15). Again, eventually receiv-
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TABLE 45




INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Out-of-Home Disposition -. 304* -. 272* .304 .092
Offense Severity -. 177* -. 121* .327 .107
Prior Record .158* .076* .342 .117
Attorney -. 172* -. 067* .348 .121
Gender -. 006 .051* .352 .123
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 165 -. 052* .354 .124
Secure Confinement




ing an out-of-home placement, the seriousness of the present of-
fense, the length of the prior record, and the presence of an
attorney explains most of the variance, 12.1%o, of which the out-of-
home placement exerts the most influence (beta= -. 272). Female
juveniles are somewhat more likely to be detained than are their
male counterparts after controlling for the other independent vari-
ables (beta=.051).
Table 46 reports the regression equation for the detention de-
cision in the counties with low rates of representation where com-
paratively few juveniles are detained (Table 15). As in other
settings, pretrial detention is most strongly associated with an even-
tual out-of-home placement and the presence of an attorney
(R2=.085). Perhaps more surprising, however, is the absence of
either the present offense or prior record from the regression equa-
tion. For the reasons indicated previously, neither the eventual dis-
position nor the appointment of counsel cause the initial pretrial
detention. Yet this data and the regression equation do not identify
any other significant causal variables that logically do explain deten-
tion. The inability of this study to model the initial detention deci-
sion is consistent with other recent research findings. 244
244 For instance, Frazier and Bishop conclude that:
neither standard sociodemographic variables nor theoretically important legal vari-
ables are related to detention decisions. These findings suggest that courts do not
1303
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TABLE 46




INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R
2
Out-of-Home Disposition -. 255* -. 192* .256 .065
Attorney -. 195* -. 143* .291 .085
Gender .028*** .037** .293 .086
Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 207* -. 041*** .294 .087
* p < .001
** p < .01
p < .05
These data raise troubling questions about the determinants
and uses of detention. Very little of the variance in the use of deten-
tion can be explained by traditional legal variables. Only .6% of the
detention decision can be explained by the seriousness of the pres-
ent offense and prior record independently of a home removal dis-
position and the presence of counsel (Table 42). The variations in
the use of detention in different parts of the state suggest that the
vague and general statutory criteria are susceptible to many differ-
ing local interpretations and applications.
Pretrial detention is a very onerous imposition and its overuse
is a frequent source of criticism. 24 5 Quite apart from the obvious
make detention decisions based on the juvenile's age, gender or race and that
courts are influenced neither by the seriousness of the current charges nor by prior
records of offending.
Frazier & Bishop, supra note 187, at 1143. After additional analyses, they conclude that
"detention decisions are systematically related neither to characteristics ofjuveniles nor
to the offenses ofjuveniles about which decision-makers are routinely informed." Id. at
1150.
245 The overuse and abuse of pretrial detention for juveniles has been criticized ex-
tensively. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 2, at 191-209; Guggenheim, Paternalism, Prevention and
Punishment: Pretrial Detention of Juveniles, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1064, 1071-74 (1977); Kris-
berg & Schwartz, supra note 187, at 357-62; Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial
Detention ofJuveniles: A Principled Solution of a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 95,
95-98 (1983).
The vast majority ofjuveniles' institutional contacts occur in pretrial detention cen-
ters rather than in postadjudication commitments to training schools or other correc-
tional facilities. See R. SARRI, supra note 223, at 7; Sarri, Service Technologies: Diversion,
Probation, and Detention, in BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS AND THE LAW
166 (R. Sarri & Y. Hasenfeld eds. 1976). Moreover, manyjuvenile courtjurisdictions do
not have juvenile detention facilities and juveniles routinely endure preventive deten-
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injurious consequences of pretrial imprisonment, such as depriva-
tion of liberty, stigmatization, and negative self-labeling, detention
may also impair a juvenile's ability to prepare legal defenses and
may increase both ajuvenile's probability of conviction and the like-
lihood of institutional confinement following adjudication. 246
Moreover, the presence of the gender variable in the regression
equation confirms the earlier observed disproportionate detention
of female offenders (Tables 28 and 29).
3. Regressing Out-of-Home Placement and Secure Confinement
Dispositions on Independent Variables
This study uses two alternative measures of dispositions-out-
of-home placement and secure confinement. The next sets of re-
gression equations examine the independent variables associated
with the juvenile court's sentencing decision to remove a juvenile
from his or her home and to institutionalize. Tables 47 through 50
summarize the regression equations for the state as a whole and
separately for the counties with high, medium, and low rates of rep-
resentation.
Table 47 reports the regression variables for juvenile court sen-
tencing decisions-out-of-home placement and secure confine-
ment-for the entire state. All of the independent variables account
for 24.5% of the variance in home removal and 22.4% of the vari-
ance in institutionalization. Of the independent variables, a previ-
ous disposition of removal from the home is the most powerful
determinant of the present decision to remove a juvenile from the
tion in adult jails. See Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Pretrial
detention is an onerous experience, especially for juveniles ...."); D.B. v. Tewksbury,
545 F. Supp. 896, 898-903 (D. Or. 1983) (graphic description of the conditions under
which juveniles are confined in adult jails); R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHErro
286-344 (1975). Commentators have described the realities of juvenile confinement
thusly:
(o]ver half a million juveniles annually detained in "junior jails," another several
hundred thousand held in adult jails, penned like cattle, demoralized by lack of
activities and trained staff. Often brutalized. Over half the facilities in which
juveniles are held have no psychiatric or social work staff. A fourth have no school
program. The median age of detainees is fourteen; the novice may be sodomized
within a matter of hours. Many have not been charged with a crime at all.
Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 119 (M. Rosen-
heim ed. 1976). It is this institutional reality thatJustice Rehnquist characterized as the
equivalent of parental supervision. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
246 See R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, supra note 194, at 101-04 (detained juveniles
more likely to be institutionalized); Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 293-94 ("[b]eing
detained before adjudication had an independent effect on the likelihood of commit-
ment, entirely apart from the fact that both detention and commitment had some com-
mon causal antecedents ...."); Frazier & Bishop, supra note 187, at 1148 (detention




REGRESSION MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING OUT-OF-
HOME PLACEMENT AND SECURE CONFINEMENT DISPOSITIONS
(STATEWIDE)
ZERO- STANDARDIZED
INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R 2
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .422* .357* .422 .179
Detention -. 265* --. 175* .467 .218
Attorney .229* .107* .483 .233
Offense Severity .157* .077* .490 .240
Number of Offenses at
Disposition - .084* -. 060* .494 .244
Age .039* .018** .494 .244
Prior Record -.282* -. 019*** .494 .244
Gender .023** --.014*** .494 .245
SECURE CONFINEMENT
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .414* .354* .414 .171
Offense Severity .191* .120* .445 .198
Detention -. 194* -. 115" .462 .214
Attorney .197* .081* .469 .220
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -.086* -.050* .471 .222
Prior Record -. 260* -. 040* .473 .223
Age -. 023** -. 040*** .474 .224
* P < .001
** p < .01
p <. 0 5
home (beta=.357). Similarly, a previous disposition of secure con-
finement is the most powerful determinant of the present decision
to incarcerate a youth (beta=.354).
Two recent studies examined the impact of prior juvenile court
sentences on the present one. Thornberry and Christenson report
that the dispositions for prior offenses exert a strong influence on
the current dispositions and that repeat offenders are likely to re-
ceive the same type of disposition for subsequent offenses, that is to
say, there is stability in sentencing.247 By contrast, Henretta, Fra-
zier, and Bishop analyze the effects of previous sentences on the
247 Thornberry & Christenson, Juvenile Justice Decision Making as Longitudinal Process, 63
Soc. FORCES 433, 442 (1984).
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present disposition while controlling for other variables and report
evidence of progression or escalation, rather than stability, in
sentencing. 248
Although this study was not designed to replicate those of
Thornberry or Henretta, it does provide evidence of the strong in-
fluence of prior dispositions on later sentences. The high zero-or-
der correlations ("r") between prior home removal and present
home removal, and between prior secure confinement and present
secure confinement show the strong relationship between the two
decisions. For the state as a whole and in all types of counties, a
previous sentence of the same type as the current sentence is the
first variable to enter the regression equation, has a beta weight that
is double or triple that of the next variables, and explains about two-
thirds to three-quarters of the total explained variance in
sentencing.
The relationship between the previous disposition and the pres-
ent one is consistent with the traditional, rehabilitative juvenile
court sentencing philosophy. If sentencing decisions are individual-
ized to fit the offender rather than the offense, then, absent a signifi-
cant change in individual circumstances, a repeat involvement calls
for a similar or greater intervention, regardless of the nature of the
present offense. Ajuvenile's recidivism provides strong evidence to
a sentencing judge that the child has failed to "learn his lesson."
The previous disposition serves as a minimum constraint on the se-
verity of the present sentence. To intervene less stringently is to
give up and admit failure.
The next three variables to enter the equations for home re-
moval and secure confinement, albeit in somewhat different order,
are seriousness of the present offense, pretrial detention, and pres-
ence of an attorney. A relationship between the seriousness of the
present offense and the more severe sentences reflects a modicum
of proportionality in individualized dispositions (Table 6). A com-
parison of the beta weights for the present offense (home=.077, in-
stitutionalize=.120) with those of previous dispositions indicates
that the latter are three to five times more powerful in explaining
the present sentence.
248 They conclude that:
prior dispositions exert a fairly strong influence on the disposition of new offenses
.... [O]nly severity of the current offense proved to be a stronger predictor of case
outcomes .... [W]e did not find only stability in dispositional outcomes over repeat
offenses. In our data, there is evidence of progression or escalation in the severity
of disposition of subsequent offenses.
Henretta, Frazier & Bishop, supra note 182, at 561.
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Pretrial detention also exerts a significant influence on the
eventual sentence imposed on a juvenile (home beta= -. 175, insti-
tutionalize beta=-. 115). The presence of detention in the regres-
sion equations means that after controlling for the effects of the
present offense, prior record and other variables that detention and
the dispositions may share in common, the fact of detention per se
exerts an additional and substantial effect on sentences. Indeed, a
juvenile's pretrial detention status is about as influential as the pres-
ent offense (beta=-.115 vs. .120) in the decision to confine and
about twice as important (beta= -. 175 vs. .077) in the decision to
remove a juvenile from home. Other studies have noted the delete-
rious impact of pretrial detention on postadjudication
dispositions. 249
Other than noting the strong and consistent relationship be-
tween pretrial detention and later receiving an out-of-home place-
ment, the above regression analyses (Tables 43-46) could not
identify causal variables that explained much of the variance in de-
tention. The presence of detention in the disposition regression
equations indicates that after controlling for the influences of the
other independent variables, the fact of detention itself has a sub-
stantial impact on the sentences that youths receive. It is possible
that both the detention and the disposition decisions share common
factors other than legal variables for which this study cannot control
but which explain the strong relationship between the two. It is at
least as likely, however, that the initial decision to detain is "irra-
tional," meaning it has no formal legal rational basis, but that it
strongly influences subsequent decisions.2 50 If process variables
such as detention have no objective bases but strongly influence
subsequent decision-making, then it is important for juvenile court
judges and legislators to scrutinize more closely and regulate more
extensively those earlier decisions that may cumulate to a juvenile's
detriment.
The regression equations indicate that the presence of an attor-
ney is an aggravating factor in a juvenile's disposition, accounting
for about 1.5% of the variance in home removal and about .6% of
the variance in secure confinement. While the overall explained va-
riance is small, the beta coefficient indicates that the presence of an
attorney has more influence on a youth's removal from home than
does the seriousness of the offense (attorney beta=.107, offense
beta=.077). Thus, earlier observations that the presence of an at-
249 See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
250 Cf. McCarthy & Smith, supra note 158, at 55-60.
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TABLE 48
REGRESSION MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING OUT-OF-HOME
PLACEMENT AND SECURE CONFINEMENT DISPOSITIONS
(HIGH REPRESENTATION COUNTIES)
ZERO- STANDARDIZED
INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R'
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .498* .347* .498 .248
Detention -. 189* -. 115* .511 .261
Prior Record -.407* -. 112* .519 .270
Number of Offenses at
Disposition --. 083* -. 068* .525 .276
Offense Severity .055* .075* .530 .281
Attorney .111* .054* .532 .283
Gender -. 014 -. 054** .535 .286
SECURE CONFINEMENT
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .478* .325* .478 .228
Prior Record .-. 393* -. 134* .494 .244
Offense Severity .099* .109* .507 .257
Detention -. 106* -. 050* .510 .260
Prior Out-of-Home
Disposition .444* .083** .511 .262
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 064* -. 040** .513 .263
* P < .00 1
** p < .01
***P <.05
torney seems to be an aggravating factor at sentencing are borne
out by the regression equations (Tables 9, 10, 14, and 18).
The other variables in the regression equation explain very lit-
tle additional variance in sentencing. The beta signs associated with
the variable "age" indicate a slight tendency to remove younger
juveniles from their homes (beta = .018) and to institutionalize older
juveniles (-.040). Similarly, the beta sign for gender (-.014) indi-
cates a very weak tendency to remove more female offenders than
males from their homes after controlling for other variables. How-
ever, while statistically significant, none of these other variables ex-
plain even .1 % of the variance in sentencing.
Table 48 reports the regression equations for home removal
and secure confinement in counties with high rates of representa-
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tion. Again, a previous sentence of home removal or institutional
confinement is the variable which is most powerfully associated with
a current home removal or secure placement. Although pretrial de-
tention, a prior record, and the severity of the present offense also
influence both decisions, their relative contributions are distinctly
subordinate to the juvenile justice system's ratification of its own
prior decisions. Somewhat surprisingly, even in counties where vir-
tually all youths are represented, the presence of an attorney is still
a slightly aggravating factor in the decision to remove a juvenile
from home (beta=.054).
TABLE 49





INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .373* .371* .373 .139
Detention -. 304* -. 213* .443 .196
Offense Severity .197* .098* .461 .213
Attorney .208* .082* .467 .218
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 087* -. 051* .470 .221
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .279* - .076* .472 .223
SECURE CONFTEMWENT
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .364* .311* .364 .133
Offense Severity .255* .156* .424 .180
Detention -. 224* -. 134* .445 .197
Gender .137* .052* .448 .201
Attorney .182* .056* .451 .203
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 101* -. 048* .454 .206
Age -.056* -.041* .455 .207
• P < .001
* < .01
**p < .05
Table 49 presents the regression statistics for out-of-home
placement and secure confinement ofjuveniles in counties with me-
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dium rates of representation. A prior home removal disposition and
pretrial detention status are the most influential determinants of a
current home removal, and a prior institutional commitment, the
seriousness of the present offense, and pretrial detention are the
most significant determinants of current institutional confinement.
The relationship between out-of-home placement and pretrial de-
tention was noted earlier (Tables 43-46). In these equations, deten-
tion emerges as a strong influence on out-of-home placement and a
somewhat lesser influence on secure confinement (home
beta= -. 213, institutionalize beta= -. 134). While a juvenile's de-
tention status explains more of the variance in home removal than
does either the present offense or the prior record, it will be recalled
that there was no apparent explanation for, the initial decision to
detain. As in previous analyses, the presence of an attorney is an
aggravating factor at sentencing (home beta=.082, institutionalize
beta= .056). After controlling for other variables, older males are
somewhat more at risk for secure confinement than are other
juveniles.
In the counties with low rates of representation, the previous
home removal or confinement disposition, the pretrial detention,
the seriousness of the offense, and the presence of an attorney ex-
plain most of the variance in dispositions. Of these, the previous
sentence is clearly the dominant influence (home beta=.338, insti-
tutionalize beta=.351) followed by pretrial detention. A compari-
son of the beta weights for attorney representation in the high,
medium, and low representation counties suggests that in the low
representation counties where attorneys appear infrequently, their
presence makes a larger contribution to the severity of the eventual
sentences imposed-than in settings where they appear more com-
monly. °
4. Regressing Appointment of Counsel, Pretrial Detention, and
Dispositions for Independent Variables Including a
Juvenile's Race
The final set of regression equations, which are computed for
Hennepin County only, include as an additional independent varia-
ble a juvenile's race-white, black, and other.25 1 Race was
"dummy" coded separately for black and Native American juveniles
(1 =not black, 2=black; 1 =not Native American; 2=Native Ameri-
can). Creating separate variables to reflect a youth's minority status










INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .388* .338* .388 .151
Detention -. 255* -. 184* .443 .197
Attorney .236* .120* .464 .215
Offense Severity .163* .072* .471 .222
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 116* -. 060* .474 .225
Gender .001 -. 025*** .475 .226
Age .039* .022*** .475 .226
SECURE CONFINEMENT
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .391* .351* .391 .153
Detention -. 207* -. 141* .426 .181
Offense Severity .177* .106* .446 .199
Attorney .205* .099* .457 .209
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 118* -. 054* .460 .212
Age -.022*** -.034** .461 .213
* P < .001
**P < .01
**p < .05
permits an assessment of the impact of race on juvenile justice deci-
sion-making. The bivariate analyses of race are reported in Tables
19-25. It is also useful to compare the regression equations re-
ported in Tables 51-53 with those for counties with medium rates of
representation (Table 41, appointment of counsel; Table 45, deten-
tion; Table 49, dispositions).
Table 51 reports the regression factors influencing the appoint-
ment of counsel. As in other analyses, the seriousness of the pres-
ent offense is the principal determinate of the decision to appoint
counsel (beta=.336). A comparison of the regression variables for
counties with medium rates of representation with those for Henne-
pin County reveals that the present offense carries substantially
more weight relative to other variables and that a juvenile's pretrial
1312 [Vol. 79
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TABLE 51
REGRESSION MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL INCLUDING A
JUVENILE'S RACE (HENNEPIN COUNTY)
ZERO- STANDARDIZED
INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Offense Severity .370* .336* .370 .137
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .171* .051* .395 .156
Home Removal .217* .102* .406 .165
Prior Record -. 144* -. 082* .412 .170
Black -. 097* -.065* .415 .173




detention status is not a factor in the appointment decision. Finally,
the regression equation confirms the observation that black and Na-
tive American juveniles are more likely to be represented than their
white counterparts (Table 20). The beta weights for race (black
beta=-.065, Native American beta=-.051) are comparable to
those for a prior record and a prior home removal disposition, sug-
gesting a small but significant relationship between minority racial
status and the appointment of counsel.
Table 52 reports the regression factors influencing the deten-
tion decision in Hennepin County. A comparison of the detention
variables with those for counties with medium rates of representa-
tion (Table 45) reveals many common features. An eventual home
removal disposition, the seriousness of the present offense, and the
presence of a prior record dominate both decisions. However, in
Hennepin County, the fourth variable to enter the regression equa-
tion is ajuvenile's black race (beta=.090). This confirms the obser-
vation that black juveniles in Hennepin County were being detained
at higher rates than their white counterparts, after controlling for
the present offense and prior record (Table 24). Indeed, comparing
the betas indicates that being black has a greater impact on the de-
tention decision than does having a prior record of offenses or a
prior training school commitment. The influence of being a Native
American juvenile on the detention decision is about half of that for
black youths (beta=.046). However, any residual influence of a ju-




REGRESSION MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE
DETENTION DECISION INCLUDING A
JUVENILE'S RACE (HENNEPIN COUNTY)
ZERO- STANDARDIZED
INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
Home Removal -. 297* -. 266* .297 .088
Offense Severity -. 235* -. 176* .341 .117
Prior Record .168* .081* .361 .131
Black .113* .090* .371 .138
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 195* -. 069* .375 .141
Native American .029 .046** .378 .143
Secure Confinement
Disposition -. 235* .063*** .380 .144
* P < .001
** p < .01
**p < .05
offense and prior record raises further troubling questions about
the administration of this practice.
The final set of regression equations examine the impact of a
juvenile's race on the dispositional decisions-out-of-home place-
ment and secure confinement. A comparison of the regression
equations for Hennepin County with those for counties with me-
dium rates of representation reveals that the same variables have
comparable weights and account for about the same amount of vari-
ance. However, in the regression equations in Table 53, whether a
juvenile is black or Native American also influences the decision to
remove him or her from home. While the effects of race are small
compared with the other variables, they are still statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, while ajuvenile's race influences somewhat the ini-
tial decision to detain, after controlling for the effects of detention,
minority youths are still at somewhat greater risk for removal from
their homes. However, interestingly, there is no evidence of racial
discrimination in the decision to commit juveniles to secure institu-
tions.
While these data provide some evidence of disparities in the
detention and sentencing of minority youths, there are other possi-
ble explanations besides racial discrimination for which this study
cannot account. Historically, juvenile court judges base their deci-
sions on a host of individual characteristics of the offender. Because
1314 [Vol. 79
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TABLE 53
REGRESSION MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT AND
SECURE CONFINEMENT DISPOSITIONS INCLUDING
JUVENILE'S RACE (HENNEPIN COUNTY)
ZERO- STANDARDIZED
INDEPENDENT ORDER BETA MULTIPLE
VARIABLES r COEFFICIENT R R2
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
Prior Home Removal
Disposition .347* .287* .347 .120
Detention -. 297* -. 200* .417 .174
Offense Severity .239* .125* .448 .200
Attorney .217* .094* .455 .207
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 103* -. 051** .458 .210
Black -. 016 .056** .461 .212
Native American -. 006 .037*** .462 .214
SECURE CONFINEMENT
Prior Secure Confinement
Disposition .354* .284* .354 .126
Offense Severity .312* .186* .446 .199
Detention -. 235* -. 118* .460 .212
Gender .191* .085* .478 .219
Attorney .213* .066* .472 .223
Number of Offenses at
Disposition -. 118* -. 057* .475 .226
Age -. 099* .053** .478 .229
* P < .00 1
** p < .01
p <. 0 5
the SJIS data only includes legal variables, this study cannot control
for many of the factors which the principle of individualized justice
deems relevant, such as family status, socioeconomic status, clinical
evaluations, "treatment needs," school progress, and employment
status. Indeed, the differential access of white and minority youth to
private counsel provides an indirect indicator that black offenders
may be somewhat poorer (Table 20). While individualized social
variables that correlate with race may account for some of the racial
differences in detention and out-of-home placement, it simply raises
under a different guise the propriety of individualizing sentences on
the basis of factors other than present offense and prior record
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when doing so produces a disparate impact. 252
The overall findings in this study are consistent with other stud-
ies of sentencing practices in juvenile courts. While legal variables
exhibit a stronger statistical relationship with dispositions than do
social variables, a very substantial amount of the variation in sen-
tencing juveniles cannot be explained. Generally, the present of-
fense and prior record-for which a prior disposition often serves as
a surrogate in this study-are the best predictors of dispositions.
However, they only account for about 25% of the variance in sen-
tencing (Table 47, home R2=.245; institutionalize R2 =.224).253
Commentators have observed, with respect to the large amount of
unexplained variation, that "the juvenile justice process is so un-
governed by procedural rules and so haphazard in the attribution of
relevance to any particular variables or set of variables that judicial
dispositions are very commonly the product of an arbitrary and ca-
pricious decision-making process." 254 Moreover, while this study
could not explain the determinants of pretrial detention, its pro-
nounced negative effect on subsequent sentences introduces yet an-
other "arbitrary and capricious" and cumulative factor into the
dispositional process.
The absence of any powerful, explanatory relationship between
the legal variables and dispositions may be interpreted as true "indi-
vidualized justice;" that is, every child is the recipient of a unique
disposition tailored to his or her individual needs without regard to
their offense severity or prior record. "Given the philosophy of the
juvenile court system, this finding might be interpreted as quite pos-
itive in the sense that it could imply that judges consider a broad
spectrum of both legal and social variables in their attempt to indi-
vidualize decisions. 255
252 See Coffee, The Repressed Issues in Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality
in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1020-1023 (1978); Feld, Reference
ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 32, at 585-601.
253 See Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at 286 (present offense and prior record explain
31% of variance in sentencing); Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 32, at 598-
99 (survey of dispositional studies that typically explain about 25% of variance); Horwitz
& Wasserman, supra note 164, at 411 (inclusion of social background variables with of-
fense variables accounts for 26% of variance); Marshall & Thomas, Discretionary Decision-
Mlaking, supra note 171, at 57 (careful measurement of legal and extralegal variables "ac-
count for only a little more than a quarter of the variance in the judicial dispositions
..... "); Thomas & Cage, supra note 204, at 244 (legal factors more clearly linked to
dispositions than are social variables); Thomas & Fitch, supra note 160, at 75 ("[T]he
levels of association between both objective and personal variables and case dispositions
are of weak to moderate magnitude, suggesting that no single factor exerts a major in-
dependent influence on judicial decisionmaking . .
254 Marshall & Thomas, supra note 171, at 57.
255 Thomas & Cage, supra note 204, at 244.
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An equally plausible interpretation, however, is that there is no
rationale to dispositional decision-making; it consists of little more
than hunch, guesswork, and hopes, constrained marginally by the
youth's present offense, prior record, and previous dispositions. In
such a case, individualization is simply a euphemism for subjectivity,
arbitrariness, and discrimination:
[T]hese findings also suggest the possibility that those who share vari-
ous social characteristics will be treated in a significantly different fash-
ion from those drawn from other categories in the population; those
against whom complaints are filed by one type of complainant will be
treated differently than those who have engaged in comparable behav-
ior, but whose offense has been brought to the attention of social con-
trol agencies by a different complainant; and those who come before
one judge will be disposed of differently than those who appear before
another judge, regardless of who they are or what their present and
past offense record might be.256
A system ofjustice in which the most powerful explanatory vari-
ables-present offense and prior record-only account for about
25%o of the variance in sentencing remains a highly discretionary
and, perhaps, discriminatory, one. It means that there is substantial
attenuation between a youth's criminal behavior and the severity of
the disposition; minor offenders can receive much more severe dis-
positions than serious offenders. Similarly situated offenders-de-
fined in terms of their present offense or prior record-can receive
markedly dissimilar dispositions depending on the county in which
they are tried or the judge before which they appear. The desirabil-
ity of perpetuating such subjective and idiosyncratic sentencing of
similarly situated offenders goes to the heart of the juvenile court as
an institution.
V. DISCUSSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
This research provides a comprehensive empirical description
and analysis ofjuvenile justice administration in Minnesota in 1986.
It raises a number of disturbing and troubling questions about the
quality of "justice" in juvenile courts in Minnesota and, by implica-
tion, in many other states. The empirical findings bear on a number
ofjuvenile justice policy issues. What degree of county and judicial
diversity in pretrial detention and sentencing is tolerable or desira-
ble within a nominally statewide juvenile justice system? What can
be done to improve the mechanisms for delivering legal services to
juveniles, especially in rural counties? What legal standards should




by young juveniles? What can be done to eliminate the impact of
prior, uncounselled convictions on subsequent sentencing of
juveniles both as juveniles and as adults? What explicit and objec-
tive criteria should be adopted to limit the initial use and subse-
quent impact of pretrial detention? Should "in/out"-commitment
and release-and "durational" sentencing guidelines be used inju-
venile courts to reduce idiosyncratic and geographical sentencing
disparities? The legislative and judicial reforms necessary to ad-
dress and resolve these problems have profound implications for
the juvenile court as an institution.
A. VARIETIES OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
The idealized portrayal of the traditional juvenile court is one
of procedural informality in the quest of the goals of treatment and
rehabilitation. 257 Historically, the predominant focus on character-
istics of the young offender fostered judicial discretion and organi-
zational diversity rather than uniformity.
Since the court intended to rehabilitate the individual delinquent, and
not primarily to exact the just measure of the law, the judge's hands
could not be tied with procedural requirements. But translated into
practice, this grant of authority meant that juvenile courts would be as
different from each other as judges were different from each other ....
The result was a system that made the personality of the judge, his
likes and dislikes, attitudes and prejudices, consistencies and caprices,
the decisive element in shaping the character of the courtroom ....
Without set rules of evidence, without fixed guidelines, and, in many
cases, without the prospect of appeal, the court quite literally had the
delinquent at its mercy. The person of the judge himself assumed an
altogether novel significance .... [A]ny attempt to analyze the work-
ings of a given court demanded a lengthy evaluation of its judge.2 58
Evaluations of contemporary juvenile courts continue to emphasize
the diversity ofjudges and the broad legal framework that allows for
"very individualistic interpretation and clearly different application"
of laws. 25
9
With Gault's imposition of procedural formality and the emer-
gence of punitive as well as therapeutic goals, 260 a state's juvenile
courts can no longer be assumed to be in conformity with the tradi-
tional model or even to be similar to one another. Intensive ethno-
257 See Mack, supra note 13, at 106-09. See also supra notes 13-23 and accompanying
text.
258 D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 238.
259 H. RUBIN, BEHIND THE BLACK ROBES: JUVENILE COURT JUDGES AND THE COURT 7
(1985). See P. KFOURY, CHILDREN BEFORE THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON LEGAL ISSUES
AFFECTING MINORS (1987).
260 See Feld, supra note 2, at 272-74; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4.
1318 [Vol. 79
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN JUVENILE COURT
graphic studies that focus on a single juvenile court cannot be
generalized to other courts in other settings. 261 The few compara-
tive studies of juvenile courts reveal some of the complexities of
goals, philosophies, and procedures that characterize the juvenile
court as an institution. 262
Recent comparative research by Stapleton and others indicates
that juvenile courts are highly variable organizations with observa-
ble structural characteristics on a number of dimensions, such as
status offender orientation, centralization of authority, formalization
of procedure, intake screening discretion, and the like.263 "[T]he
empirical typology of metropolitan juvenile courts reflects the exist-
ence of the two major types ofjuvenile courts ('traditional' and 'due
process') suggested in the literature. More important, however, it
reveals variations in court structure and procedure that are not cap-
tured adequately by existing simplistic typologies." 264 The recogni-
tion that a state's juvenile courts cannot be treated as a single,
uniform justice system vastly complicates research which must iden-
tify and account for these systemic differences as well.
The present study provides additional support for the existence
of "varieties of juvenile justice." Even though the same state laws
and rules of procedure apply in all eighty-seven counties of Minne-
sota, it is readily apparent that at the county level the administration
of juvenile justice differs substantially. This comparative research
design was shaped by variations in rates of representation. The ap-
pearance of counsel, as a dependent variable, provides an indicator
of structural variation of types of courts on many other dimensions
as well. A juxtaposition between a traditional therapeutic and due
process orientation summarizes many of the variations in juvenile
justice administration. 265 "At one extreme lies the system best de-
261 Detailed ethnographic studies ofjuvenile courts include: M. BORTNER, supra note
59 (juvenile court in midwestern state); A. CICOUREL, supra note 159 (urban court); R.
EMERSON, supra note 159 (urban court).
262 See Cohen & Kluegel, Detention Decision, supra note 193 (comparison of juvenile
courts in Denver and Memphis); Cohen & Kluegel, Determinants, supra note 210 (same);
Hackler, Brockman & Luczynska, The Comparison of Role Interrelationships in Two Juvenile
Courts: Vienna and Boston, 5 INT.J. GRIM. & PENOLOGY 367 (1977) (cross-national compar-
ison); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Form and Function,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 7 (1965) (diversity ofjuvenile courts).
263 See Stapleton, Aday & Ito, An Empirical Typology of American Metropolitan Juvenile
Courts, 88 AM.J. Soc. 549, 555 (1982). See also Hasenfeld & Cheung, The Juvenile Court as
a People-Processing Organization: A Political Economy Perspective, 90 AM. J. Soc. 801 (1985)
(analysis ofjuvenile courts in their sociopolitical context).
264 Stapleton, Aday & Ito, supra note 263, at 559.
265 See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246 (1968) (crime con-
trol-due process dichotomy); V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra note 66, at 38-46
(cooperative-adversary dichotomy); Cohen & Kluegel, supra note 210, at 168-70 (thera-
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scribed by the concept of parens patriae, with an emphasis on 'help-
ing' the child, intervening in his or her best interest. At the other
lies the more formal, legalistic system, with a due process model of
restricted information flow and precise rules of adjudication
"266
Having categorized Minnesota's juvenile courts on the basis of
the availability of attorneys, it is useful to highlight some of the
other differences among juvenile courts in the counties with high
rates of representation and those with low rates of representation.
Other systematic or structural differences are observable between
counties in which 94.5% ofjuvenile offenders are represented and
those in which only 19.3% are represented.
Using some of Stapleton's criteria, it is apparent that the courts
in high representation counties and those in low representation
counties differed significantly in their "status offender orienta-
tion." 267 The high representation counties handled about 10%
more juveniles charged with criminal offenses and 10% fewer status
offenders than did the low representation counties (Table 1, 20.9%
versus 30.5% status offenses). While some of these differences may
reflect geographic differences in rates of delinquency, it probably
represents a jurisdictional policy decision about informal screening
of cases as well.
The differences between the rates of representation and the im-
pact of counsel on juvenile justice administration have been noted
extensively throughout this Article. Although the presence of an at-
torney is not one of the indicators of "formalization" used by Sta-
pleton, Aday and Ito, 26 8 the presence of lawyers, as an indicator of a
"due process orientation," is consistent with their classification
scheme. The formalization associated with higher levels of repre-
sentation are apparently also associated with more severe sentenc-
ing practices. After controlling for the effects of differences in
offense patterns, the judges in the procedurally formal, high repre-
sentation counties order more severe sentences than do their coun-
terparts in low representation counties. 269 Proportionately, almost
twice as many youths are removed from their homes and confined in
peutic-due process dichotomy); Feld, supra note 2, at 167-68 n.88 (applying Packer's
crime control/due process dichotomy to juvenile justice); Handler, supra note 262, at 14-
20 (casework-legal dichotomy).
266 Stapleton, Aday & Ito, supra note 263, at 550.
267 Id. at 553.
268 Id.
269 Cohen and Kluegel compared juvenile justice administration in Denver, which ex-
hibited a strong "due process" orientation, and Memphis, which resembled the more
traditional, therapeutic model ofjuvenile courts. Contrary to the findings in the present
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the high representation counties as in the low representation coun-
ties (compare Tables 6 and 12).
The judges in the high representation counties also appear to
rely upon and reinforce the authority of their professional staff to a
greater extent than do those in the low representation counties. For
example, probation officers in the high representation counties re-
fer substantially more cases than do their counterparts in low repre-
sentation counties (Table 2), and those referrals result in more
serious dispositions than might otherwise be expected (Table 6).
While the juvenile courts in the high representation counties detain
proportionally more youths than do those in the low representation
counties, these disparities in detention are increasingly significant as
the seriousness of the offenses decline (Table 15).
Most fundamental, however, is the differential presence of de-
fense attorneys in the high and low representation juvenile courts.
What accounts for these differences? To what extent is the presence
of defense counsel a reflection of differences in the roles of prosecu-
tors in these respective jurisdictions.270 If more prosecutors are
present and involved in the pre-screening of cases using formal
legal criteria in the high representation courts, then there may be a
correspondingly greater legal role for defense counsel. This may
explain, perhaps, why so many fewer defense attorneys appear at
the time of sentencing in the high representation counties than in
the other types of courts (see Table 3). It may be, for example, that
the presence of defense attorneys in juvenile court evolves with the
presence of prosecutors who Use formal legal screening criteria. 27'
These procedurally and philosophically different courts operat-
ing under uniform state laws implicate a host of socio-legal issues
that go far beyond issues ofjuvenile justice administration. 272 What
study, they reported more severe sentences imposed by the therapeutic court than by
the due process oriented court. Cohen & Kluegel, supra note 210, at 173.
270 Stapleton, Aday, and Ito differentiate among different types ofjuvenile courts on
the basis of the presence and role of prosecutors in screening cases. Stapleton, Aday &
Ito, supra note 263, at 554-55. See generally Rubin, The Emerging Prosecutor Dominance of
Juvenile Court Intake Process, 26 CRIME & DELIN9.. 299, 312-17 (1980).
271 Eisenstein and Jacob analyze the processing and disposition of adult felony cases
using the model of a "courtroom work-group." J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOb, FELONY JUS-
TIcE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 294-99 (1977). Applying
their "work-group" concept to this juvenile court study, it may be that defense lawyers
are as effective as the juvenile justice system allows them to be. If prosecutors do not
pre-screen cases on formal legal grounds, then the juvenile court's erhphasis on substan-
tive justice discourages the presence and participation of defense attorneys.
272 See generally D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw (1976); D. BLACK & M. MILEsKI, THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW (1973); W. EVAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw: A SOCIAL-
STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1980); J. INVERARITY, P. LAUDERDALE, & B. FELD, LAW AND
SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL LAw (1983); C. REASONS & R. RICH,
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external political, social, and legal variables influence the proce-
dural and substantive orientation of a court? What are the legal cul-
tures that foster a traditional or due process orientation? What are
the comparative costs and benefits of formal versus informal dispute
resolution?
This research documents substantial variations within a single
state's juvenile justice system in offense screening, detention, sen-
tencing, and the role of counsel injustice administration. While di-
versity rather than uniformity historically characterized juvenile
justice, whether continued justification remains for such extensive
local variation is highly questionable. Answering this question,
however, depends upon additional research on the determinants
and impact of diversity. This, in turn, requires much more informa-
tion than is currently required or collected through the SJIS coding
forms. The juvenile court judicial information systems in other
states routinely collect information on a host of important legal and
socio-demographic variables. 273 Because this information is already
included in a juvenile's social services records, expanding the SJIS
code forms to incorporate summaries in the Minnesota data report-
ing system would entail minor additional administrative burdens,
but would greatly enrich policy analysis.
B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE WAIVER OF COUNSEL IN
JUVENILE COURT-SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE DARK SECRET
Empirical evaluations of the impact of Supreme Court decisions
on police and courtroom practices indicate that their influence often
is limited and their policy goals frequently overridden by the organi-
zational requirements of the affected agencies. 274 Several contem-
poraneous observers reported the limited influence of Gault on the
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: A CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE (1978); R. SIMON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
LAw: INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS (1968).
273 See, e.g., NATIONAL JUVENILE COURT DATA ARCHIVE, NEBRASKA JUVENILE COURT
CASE RECORDS 1975-1985 USER'S GUIDE (1986) (living arrangements of child, parental
marital status, family income, occupation of parent, employment and school status, and
school attainment); PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE COURT JUDGES' COMM'N, STATISTICAL CARD
PROCEDURES (1984) (school status, family status, family income, victim information in-
cluding the amount of injury inflicted or property taken, and the use of a weapon).
274 See Ingraham, The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 615,
615-16 (1974) (impact of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)); Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 727-29 (1970) (impact of
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), exclusionary rule); Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociologi-
cal Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender's Office, 12 SoC. PROBS 255, 265-68 (1965)
(impact of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); Comment, Interrogations in New
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE LJ. 1521, 1613-16 (impact of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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delivery and effectiveness of legal representation. 275 Nearly twenty
years after Gault held that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to
the assistance of counsel, 276 more than half of all delinquent and
status offenders in Minnesota still did not have lawyers (Tables 3
and 4). Indeed, in only six of Minnesota's eighty-seven counties are
even a majority ofjuveniles represented, and in sixty-eight counties,
less than one-third of juveniles have counsel. 277
Many juveniles who receive out-of-home placement and even
secure confinement dispositions were adjudicated delinquent and
sentenced without the assistance of counsel (Tables 9 and 10). For
the state as a whole, nearly one-third of all juveniles removed from
their homes and more than one-quarter of those incarcerated in se-
cure institutions were not represented (Table 10). In the sixty-eight
counties in the state with low rates of representation, more than half
of the juveniles who were removed from their homes and who were
incarcerated were not represented (Table 10). These very high rates of
home removal and incarceration without representation constitute
an indictment of all participants in the Minnesota juvenile justice
process-the juvenile court bench, the county attorneys, the organ-
ized bar, the legislature and especially the Minnesota Supreme
Court, which has supervisory and administrative responsibility for
the state's juvenile courts.
The United States Supreme Court held in Scott v. Illinois278 and
the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Borst279 that it was im-
proper to incarcerate an adult offender, even one charged with a
minor offense, without either the appointment of counsel or a valid
waiver of counsel. 280 Moreover, both the United States and the
Minnesota Supreme Courts have described the type of penetrating
inquiry that must precede a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"
waiver of the right to counsel.
Whether the typical Miranda advisory and the following waiver
of rights under the "totaiity of the circumstances" is sufficient to
assure a valid waiver of counsel by juveniles is highly questionable.
Shortly after the Gault decision, commentators warned that simply
importing adult waiver doctrines into delinquency proceedings was
unrealistic and threatened the entire fabric of rights that the Gault
275 See Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 515; Duffee & Siegel, supra
note 114, at 548.
276 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42 (1967).
277 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
278 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
279 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
280 Scott, 440 U.S. at 374; Borst, 278 Minn. at 398-400, 154 N.W.2d at 894-95.
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decision granted. 28 t An earlier article that criticized the ease with
which juvenile court judges often found waivers of rights by minors
noted that:
considerable doubt remains as to whether a typical juvenile's waiver is,
or even can be, "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Empirical stud-
ies evaluating juveniles' understanding of their Miranda [and Gault]
rights indicate that most juveniles who receive the Miranda warning
may not understand it well enough to waive their constitutional rights
in a "knowing and intelligent" manner. Such lack of comprehension
by minors raises questions about the adequacy of the Miranda warning
[or Gault's advisory of the right to counsel] as a safeguard. The Mi-
randa warning was designed to inform and educate a defendant to as-
sure that subsequent waivers would indeed be "knowing and
intelligent." If most juveniles lack the capacity to understand the
warning, however, its ritual recitation hardly accomplishes that
purpose.282
No doubt, many juvenile court judges in Minnesota concluded
that the majority of unrepresented juveniles "waived" their right to
counsel in delinquency proceedings. 283 Are the majority of the
young juveniles in Minnesota who waived their rights to counsel re-
ally that much more competent and legally sophisticated than the
eighteen-year-old adult defendant in Burt v. State,284 whose waiver
was disallowed? Continued judicial and legislative reliance on the
"totality of the circumstances" test clearly is unwarranted and inap-
propriate in light of the multitude of factors implicated by the "to-
tality" approach, the lack of guidelines as to how the various factors
should be weighed, and the myriad combinations of factual situa-
tions that make every case unique. These factors result in virtually
281 Lefstein, Stapleton and Teitelbaum cautioned that:
the concept of waiver of rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings is unrealistic.
The Supreme Court in Gault assumed without discussion that the waiver doctrine
could be imported to juvenile court hearings .... We submit that these special
problems are extremely serious, and that a review of the appropriateness of this
doctrine for juvenile courts is necessary.
Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 537-38.
282 Feld, supra note 2, at 174-75.
283 An early empirical study of the right to counsel for adult defendants in Minnesota
reported that:
the attempted waiver is the exceptional case. Although one prosecutor estimated
that almost 10 percent of the accused attempted to decline counsel-especially if
they expected to be granted probation-this figure was atypical. Most estimates ran
under three percent, and even this minute figure is greatly fractionalized when the
judge fully explains the important role a defense lawyer may play. On the basis of
these findings, any appellate court would seem justified in begrudgingly treating a
state's claim that counsel has been intelligently waived.
Kamisar & Choper, The Right To Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy
Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1963) (emphasis added).
284 256 N.W.2d 633, 636 (1977) (18 years old, had only a tenth grade education, and
his scores on I.Q. tests were consistently low).
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unlimited and unreviewable judicial discretion to deprive juveniles
of their most fundamental procedural safeguard-the right to
counsel.
Only the cynical or myopic can contend that immature and im-
pressionable young juveniles can waive their right to counsel alone
and unaided. How, then, does one explain the fact that in the sixty-
eight counties with low rates of representation, only 18.6% of
twelve-year-old juveniles have counsel? That only 19.9% of thir-
teen-year-old juveniles do? That in the entire state of Minnesota,
less than half of the fourteen and fifteen-year-old juveniles do? Can
that many juveniles be so mature as to make "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" waivers of their constitutional rights alone and un-
aided in a frightening and alien courtroom environment? 285 Or is it
that the youngest juveniles do not need representation because the
consequences of juvenile court adjudication and disposition are so
benign? How, then, does one account for the fact that more than
one in five juveniles aged thirteen are removed from home-the high-
est rate for any age group-and nearly one in ten of those thirteen-
year-old youths is incarcerated?
There are direct legislative and judicial policy implications of
the findings reported here. Legislation or judicial rules of proce-
dure mandating the automatic and non-waivable appointment of
counsel at the earliest stage in a delinquency proceeding is neces-
sary.286 As long as it is possible for a juvenile to waive the right to
counsel, juvenile court judges will continue to find such waivers on a
285 Flicker notes that:
[t]he special problems ofjuveniles in connection with the right to counsel include:
1. Immaturity. Ajuvenile's youth, limited experience, and undeveloped cognitive
skills create confusion and fear in an unfamiliar and threatening situation and a
greater need for assistance in decisionmaking, case preparation, and dealing with
law enforcement, social service, and court officials.
B. FLICKER, PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES ii (1983).
286 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (West Supp. 1985) (no child may waive the
assistance of counsel at any of the stages and hearings of the juvenile justice process);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-205 (court to advise public defender to provide defense for juve-
nile); State v. Doe, 95 N.M. 302, 304, 621 P.2d 519, 521 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (child
cannot waive the initial appointment of counsel).
Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum conclude that mandatory representation is
essential:
[iun view of the inability of most juveniles to protect themselves from the conse-
quences of the waiver of rights, or from the forces impelling them to effect a waiver,
and because of the difficulties in placing substantial reliance on parental assistance,
it may be argued that a minor should not, except in the most unusual circumstances
[such as prior consultation with counsel], be held to a waiver of the right to counsel,
nor an uncounseled minor to a waiver of the rights to silence, confrontation, and
cross examination.
Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 553. See also Rubin, supra note 24, at
12 (mandatory representation by counsel at all stages of the juvenile process).
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discretionary basis under the "totality of the circumstances." The
very fact that it is legally possible for a juvenile to waive counsel
itself may discourage some youths from exercising their right if as-
serting it may be construed as an affront to the presiding judge.28 7
The A.B.A.-I.J.A. Juvenile Justice Standards recommend that "[t]he
right to counsel should attach as soon as the juvenile is taken into
custody.... when a petition is filed.., or when the juvenile appears
personally at an intake conference, whichever occurs first." 28 8 In
addition, "[the juvenile] should have the 'effective assistance of
counsel at all stages of the proceeding,' " and this right to counsel is
mandatory and non-waivable. 28 9
Some may question the utility of mandatory, non-waivable
counsel if, as this research indicates, many of the consequences of
representation are negative. Obviously, full representation of all
juveniles would eliminate any variations in sentencing or processing
associated with the presence of attorneys. Full representation
would "wash out" the apparently negative effects of representation.
Clearly, a full representation model is quite compatible with con-
temporary juvenile justice administration. Five counties-urban,
287 Handler notes that:
if the program of rights is to be effective, it must deal with the problem of waiver-
waiver by those who do not understand and waiver by those who, rightly or
wrongly, think, or have been coerced into thinking that they have more to gain by
playing ball or by manipulation. Waiver under either circumstance should not be
allowed .... [T]he community's interest here is greater than that which the adoles-
cent or the parent thinks his best interests are. Furthermore, if these rights are to
serve the important function of testing and questioning the juvenile process, al-
lowing waiver should increase coercive tactics by the officials who are going to be
questioned. Paradoxically, then, for "rights" to be effective, they must be made
mandatory.
Handler, supra note 262, at 33.
288 A.B.A.-IJ.A., PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 83, std. 5.1, at 89.
289 Id. The commentary to the Standards does qualify the absolute, nonwaivable na-
ture of the right to counsel. "[I]n recommending that the respondent's right to counsel
in delinquency proceedings should be nonwaivable, this standard is not intended to
foreclose absolutely the possibility ofpro se representation by a juvenile." A.B.A.-IJ.A.,
PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 83, std. 5.1 commentary, at 93. While the
Supreme Court held in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1976), that an adult defen-
dant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when
he or she voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, id. at 834-36, whether a juvenile
defendant can meet the requirements of a Faretta waiver is questionable. See supra notes
71-73 and accompanying text. Moreover, while the Faretta right to proceed pro se was
based on the sixth amendment right to counsel, Gault based its holding on the four-
teenth amendment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). A court or legislature could
conclude that the "special circumstances" of youth, immaturity, and inexperience im-
posed a significantly higher, effectively unattainable, standard for competence before
allowing the waiver of counsel by a young juvenile.
See generally B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at i ("Providing accused juveniles with a
non-waivable right-to-counsel is probably the most fundamental of the hundreds of
standards in juvenile justice ...."); Handler, supra note 262, at 21.
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suburban, and rural-which process 21% of all of the delinquents in
Minnesota already employ a full representation system. The com-
parisons between the counties with high rates of representation and
those with medium and low rates of representation do not indicate
that juvenile justice grinds to a halt ifjuveniles are routinely repre-
sented. The systematic introduction of defense counsel would pro-
vide the mechanism for creating trial records which could be used
on appeal and which could provide an additional safeguard to as-
sure that juvenile court judges adhere more closely to the formal
procedures that are now required. 290 Moreover, eliminating waivers
of counsel would lead to greater numbers of public defenders in
juvenile justice cases. An increased cadre of juvenile defenders
would get education, support, and encouragement from statewide
asociation with one another similar to the post-Gideon revolution in
criminal justice that resulted from the creation of statewide de-
fender systems.
More fundamentally, however, since the Gault decision, the ju-
venile court is first and foremost a legal entity engaged in social con-
trol and not simply a social welfare agency. As a legal institution
exercising substantial coercive powers over young people and their
families, safeguards against state intervention and mechanisms to
implement those safeguards are necessary. 291 The Gault Court was
290 Several courts acknowledge that juvenile cases exhibit far more procedural errors
than do comparable adult cases and suggest that confidential proceedings and the ab-
sence of counsel may foster ajudicial casualness toward the law that visibility and appel-
late accountability might constrain. See, e.g., RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska
1971); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 597 (La. 1978). Commentators have been even more
critical of closed proceedings and the lack of appeals taken from juvenile courts.
[A]ccess to juvenile delinquency hearings would function as a check on the abuse of
power by judges, probation officers, and other public officials. The nature of the
juvenile justice system, even more than the criminal system, suggests a compelling
need to check the exercise of government power. Juvenile court judges, for exam-
ple, exercise more discretion than their criminal trial counterparts .... Such a
system relies heavily on subjective judgments, making the "compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge" a particular hazard. Juvenile court judges, moreover, are often less
qualified and less competent than other judges. As a result, juvenile courts often
commit "much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found in
adult criminal cases." Becausejuvenile cases are only rarely appealled, public scru-
tiny of the juvenile justice system takes on added importance as a check against
official misconduct.
Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1540,
1550-51 (1983) (citations omitted).
291 Handler argued, even prior to Gault, that adversary procedures were necessary to
assure accurate fact-finding in delinquency proceedings and that "the nonadversary, so-
licitous procedure seriously underestimates the extraordinary task placed on the fact-
finder adjudicator." Handler, supra note 262, at 29. While the United States Supreme
Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970), asserted that judges were as
capable as juries of accurate fact-finding, it did not disturb Gault's premise that delin-
quency hearings were adversary proceedings. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
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unwilling to rely solely upon the benevolence of juvenile court
judges or social workers to safeguard the interests of young people.
Instead, it imposed the familiar adversarial model of proof which
recognizes the likely conflict of interests between the juvenile and
the state. 29 2 Further, in an adversarial process, only lawyers can ef-
fectively invoke the procedural safeguards that are the right of every
citizen, including children, as a condition precedent to unsolicited
state intervention.29 3
A rule mandating non-waivable assistance of counsel for
juveniles appearing in juvenile court might impose substantial bur-
dens on the delivery of legal services in rural areas, such as the sixty-
eight counties with low rates of representation. 29 4 Presumably,
however, those counties already are providing adult defendants with
representation and standby counsel in criminal proceedings so the
organizational mechanisms already exist. Moreover, despite any
possible fiscal or administrative concerns, every juvenile is already
entitled by Gault to the assistance of counsel at every critical stage in
the process and only an attorney can redress the imbalance between
a vulnerable youth and the state.29 5 As the Supreme Court said in
Gault, "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court," 29 6 especially if the justification proferred for such a proceed-
292 The Gault Court explicitly invoked the fifth amendment to establish that juveniles
were protected against self-incrimination in delinquency proceedings. Gault, 387 U.S. at
49-50. As a consequence of the Court's application of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, juvenile adjudications no longer could be characterized as either "noncriminal"
or as "nonadversarial," because the fifth amendment privilege, more than any other
provision of the Bill of Rights, is the fundamental guarantor of an adversarial process
and the primary mechanism for maintaining a balance between the state and the individ-
ual. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (describing the multiple poli-
cies underlying the fifth amendment, which include "our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system"). See generally Goodpaster, supra note 38; Good-
paster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986).
293 See Kaplan, Defending Guilty People, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 223, 229 (1986) ("[lit
is belaboring the obvious to assert that within the confines of the adversary system, the
accuracy of a finding that a particular defendant is guilty or not guilty-especially the
former-is greatly improved by providing him with a lawyer.")
294 A.B.A.-I.J.A., PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, supra note 83, std. 5.1 commentary,
at 93 (inadequate availability of legal services in rural areas may make compliance with
mandatory counsel recommendation difficult).
295 Grisso concludes that:
[t]he beneficial effects of a per se requirement of counsel in juvenile waiver pro-
ceedings should be enhanced as the juvenile justice system increases its own sup-
port of a strong advocacy role for these attorneys. At a minimum, the requirement
provides a reasonable level of protection for younger juveniles; without this protec-
tion, they would be subjected to the very circumstances that Miranda [and Gault]
sought to eliminate.
Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 79, at 1164.
296 387 U.S. at 28.
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ing is simply the state's fiscal convenience. The issue is not one of
entitlement, because all are entitled to representation, but rather
the ease or difficulty with which waivers of counsel are found, which
in turn has enormous implications for the entire administration of
juvenile justice.
Short of mandatory and non-waivable counsel, a prohibition on
waivers of counsel without prior consultation and the concurrence
of counsel would provide greater assurance than the current prac-
tice that any eventual waiver was truly "knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. ' 29 7 Because waivers of rights, including the right to
counsel, involve legal and strategic considerations as well as knowl-
edge and understanding of rights and an appreciation of conse-
quences, it is difficult to see how any less stringent alternative could
be as effective. A per se requirement of consultation with counsel
prior to a waiver takes into account the immaturity of youths and
their lack of experience in law enforcement situations. In addition,
it recognizes that only attorneys possess the skills and training nec-
essary to assist the child in the adversarial process. Moreover, a re-
quirement of consultation with counsel prior to waiver would assure
the development of legal services delivery systems that would then
facilitate the more routine representation of juveniles.
At the very least, court rules or legislation should prohibit the
removal from home or incarceration of any juvenile who was neither
represented by counsel nor provided with standby counsel. Such a
limitation on disposition is already the law for adult criminal de-
fendants,2 98 for juveniles in some jurisdictions,299 and the opera-
297 In McLemore v. Cubley, 569 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1978), a class-action suit that
raised the issue whether a juvenile can intelligently and competently waive his right to
counsel in a delinquency proceeding without prior consultation with counsel, the Court
rejected the juveniles' contention and reaffirmed the "totality of the circumstances" test
as the appropriate means to determine the validity of ajuvenile's waiver of rights. Id. at
940. However, an empirical study ofjuveniles' understanding of their right to counsel
concluded that:
the appointment of legal counsel at an earlier point in the juvenile justice process is
recommended as a means of enhancing juveniles' understanding of the law and the
legal process, and ensuring that any waiver of their legal rights is an informed
waiver with a full understanding of the possible consequences of the waiver. 'Earlier
appointment of legal counsel would also reduce the wide variation in the quality of
legal counsel and the amount of time attorneys are able to spend in case
preparation.
Lawrence, supra note 80, at 57.
298 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344-45 (1963). See also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
299 See Feld, supra note 2, at 187. In Thomas v. Mears, 474 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Ark.
1979), the court entered a consent decree creating a presumption against waiver of
counsel and prohibiting a waiver where the parents initiate the petition or request a
juvenile's removal from the home. Id. at 911.
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tional practice in jurisdictions such as New York and Pennsylvania,
where virtually no unrepresented juveniles are removed or
confined. 300
Apart from simply documenting variations in rates of represen-
tation, this research also examined the determinants of representa-
tion. It examined the relationship between legal variables-
seriousness of offense, detention status, prior referrals-and the ap-
pointment of counsel. In each analysis, it showed the relationship
between the legal variables and dispositions, the legal variables and
the appointment of counsel, and the effects of representation on dis-
positions, while controlling for those legal variables. The regres-
sion equations summarized the interrelationship between those
variables and their effects on the appointment of counsel and the
influence of counsel on dispositions.
There are complex relationships between the factors producing
more severe dispositions and the factors influencing the appoint-
ment of counsel. Each legal variable that is associated with a more
severe disposition is also associated with greater rates of representa-
tion. Yet, within the limitations of this research, it appears that rep-
resentation by counsel is an additional aggravating factor in a
juvenile's disposition. When controlling for the seriousness of the
present offense, unrepresented juveniles seem to fare better than do
those with lawyers (Table 10). When controlling for the seriousness
of the present offense and prior referrals, the presence of counsel
produces more severe dispositions (Table 14). When controlling
for offense and detention status, unrepresented juveniles again fare
better than do those with representation (Table 18). When control-
ling for the effects of all of the independent variables simultaneously
through the use of regression techniques, the relationship between
the presence of an attorney and receiving a more severe disposition
persists (Tables 47-50). In short, while the legal variables enhance
the probabilities of representation, the fact of representation ap-
pears to exert an independent effect on the severity of dispositions.
Although other studies have alluded to this phenomenon, 30'
this research provides strong and consistent evidence that represen-
tation by counsel redounds to the disadvantage of a juvenile. One
possible explanation is that the lawyers who appear in juvenile
courts are incompetent and prejudice their clients' cases. 30 2 While
systematic qualitative evaluations of the actual performance of coun-
300 See Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 402-07.
301 See, e.g., M. BORTNER, supra note 59, at 138-40; Clarke & Koch, supra note 57, at
297; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note 10, at 419.
302 See J. KNITZER AND M. SOBE, supra note 114, at 8-9; A. PLATr, supra note 13, at 139;
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sel in juvenile courts are lacking, the available evidence suggests
that even in jurisdictions where counsel are routinely appointed,
there are grounds for concern about their effectiveness.303 Public
defender offices in many jurisdictions often assign their least capa-
ble lawyers or newest staff attorneys to juvenile courts to get trial
experience and these neophytes may receive less adequate supervi-
sion than their prosecutorial counterparts.3 04 Similarly, court ap-
pointed counsel may be beholden to the judges who select them and
more concerned with maintaining an ongoing relationship with the
court than vigorously protecting the interests of their frequently
changing clients.30 5
V. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM, supra note 66, at 38; Fox, supra note 13, at 1237; Lef-
stein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 511-12.
303 The state of New York had the highest rate of representation, over 95%, in a six-
state study of the delivery of legal services in juvenile courts. Feld, In re Gault Revisited,
supra note 10, at 400-02. Despite the routine presence of counsel, however, observers
expressed concern about the quality of their performance. Knitzer and Sobie reported a
number of very disturbing findings.
Using the most basic criteria of effectiveness-that the law guardian meet the client,
be minimally prepared, have some knowledge of the law and of possible disposi-
tions, and be active on behalf of his or her client-serious and widespread problems
are evident.
-Overall, 45% of the courtroom observations reflected either seriously inade-
quate or marginally adequate representation; 27% reflected acceptable representa-
tion, and 4% effective representation.... Specific problems center around lack of
preparation and lack of contact with the children.
-In 47% of the observations it appeared that the law guardian had done no or
minimal preparation. In 5% it was clear that the law guardian had not met with the
client at all .... Further, in 35% of the cases, the law guardians did not talk to, or
made only minimal contact with their clients during the court proceedings.... In
addition, ineffective representation is characterized by violations of statutory or due
process rights; almost 50% of the transcripts included appealable errors made
either by law guardians or made by judges and left unchallenged by the law guardi-
ans ....
J. KNITZER & M. SOBIE, supra note 114, at 8-9.
304 Flicker notes that:
[i]n some defender offices, assignment to kiddie court' is the bottom rung of the
ladder, to be passed as quickly as possible on the way up to more visible and pres-
tigious criminal court assignments. Little attention may be paid by superiors to
performance in juvenile court, providing few incentives for hard work. Finally, the
problem of cooptation is prevalent in juvenile court and many public defenders
choose to join with the other child-savers in the court, sacrificing their clients' rights
to zealous representation to the treatment goals of probation officers, judges, and
other officials.
B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at 2. Indeed, commentators have noted that judges avoid or
resist assignment to juvenile court for similar reasons. "(T]he juvenile court is consid-
ered to be the lowest rung on the judicial ladder. Rarely does the court attract men of
maturity or ability. The work is not regarded as desirable or appropriate for higher
judgeships." Handler, supra note 262, at 17.
305 Flicker commented that:
[a]nother concern in assigned counsel systems is the preservation of the indepen-
dence of attorneys from the influence ofjudges and other court officials. The prob-
lem is acute in juvenile courts because of its relative informality and smaller size.
The continued reliance by probation officers, judges, and other officials on the con-
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Measuring defense attorney performance by dispositional out-
comes raises questions about the meaning of effective assistance of
counsel in a court system in which many of the participants-juve-
nile court judges, probations officers, and prosecuting attorneys-
do not regard an acquittal as a "victory." What does it take to be an
effective attorney in juvenile court? Why do fewer defense attorneys
appear at the time of juveniles' sentencing than appear at adjudica-
tions (Table 4)? Since virtually all juveniles are convicted of some
offense (Table 31), thereby giving the court jurisdictional authority
to intervene, how might attorneys for juveniles become more famil-
iar with dispositional alternatives and more effective advocates for
the substantive interests of their clients?3 06
Perhaps, however, the relationship between the presence of
counsel and the increased severity of disposition is spurious. Obvi-
ously, this study cannot control for all of the variables that influence
dispositional decision-making. It may be that early in a proceeding,
a juvenile court judge's familiarity with a case alerts him or her to
the eventual disposition that will be imposed if the child is convicted
and counsel may be appointed in anticipation of more severe conse-
quences. 30 7 In many states and counties, the same judge who pre-
cepts of rehabilitation and best interests of the child create a tension between the
adversarial role of defense counsel and the interventionist objectives of those who
see themselves as providers of social services. The court officials' hostility to coun-
sel's efforts has resulted in negative performance evaluations, slashed fees, and even
pressure from the court to remove the offending attorneys from the panel.
B. FLICKER, supra note 285, at 4.
The relative efficacy of public defender versus court appointed systems of delivering
legal services has been studied in both juvenile and adult settings in several jurisdic-
tions. SeeJ. EiSENSTEIN & H.JAcoB, supra note 271, at 294-99 (examining types of attor-
neys on criminal justice administration in three jurisdictions); Kamisar & Choper, supra
note 283, at 101-16; Nardulli, supra note 179, at 415; Platt, Schechter, & Tiffany, In
Defense of Youth: A Case of the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. LJ. 619, 638 (1968);
Wheeler & Wheeler, supra note 179, at 326-27; Note, Comparison of Public Defenders' and
Private Attorneys' Relationships with the Prosecution in the City of Denver, 50 DEN. L.J. 101, 124
(1973).
306 Knitzer and Sobie report that "substantial numbers of law guardians assume virtu-
ally no role at dispositional proceedings. Instead, they rely almost totally upon others."
J. KNITZER & M. SOBME, supra note 114, at 10.
In State ex rel. D.E.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401 (W.Va. 1980), the West Virginia
Supreme Court discussed thoughtfully and extensively the role of counsel at a disposi-
tional hearing.
[Clounsel has a duty to investigate all resources available to find the least restrictive
alternative .... Court appointed counsel must make an independent investigation
of the child's background .... Armed with adequate information, counsel can then
present the court with all reasonable alternative dispositions to incarceration and
should have taken the initial steps to secure the tentative acceptance of the child
into those facilities.
Id. 412-13.
307 See Aday, supra note 58, at 115.
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sides at a youth's arraignment and detention hearing will later
decide the case on the merits and then impose a sentence.308 Per-
haps the initial decision to appoint counsel is based upon the evi-
dence developed at those earlier stages which also influences later
dispositions. In short, perhaps judges attempt to conform to the
dictates of Argersinger and Scott, try to predict, albeit imperfectly,
when more severe dispositions will be imposed and then appoint
counsel in such cases. Even if this somewhat explains the greater
severity of sentences of represented juveniles than unrepresented
ones, it remains the case that the requirements of Argersinger, Scott,
and Borst are not being fulfilled because many unrepresented
juveniles are removed from their homes and incarcerated as well. A
fundamental dilemma posed by Argersinger and Scott is how to obtain
the information necessary to determine before the trial whether,
upon conviction, the eventual sentence will result in incarceration
and thus will require the appointment of counsel without simultane-
ously prejudging the case and prejudicing the interests of the
defendant.
Another possible explanation for the aggravating effect of law-
yers on sentences is that juvenile court judges may treat more for-
mally and severely juveniles who appear with counsel than those
who do not. Within statutory limits, judges may feel less con-
strained when sentencing a youth who is represented. Adherence to
formal due process may insulate sentences from appellate rever-
sal.30 9 Such may be the price of formal procedures. While not nec-
essarily punishing juveniles who are represented because they
appear with counsel, judges may be more lenient toward those
youths who appear unaided and "throw themselves on the mercy of
308 Feld notes that:
at a detention hearing, ajudge may be exposed to a youth's "social history" file and
the youth's prior record of police contacts and delinquency adjudications, all of
which bear on the issue of the appropriate pretrial placement of the youth. When
that same judge is subsequently called on to determine the admissibility of evidence
in a suppression hearing and the guilt of the juvenile in the same proceeding, the
risks of prejudice become almost insuperable. To whatever degree a judge is un-
able to compartmentalize, a juvenile is denied the basic right to a fair trial by an
impartial tribunal with a determination of guilt based on admissible evidence. The
risk of prejudice is even more significant in juvenile court proceedings than in adult
bench trials because adult defendants can at least avoid the risk by choosing a jury
trial. Since juveniles have no right to ajury trial, their risks of prejudice are aggra-
vated by their inability to avoid those risks.
Feld, supra note 2, at 240-41.
309 Duffee and Siegel contend that "juveniles who are represented by counsel should
be subjected to control . . .more often than those who waive their rights. When the
appearance of due process has been maintained, the juvenile court should feel secure
about future challenges and safer in prescribing even stricter control over its wards."
Duffee & Siegel, supra note 114, at 548-549 (emphasis added).
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the court." While such an interpretation is consistent with this data,
it raises in a different guise the question ofjudicial hostility toward
adversarial litigants. Why should the fact that a youth avails himself
of an elementary, constitutional procedural safeguards result in an
aggravated sentence compared to that of an unrepresented juve-
nile? At the very least, further research, including qualitative stud-
ies of the processes of initial appointment and performance of
counsel in several jurisdictions will be required to untangle this
complex web.
Qualitative studies are also necessary to determine what attor-
neys actually do in juvenile court proceedings. In light of this re-
search, the right to counsel and the role of counsel in juvenile court
entails a twostep process. The first is simply assuring the presence
of counsel at all. In many jurisdictions, simply getting an attorney
into juvenile court remains problematic. Once an attorney is pres-
ent, however, the role he or she adopts is also fraught with difficul-
ties. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to prescribe the
appropriate role for counsel, a number of commentators have ques-
tioned whether attorneys can function as adversaries in juvenile
courts and, yet, have questioned the utility of their presence in any
other role. 310 The reluctance of many to simply apply the role of
counsel established in adult criminal courts to juvenile proceedings
stems from the perceived differences in sentencing policies and the
more "therapeutic" orientation of juvenile courts. Thus, many
commentators prescribe different roles for counsel during the fact-
finding adjudicative stage than for the dispositional process.
Whether there are sufficient differences between punishment in
criminal courts and treatment in juvenile courts to sustain differ-
ences in the role of counsel is certainly open to question.31I At the
very least, however, many more observations and studies of attor-
neys' actual performance must precede efforts to prescribe appro-
priate roles.
310 See Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, supra note 114, at 398-99; Kay & Segal, supra
note 114, at 1412; Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at 510-12; McMillian
& McMurtry, supra note 114, 572; Platt & Friedman, Limits of Advocacy, supra note 178, at
1163.
311 See B. FELD, supra note 141, 131-69 (analyzing conditions of confinement in juve-
nile training schools); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4 (contending that juvenile
courts effectively "punish" youths and that there is no justification for any procedural
differences between juvenile and adult courts).
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C. BALDASAR, EDMISON, AND THE USE OF PRIOR UNCOUNSELLED
CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE SENTENCES FOR JUVENILES AND
ADULTS
The inclusion of some juvenile delinquency convictions in the
criminal history score of the Minnesota Adult Sentencing Guide-
lines3 1 2 and the impact of previous delinquency dispositions on
present juvenile court sentences raises an additional important is-
sue. Juvenile court judges are influenced by the nature of previ-
ously imposed sentences as well as by a juvenile's prior record
(Table 47). Judges sentencing adult offenders, whether by the
guidelines or on a discretionary basis, also consider juveniles' prior
records of delinquency.3 13 Yet, several federal and state cases-
Baldasar, Tucker, Burgett, Nordstrom, and Edmison-have condemned
the enhancement of a defendant's current sentence on the basis of
prior convictions where the defendant was unrepresented.3 14 The
enhancement of sentences occurs both formally by statute or guide-
line and informally as an exercise of judicial sentencing discretion.
This research demonstrates that many unrepresented juveniles are
routinely adjudicated delinquent and removed from their homes
and incarcerated. It.also shows that those earlier dispositions sub-
stantially influence later ones. Further, it is undoubtedly the case
that many of those unrepresented juveniles who are later tried as
adults will have their prior, uncounselled convictions included in
their adult criminal history scores as well.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission policy deci-
sion to include juveniles' prior records in the adult criminal history
score is correct. 315 Other jurisdictions using sentencing guidelines
312 The Adult Sentencing Guidelines explicitly include the felony convictions of
juveniles aged 16 or older in the adult criminal history score. MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 103, at 22-24. The guidelines provide that:
4. The offender is assigned one point for every two juvenile adjudications for of-
fenses that would have been felonies if committed by an adult, provided that:
a. The juvenile adjudications were pursuant to offenses occurring after the of-
fender's sixteenth birthday;
b. The offender had not attained the age of twenty-one at the time the felony
was committed for which he or she is being currently sentencing [sic]; and
c. No offender may receive more than one point for prior juvenile
adjudications.
Id. at 29.
313 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 231, 144 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1958);
State v. Dainard, 85 Wash. 2d 624, 628, 537 P.2d 760, 762 (1975).
At least some courts have held, without elaboration, that "a juvenile adjudication
[obtained] without counsel is not per se constitutionally infirm," and allowed its use in
subsequent adult sentencing. People v. Covington, 144 Mich. App. 652, 655, 376
N.W.2d 178, 180 (1985). But see supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 86-109 and accompanying text.
315 See Feld, Dismantling Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 4, at 233-37.
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also include a juvenile's prior record of delinquency in the adult
criminal history scorer 16 Having done so, however, both juvenile
and adult sentencing authorities must now confront the reality of
the quality of adjudication in juvenile courts. Both the United
States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have de-
nied juveniles the right to jury trials, contending that a juvenile
court judge's factual determinations are as reliable as those of a
jury.3 17 While this is a dubious equation, it is even more questiona-
ble given the routine absence of counsel in delinquency
proceedings.
If juvenile adjudications are to be used to enhance sentences
for juveniles as juveniles or as adults, then a mechanism must be
developed to assure that only constitutionally obtained prior convic-
tions are considered. Again, automatic and mandatory appointment
of counsel in all cases is the obvious device to assure the validity of
The Sentencing Guidelines Commission's decision to include juvenile felony con-
victions in an adult criminal history score was predicated on several substantial pol-
icy considerations. The commission initially found that including such information
was consistent with existing adult sentencing practices, especially in the urban coun-
ties of the state .... The commission chose to include in the sentencing framework
features of incapacitation, which focus on persistence of criminal activity, as well as
features of 'just deserts," which focus on the seriousness of criminal activity. A
pattern of criminal violations is reliable evidence of persistence, regardless of
whether it occurs while the offender is a juvenile or an adult.
Id. at 234-35. In State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota
Court of Appeals upheld the use ofjuvenile adjudications to enhance the sentence of an
adult defendant. The Court noted that the protections afforded by the Juvenile Court
Act were consistent with the inclusion of juvenile adjudications in the Sentencing
Guidelines.
The legislature has drawn a line between the mistakes of youth that are not repeated
and those which continue into young adulthood. The system punishes only those
offenders who have abused the juvenile court's leniency and then does so only
within the confines and safeguards supplied by the Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines.... The one point limit was deemed consistent with the purpose of including a
juvenile record in the criminal history-to distinguish the young adult felon with no
juvenile record of felony-type behavior from the young adult offender who has a
prior juvenile record of repeated felony-type behavior. The one point limit also was
deemed advisable to limit the impact offindings obtained under a juvenile court procedure
that does not afford the full procedural rights available in adult courts.
Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added). The court in Little expressly noted that in his juvenile
proceedings, Little received the assistance of counsel. Id.
316 See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9721(b) (Purdon 1982); 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(b) (1) (ii) (1984) (juvenile adjudications
may be counted when there was an express finding that the offense constituted a felony
or one of the weapons misdemeanors); Commonwealth v. Bivens, 337 Pa. Super. 216,
218 n.2, 486 A.2d 984, 985 n.2 (1985).
31-7 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1970); In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d
836, 841 (Minn. 1987). The McKeiver decision reflects the Supreme Court's belief that
the quality of juvenile adjudications are the functional equivalent of adult determina-
tions. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (emphasis on factfinding procedures). The correctness
of this equation is highly questionable. See Feld, supra note 2, at 243-66; Feld, Punish-
ment, Treatment, supra note 4.
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the criminal history score. Anything less will subject a juvenile or
young adult's sentence to direct or collateral attack, produce addi-
tional appeals, and impose a wasteful and time-consuming burden
on the prosecution to establish the validity of prior convictions.
Until provisions for the mandatory appointment of counsel are
implemented, however, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Com-
mission should amend the guidelines to create a presumption that
all prior juvenile felony convictions included in the adult criminal
history score were obtained without the assistance of counsel, with
the -burden on the prosecution to establish that such prior convic-
tions were obtained validly. This takes cognizance of the fact that
more than one-third of all juvenile felony convictions were obtained
without counsel (Table 3). It would increase the prosecutor's insti-
tutional interest in juvenile justice administration and provide a
non-judicial mechanism to assure that juveniles charged with felony
offenses were represented and that any waivers of counsel were ade-
quately documented on the record.
D.. REGULATING PRETRIAL DETENTION
The overuse and abuse of pretrial detention is a recurrent
theme in juvenile justice. Although the United States Supreme
Court in Schall v. Martin318 upheld the constitutionality of preven-
tive detention ofjuveniles, as a matter of policy, the types of statutes
approved in Schall and used in Minnesota are deficient and lack any
objective, administrative criteria.319 The virtual absence of mean-
ingful substantive standards for detention and the minimal proce-
dures used to implement them invariably result in the excessive
detention of many juveniles who pose no threat to themselves or
others. 320
Empirical studies in several other jurisdictions report that there
is no apparent rationale to detention decisions. 32' The present
study confirms that there is no discernible legal or substantive ra-
tionale for detention in Minnesota either. Like other studies report-
ing negative effects of pretrial detention on subsequent sentencing,
318 467 U.S. 283 (1984).
319 Schall, 467 U.S. at 268. See generally Feld, supra note 2, at 191-209.
320 Professor Feld noted that:
[t]he lack of statutory standards or criteria about ultimately speculative future be-
havior remits the detention decision to the individual discretion of each judge. As
the [Schall] dissent noted, unstructured discretion both creates the danger that
many juveniles will be detained "erroneously" and fosters arbitrariness, inequality
and discrimination in a process that impinges on fundamental liberty interests.
Feld, supra note 2, at 203-04.
321 See supra notes 187-89, 193-95 and accompanying text.
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this research also confirms the substantial impact of detention on
later dispositions. The regression equations reported in Tables 43-
46 explain only 9% of the variance in detention decisions and the
most influential variable is the sentence imposed later. Analyses of
sentencing decisions indicate that pretrial detention is typically the
second most important determinate of home removal and secure
confinement. Moreover, the analyses suggest some gender and ra-
cial bias in the administration of detention.
Detention constitutes a highly arbitrary and capricious process
of short-term confinement with no tenable or objective rationale.
Once it occurs, however, it then increases the likelihood of addi-
tional post-adjudication sanctions as well. In operation, detention
almost randomly imposes punishment on some juveniles for no ob-
vious reason and then punishes them again for having been pun-
ished before.
An earlier article criticized Minnesota's legislature and
Supreme Court for perpetuating such an unjust process.3 22 The
present research provides additional evidence of the deficiencies of
the current detention statute, the prejudicial and cumulative impact
of detention decisions, and the need for substantive revisions.
There are a number of recommended standards for detention that
the Minnesota Supreme Court and legislature might consider to
limit the scope of detention. The American Bar Association's Juve-
nile Justice Standards Project, for example, recommended that aju-
venile not be detained unless: the youth is charged with a serious
crime of violence which, if proven, would likely result in commit-
ment to a secure facility; the youth is an escapee from an institution
to which he has been previously committed as an adjudicated delin-
quent; or the juvenile will not appear at subsequent proceedings
based on a demonstrated history of prior failures to appear.3 23 Sim-
ilarly, the National Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee recom-
mends detention only "[t]o prevent the juvenile from inflicting
bodily harm on others." 324 Commentators have recommended that
"[c]riteria for detention should be explicit and limited solely to acts
that would be felonies requiring detention if committed by
adults."3 25 In Minnesota (Table 15), the adoption of such criteria
322 See Feld, supra note 2, at 208-09.
323 A.B.A.-I.J.A., INTERIM STATUS, supra note 231, std. 6.6.
324 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM., TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY7
PREVENTION, § 12.7, at 390 (1976) ("A court may not, however, detain a youth simply to
prevent the predicted commission of property offenses.").
325 R. SARRI, supra note 223, at 68 (1974).
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would dramatically reduce the numbers of juveniles detained and,
perhaps, subsequently removed from their homes.
In addition to objective, offense-based detention criteria, court
rules or law should create a presumption against detention of non-
felony offenders with the burden on the proponent to establish both
the need for detention and the exhaustion of all non-secure alterna-
tive placements. When adult defendants are charged with misde-
meanor offenses, for example, the Minnesota rules of criminal
procedure create a presumption for citation in lieu of arrest or de-
tention.3 26 To the extent that female offenders charged with minor
delinquencies and status offenses are disproportionately at risk for
detention and subsequent home removal (Tables 28 and 30), shelter
care alternatives to secure detention are necessary. 327
E. SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILE COURT
Historically, juvenile courts based their dispositional decisions
on an individualized assessment of a youth's "best interests. '3 28 In-
creasingly, however, thC principle of offense and an emphasis on
characteristics of the offense rather than those of the offender domi-
nate juvenile court sentencing decisions. The changes in sentencing
orientation are reflected in legislative changes in juvenile courts'
purpose clauses,3 29 legislative changes in juvenile sentencing stat-
utes, and the adoption by correctional administrators of disposi-
tional guidelines that emphasize proportional and determinate
sentences based on the present offense and prior record and dictate
the length, location, and intensity of ntervention.330 The shift in
emphasis from treatment to punishment is also reflected in the ac-
tual determinants of dispositional decision-making. 33 1
Reflecting the national trend, Minnesota has changed the un-
derlying philosophical premises and sentencing policies in its juve-
nile courts as well. In 1980, the Minnesota Legislature redefined
326 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(1) (1) (a) & (b) (shall issue citations in lieu of arrest or
detention).
327 One hypothesis, which this data cannot address, is that the the greater rates of
detention and home removal of female compared to male juveniles charged with minor
offenses-misdemeanor property offenses, other delinquency and status-reflect a
"family sponsorship" variable. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text. For some
reason, parents of female juveniles charged with minor delinquencies are less willing
than those of male juveniles charged with similar offenses to have the child at home,
either prior to trial or following adjudication.
328 See generally Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4 (analyzing the philosophical
shift from treatment to punishment in juvenile courts).
329 See id
330 Id.
331 See supra notes 157-71 and accompanying text.
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the purpose of its juvenile courts.33 2 Minnesota derived its new
statement of purpose from the juvenile justice Standards which also
recommend determinate sentences which are proportional to the se-
riousness of the offense and jury trials. 333 While Minnesota's new
punitive purpose clause marks a fundamental philosophical depar-
ture from its previous rehabilitative orientation, the legislature did
not provide for a jury trial. 3 34
Although, statutorily, Minnesota is an "indeterminate" sentenc-
ing state,33 5 in 1980, the Minnesota Department of Corrections ad-
332 The relevant provision states that "[t]he purpose of the laws relating to children
alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote public safety and reduce juvenile delin-
quency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by develop-
ing individual responsibility for lawful behavior." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011(2) (West 1982)
(emphasis added). See also A.B.A.-IJ.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO Dis-
POSITIONS, 1.1 (1980). See generally Feld, Dismantling Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 4, at
197-203. The changes in the purpose clause provide a basis upon which courts decide
cases. Thus, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided, as a matter of law, that a juvenile
charged with murder should be tried as an adult on the basis of the amendments to the
purpose clause. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The court noted
that:
the 1980 amendments also reflect a shift in legislative attitude regarding punish-
ment as a goal ofjuvenile courts. Prior to the amendments the stated purpose of
those courts was to secure care and guidance .... Subsequent to the 1980 amend-
ment... [f]or [those] youths charged with the commission of a crime, a more puni-
tive approach is emphasized ....
Id. at 478.
333 A.B.A.-IJ.A., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS, supra note 166, std 5.2;
A.B.A.-I.J.A., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION 4. 1 (a) (1980).
334 See Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 4, at 197-203. Moreover, in
In re the Welfare of K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987), the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that ajuvenile could not voluntarily waive juvenile courtjurisdiction in order
to obtain ajury trial in an adult criminal proceeding. Id. at 842. "The legislature could,
and apparently did, conclude that allowing ajuvenile to waive juvenile court jurisdiction
for some perceived short-term benefit ignores the best interests of the State in address-
ing juvenile problems as well as the overall interests of the juvenile." Id. at 840. As a
result of K.A.A., juveniles are trapped in a procedurally deficient justice system without
any possibility of escape. Cf. F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1937).
335 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (West 1988). In addition to providing the customary
range of dispositional options, however, Minnesota's dispositional statute includes the
following language which was adopted in 1976:
Any order for a disposition authorized under this section shall contain written find-
ings of fact to support the disposition ordered, and shall also set forth in writing the
following information:
(a) why the best interests of the child are served by the disposition ordered; and
(b) what alternative dispositions were considered by the court and why such disposi-
tions were not appropriate in the instant case.
Id.
In In re Welfare of L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), the Minnesota
Court of Appeals interpreted the language to require consideration of "less restrictive
alternatives" and proportionality of sanctions. The court stated:
To measure what is necessary, a trial court must assess two factors, the severity of
the child's delinquency, and the severity of the proposed remedy. When the sever-
ity of intervention is disproportionate to the severity of the problem, the interven-
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ministratively implemented a determinate sentencing plan for
youths committed to the state's juvenile institutions. Based on the
juvenile's present offense and prior record, the plan "provide[s] a
more definite and distinct relationship between the offense and the
amount of time required to bring about positive behavior
change. s33 6 Under the current version of the guidelines, a juve-
nile's projected minimum length of stay, based on the present of-
fense and prior record, is established within seven weeks after
admission to an institution. 337
The departmental decision to implement a determinate sen-
tencing system reflected its concerns with the adequacy and equity
of individualized treatment dispositions.338 Under the Minnesota
tion is not necessary and cannot lawfully occur. The court must take the least
drastic necessary step.
Id. at 398. See also Comment, Minnesota Articulates Standards for Delinquency Disposition, 13
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 247 (1987) (dispositions proportional to seriousness of offense).
336 MINNESOTA DEP'T. OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES 2-3 (1980). It
should be noted, however, that the Department of Corrections Guidelines only apply to
those juveniles committed to the state department of corrections. Minnesota is among
those states where the juvenile court judge determines the nature and location of dispo-
sitions. Minnesota has several hundred private commitment alternatives to the state and
many juvenile courts have assurances from private facilities that they will confine chil-
dren for terms desired by the court. Because the departmental guidelines do not govern
the initial commitment decision, Minnesota effectively has at least eighty-seven different
sets of sentencing practices in addition to the departmental release guidelines.
337 MINNESOTA DEP'T. OF CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE RELEASE § 5-204.4
(1985). The guidelines provide that:
[t]he scheduling of parole consideration reviews shall be based on the severity, re-
cency, and chronicity of thejuvenile's adjudicated offenses according to the grid for
projected length of stay. Using the severity, recency, and chronicity of a juvenile's
offense behavior as a starting point in projecting the length of stay recognizes that
state juvenile correctional facilities are expensive and restrictive facilities, that the
best predictor of future offending is the number of past offenses and that the Min-
nesota Juvenile Code emphasizes public safety as well as treatment.
Id. The actual parole release within the minimum/maximum range is based upon both
the presumptive sentence which reflects aggravating/mitigating factors associated with
the commitment offense, and subsequent institutional conduct including the completion
of an agreed upon treatment plan. Id. at § 5-204.2.
338 An evaluation of commitment/release decision-making in Minnesota's juvenile
correctional institutions prior to the adoption of the guidelines concluded that:
There is no relationship between the juvenile's offense and the disposition of his
case at either the State Training School or the Minnesota Home School.
Status offenders stay slightly longer in the institution than serious offend-
ers .... Juveniles at the State Training School stay longer than juveniles at the other
two institutions.
All in all, there are no consistent or systematic criteria used in making decisions
about whether or not to institutionalize and when to parole juveniles.
D. CHEIN, DECISION MAKING IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS 1 (1976). See also
Wheeler,Juvenile Sentencing and Public Policy: Beyond Counterdeterrence, 4 POL'y ANALYSIS 33,
44 (1978) (length of stay based on the institution to which committed)[hereinafter Be-
yond Counterdeterrence]. Wheeler reports that:
[t]he juvenile sentencing structure is a paradox. Each institution in this study ap-
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Department of Corrections sentencing guidelines, a juvenile's
length of stay is based on the severity of the most serious offense
committed and the weight of "risk of failure" factors that are "pre-
dictive to some degree of future delinquent behavior."3 39 The re-
cidivism risk factors included in the juvenile release guidelines are
prior felony adjudications and probation and parole failures.
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines for adult offenders, which
are explicitly punitive and expressly designed to achieve "just
deserts" rely on similar factors. The "purpose and principles" sec-
tion of Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guidelines specifically men-
tions severity of the offense and past criminal history as factors in
determining sentencing.340 The adult guidelines also add points to
the sentencing scale whenever the defendant committed the offense
while on probation or parole. 341
peared to have operationalized a sentencing procedure that often discriminated
against the youngest age group, the least serious offender, and the white offender in
long-term, "treatment-oriented" facilities. But generally, the institutional decision-
making process that determined release appeared more random than deliberate.
The data illustrate the absence of discrimination in release criteria with regard to
offense at commitment. The fact that felony offenders were treated equally or less
strictly than status and non-felony offenders resulted in disproportionately heavy
application of correctional resources on youngsters who were the least threat to the
community.
G. WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE SENTENCING AND EFFECTS
OF PRISONIZATION 44 (1978) [hereinafter COUNTER-DETERRENCE].
Chein's study found that commitment and release decisions in Minnesota were so
"individualized" that no factors explained the institutional staffs' handling of different
youths. D. CHEIN, supra, at 35. There was no relationship between the most serious
offenses in juveniles' files and their dispositions. Id. at 33. The most significant variable
affecting the length of youths' incarceration was the institution to which they were com-
mitted. Id. at 37.
This finding is consistent with studies in other jurisdictions which also reported that
within a nominally "indeterminate" juvenile sentencing system, incarcerated youths
serve "fixed sentences" based on the institutions to which they are committed. E.g., G.
WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE, supra, at 39; Wheeler, Beyond Counterdeterrence, supra, at
45. Wheeler notes that "[t]he particular institution to which the male offender was as-
signed appears to be more important in determining length of stay than the offender's
social characteristics or offense." G. WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE, supra, at 40. The
study concludes that a pattern of uniformity in sentences, rather than individualized dif-
ferentiation, prevails in such institutions. Id. at 41. Wheeler further notes that:
[T]he "institutional effect ... is more random than deliberate. While release prac-
tices in individual institutions tended to discriminate against whites, the youngest
age group, and the least serious offenders, these differences were nullified by dis-
parity observed in mean stay for each of these groups when we controlled for insti-
tutional assignment. In this instance, institutional assignment emerges as more
important in terms of predicting length of incarceration than the offender's social
characteristics or offense.
Id.
339 See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 336, at 7.
340 MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY 1.2 (1983).
341 Id. at II.B.2.
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Apparently, some of Minnesota's juvenile courts are using de-
terminate sentencing guidelines as well.3 42 In In re D.S.F., 43 the ju-
venile received a ninety-day sentence of incarceration for an assault.
In rejecting a less restrictive alternative disposition, the trial court
asserted that confinement was required because "a specific conse-
quence was necessary to impress upon D.S.F. the seriousness of his
behavior." 344
While the majority in D.S.F. concluded that the disposition was
within the broad sentencing discretion that juvenile courts enjoy,3 45
the dissent characterized it as "a purely offense-based determinate
sentence of incarceration as a largely predetermined consequence
for a serious assault. '346 Judge Crippen's dissent in D.S.F. correctly
perceived that determinate sentencing strikes at the very heart of
the traditional juvenile court.3 47 Judge Crippen suggested that pu-
nitive juvenile sentencing practices posed three alternative options:
restructuring juvenile courts to fit their original rehabilitative pur-
pose; extending to juveniles all of the procedural safeguards af-
forded to adults in criminal cases; 348 or abolishing juvenile courts
342 See In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Crippen,J., dissent-
ing). "[I]t is evident that a determinate sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial
court was prompted by unpublished sentencing guidelines, based singularly on the of-
fense committed, and not by the spontaneous exercise of discretion by the presiding
judge." Id. at 779 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Judge Crippen further noted that cases in
which the sentence is based on the type of offense, "we are dealing here with a criminal
justice sentence, not a juvenile court disposition aimed at doing what is best for the
individual. The juvenile has been ordered incarcerated for a definite term as part of a
predetermined sentencing practice." Id. at 780 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
343 416 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
344 Id. at 774
345 Id.
346 Id. at 775 (Crippen, J., dissenting) ("[The sentence was chosen based solely on
the occurrence of a serious offense... and acceptance by the trial court of a settled local
court sentencing practice.").
347 Judge Crippen's analysis noted that:
[d]eliberate acceptance of offense-based determinate sentencing categorically belies
the promises which are the foundation for the 1971 due process analysis of the
United States Supreme Court [in McKeiver]. Appellate affirmation of criminal jus-
tice sentencing in the juvenile court unravels the rationale underlying the equal
protection analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court [in In re KA.A.]. A system
already on the brink of its demise is pushed still closer to a long postponed day of
reckoning.
416 N.W.2d at 777 (Crippen,J., dissenting).
348 D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 777 (Crippen, J., dissenting) ("Can American law suffer
criminal justice sentencing in a court which denies criminal law safeguards for the ac-
cused?"). Judge Crippen noted two fundamental procedural deficiencies in juvenile jus-
tice administration: "the demonstrated need for jury trials in accusatory proceedings
where juveniles may be incarcerated, and the additional need for representation by com-
petent counsel in every case where ajuvenile is faced with incarceration." Id. (Crippen,
J., dissenting). See also notes 349-51 infra and accompanying text.
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altogether. 349 While Judge Crippen was reluctant to acknowledge
his "ultimate disillusionment" with the juvenile court experiment
and endorse the third alternative, neither could he subscribe to the
majority's approval of punitive sentences without criminal proce-
dural safeguards. 350
Earlier, this Article summarized the research literature on de
facto sentencing practices in juvenile court.35' The data reported in
this Article support the two principal findings which emerge from
that research literature: a juvenile's present offense, prior record,
and previous sentences account for most of the variance in disposi-
tions that can be explained; and after controlling for the legal vari-
ables, discretionary individualization may be synonymous with a
variety of inequalities based on race, gender or simple geography.
Clearly, the seriousness of a juvenile's offense substantially al-
ters the sentence imposed. For the state overall, and in the counties
with high, medium, and low rates of representation, juveniles
charged with a felony offense against the person consistently have
the highest rates of out-of-home placement and secure confinement,
followed by those charged with a felony offense against the property
and then with a minor offense against person (Table 6). Thus, the
principle of offense and proportionality in dispositions influences
judicial decision-making. Likewise, the length of a juvenile's prior
record strongly influences dispositional decision-making. There is a
direct, linear relationship between additional referrals and the se-
verity of the eventual sentence. Regardless of the seriousness of the
present offense, of those juveniles with five or more prior referrals,
nearly two-thirds are removed from their homes and nearly half are
incarcerated (Table 12). Within each offense category, the same lin-
ear relationship between additional offenses and increased severity
of dispositions prevails (Table 12). Similarly, the regression equa-
tions identified the legal variables-previous sentence, offense se-
verity, and prior record-as the most influential determinants of a
juvenile's present disposition (Table 47). In general, the severity of
the sentence imposed upon a juvenile on a previous occasion ex-
349 See id. (Crippen, J., dissenting). Judge Crippen concluded that:
we could call for dismantling a system that openly exacts from our younger citizens
a sacrifice of liberties and gives in return a false promise to serve the best interests
of those who come before it. The federal and state constitutions do not permit a
criminal justice system without criminal justice safeguards .... Can we accept as
merely unfortunate a system meting out punishment without fundamental constitu-
tional safeguards?
Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting).
350 Id. at 777 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
351 See supra notes 157-71 and accompanying text. See also Feld, Punishment, Treatment,
supra note 4.
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plains more of the variance in dispositions than virtually all of the
other variables combined.
To the extent that juvenile justice administration can be ratio-
nalized, the traditional principles of adult criminal law provide the
appropriate framework. While there are substantial variations in
sentencing that cannot be explained simply by the legal variables,
these factors account for most of what can be explained. Within the
limits of this research and data, the other variables that consistently
appear to influence judges' decisions are ajuvenile's pretrial deten-
tion status, representation status, gender, and, perhaps, race. Aju-
venile's pretrial detention status has a consistently substantial and
negative effect on subsequent sentencing (Tables 17, 47-50), as
does the presence of an attorney on behalf of a juvenile. This study
also reports that a somewhat larger proportion of black juveniles
charged with felony offenses received more severe sentences than
did white juveniles in Hennepin County, and that this disparity
probably resulted from a difference in the rates of pretrial detention
due to a juvenile's race (Tables 22-26). The regression equations
also identified a small racial component in the initial detention deci-
sion (Table 51) and the later decision to remove a youth from his or
her home (Table 52). The impact of "status" and process vari-
ables-pretrial detention, representation, and possibly being female
or a member of a racial minority-on sentencing raises serious
concerns.
If, in fact, the legal variables already strongly influence juvenile
court judges' sentencing decisions, it is time to formalize the dispo-
sition process through the adoption of sentencing guidelines to reg-
ularize the commitment and release, and durational decisions. The
rationale for the Adult Sentencing Guidelines is "to reduce sentenc-
ing disparity by providing recommendations" governing both the
decision to incarcerate and the length of confinement.352 The Sen-
tencing Guidelines Commission's research found some evidence of
both racial disparities and regional disparities in the sentencing of
offenders.3 53 This research reports similar non-systematic racial,
gender, and geographic disparities in the administration ofjuvenile
justice as well.
The adoption of administrative criteria or sentencing guidelines
to structure the disposition ofjuveniles does not require sentencing
them just like adults. An increasing number of jurisdictions have
adopted determinate and proportional sentencing guidelines to
352 MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 103, at 13.
353 Id. at 5.
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structure dispositional practices in juvenile courts.3 54 It is highly
desirable that young offenders survive adolescence with their life
chances intact and this goal is threatened by the draconian
sentences frequently inflicted on eighteen year old "adults." Devel-
opmental differences render youths less culpable or criminally re-
sponsible than their adult counterparts.3 55 The common law mens
rea infancy defense and "diminished responsibility" doctrines pro-
vide a conceptual justification for shorter sentences for juveniles.356
Shorter sentences for reduced culpability is a much more modest
justification and attainable goal for the juvenile courts than those
advanced by the Progressive childsavers. Principles of determinacy
and proportionality, however, recognize the legal and punitive reali-
ties ofjuvenile court intervention. Acknowledging the punitive real-
ity of the contemporary juvenile court, however, carries with it a
concomitant obligation to provide appropriate procedural safe-
guards, most notably the effective assistance of counsel.
354 See Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4 (summarizing recent legislative and
administrative changes in juvenile court sentencing practices).
355 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988) (constitution bars capital pun-
ishment for fifteen-year-old offender because of lesser culpability).
356 See F. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 66-67 (1978); Feld, supra note 2, at
275; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4; Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11
WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 664-74 (1970); McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility
in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 181, 214-16 (1977); Walkover, The
Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 533-47 (1984); Weissman,
Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60 DEN. LJ. 485, 495-501 (1983).
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